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PREFACE 
Man's fascination with flight has been well recorded 
in art, myths, and religious writings for well over 3,500 
years. Modern aviation began with the flights of the 
Wright Brothers in the early 1900s. Unfortunately, there 
were many accidents as the art and science of flight 
developed. Public concern about accidents and their causes 
is very strong. This concern has created a process of 
aviation accident investigation and the teaching of the 
skills required to carry out this process. 
Aviation accident investigation is a very technical 
undertaking. Finding the probable cause of aviation 
accidents has been an important part of the development of 
a safe air transportation system. However, there is also a 
social need of finding fault associated with the 
investigation process. Finding fault is a necessary 
element of litigation which is often associated with 
accidents. 
This social need created the requirement for higher 
quality and clearer factual presentation of the events 
surrounding accidents. It also created conflicts during 
the investigation process when the technical probable cause 
seekers hindered the social, fault finding process. Laws, 
regulations, and the aviation accident investigation school 
curriculums did not address these conflicts. 
By restricting the scope of this study to the US, the 
content and recommendations have application to the 
aviation accident investigation system in America. 
Addressed is the legal system's use of aviation accident 
investigation reports. The research confirmed the need for 
changes in the teaching, execution and government 
regulation of the aviation accident investigation process. 
It was only through the cooperation of the academic 
community and organizations which taught accident 
investigation subjects that much of this material was 
accumulated. 
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Aviation accident investigators, both current and 
retired, were sources of many technical aspects of this 
study. Members of the government, military, FAA and NTSB, 
plus the legal community, offered input to the social 
aspects of the study. These three groups were furnished 
draft copies of this reset as it progressed, and reviewed 
its Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations. Their 
comments and suggestions were incorporated into the 
research. 
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Dr. Deke Johnson who provided guidance from a non-aviation 
viewpoint; arid Dr. David Wepster, his experience as a 
writer and educator was very helpful. These people worked 
as a team to guide me through this research which covered 
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There are many others to whom I owe special thanks, 
such as the faculty and staff of the Department of 
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Department of Aviation and Space Education, and the OSU 
administrative staff with whom I have had contact. Their 
help and encouragement have been of great assistance. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Study 
This research is a study of the conflicts that existed 
between the technical and social aspects of the aviation 
accident investigation process. The act of "flying" is an 
unusual combination of physical and physiological sciences 
which must be understood and followed to maintain an 
acceptable level of safety. Since the days of the first 
flights, aircraft accident investigation has played an 
important role in the development of the art, science, and 
mechanics of aviation (Dorman, 1976). 
In the early years of aviation, 1903 through the mid 
1930s, aircraft crashes were fairly common and seemed to be 
an acceptable and necessary part of the development of 
aviation (Walsh, 1975). When crashes occurred, the early 
inventors were anxious to learn what had happened, so that 
their next efforts at flying might not end in a similar 
fashion. Material failures were the most common causes of 
accidents, but the human factor, the pilot very often 
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played a critical role in determining the likelihood of 
accomplishing a successful flight (Josephy, 1962). 
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The early flights of the Wright Brothers and others 
were measured in seconds. The altitudes they reached were 
eight to ten feet and their speeds were usually less than 
20 miles per hour (Vivan, 1921). Under these 
circumstances, most crashes did not result in any broken 
bones, only broken aircraft, broken hopes, and sometimes 
broken pride. It was not until 1908, when Selfridge was 
killed at Ft. Myer, VA, that a death occurred due to a 
powered aircraft accident. This event resulted in the 
first formal aviation accident investigation in the United 
States (US). The investigation process took only about six 
hours to complete (Squier, 1908). Because these early 
aviation accidents did not involve "the public," there was 
little interest in accident investigation outside the 
immediate aviation community. 
As time went by, aviation in America grew, and the 
barnstorming age brought the magic of flight to thousands 
of people (Ward, 1953). Unfortunately, some of these 
flights ended in tragic accidents, with innocent non-
aviators being injured or killed. These accidents resulted 
in public demand for safer aircraft, pilots and some form 
of control over all aviation activities. 
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Also required were changes to America's justice system 
in order to resolve the many new legal issues that aviation 
activities created. For example, when aviation accidents 
took place and the public sought compensation for its 
losses, they found a void in the laws that should have been 
protecting them from this new science of flight (McNair, 
1930). This was the foundation for the support of new laws 
(Farlow, Hotchkiss, Knauth, and Miles, 1929) to govern 
these magnificent men and their flying machines. 
In response to industry and public requests, the first 
aviation laws on a national level were enacted in 1926 (Air 
Commerce Act). Soon afterwards, official government 
investigations of non-military aviation accidents began to 
take place (Young, 1931). The initial and primary purpose 
of the aviation accident investigation process was to 
prevent future accidents by learning as much as possible 
about each accident that had occurred (Dorman). 
By the late 1930s, aviation was beginning to mature, 
and the skill levels of aircraft accident investigators 
were also being perfected (Dorman). As stated in the Civil 
Aeronautics Administration's (CAA) 1953 manual, Aircraft 
Design Through Service Experience, much of the development 
of air travel, "is a result of the lessons learned by these 
investigators from previous accidents" (p. iii). 
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At the end of World War II, the aviation industry had 
reached a level of design and manufacturing that could 
produce the aircraft, supporting hardware and facilities 
needed for a modern air transportation system. With the 
advent of the jet age, the safety level of air travel 
reached a point far above what had previously taken place. 
Considering the high frequency rate at which aircraft took 
off and landed, air travel had certainly become a very safe 
means of transportation (Matthews, 1995). The basis for 
this level of safety was acquired from the lessons learned 
during government accident investigations conducted over 
the past 70 years (Miller, 1994). 
Background of the Problem 
As the aviation industry matured, its safety record 
reached a level where the public began to accept traveling 
in an airplane as a normal activity that had high national 
value (Truman, 1947). From the early 1960s, when less than 
20 percent of the public had flown, (M.K. Hynes, 1967) to 
the mid 1990s, when over 75 percent of the American public 
had flown, millions of take offs and landings were being 
made without incident (Pena, 1995). Aviation accidents, at 
least those of major airlines, were so infrequent that they 
were considered "random events" by some government 
'officials and NTSB accident investigators (R. Scheedle, 
personal communication, June 19, 1992). 
The technology of aviation became so well developed, 
that the reliability of the equipment being used reached a 
level where design defects or material failures were no 
longer considered the major causes of accidents. Much of 
this development was the result "of the lessons learned 
from investigating accidents," (Copeland, 1937, p. 2). 
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This trend had been taking place for 30 years, and had been 
fairly stable for eight years (Taylor, 1990). The human 
factor was now accounting for approximately 60 to 80 
percent of all aviation accidents (Reingold, 1994). 
Unless a major or politically sensitive accident was 
being investigated, the investigation process had become a 
routine activity (Waldock, 1992). This expectation, on the 
part of government investigators, resulted in work 
activities that detracted from the quality of their reports 
(Wolk, 1993). The question could be raised, Are aviation 
accident investigators becoming conditioned by these 
statistics and trends? Were government and private 
computer data bases on accident factors becoming distorted 
because of the input of incorrect information? 
A social concept, common in the US but rooted in old 
English law, was the undertaking of "tort litigation." 
This was the legal remedy available to someone who had 
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suffered because of the acts (or failure to act) by another 
party (Black, 1991). When an aircraft accident happened, a 
"loss" to someone, called a plaintiff, usually occurred. 
Personal injury, death and/or ~oss or damage to property 
are characteristics of all aviation accidents. Under the 
legal concept of res ipsa loquitur, (the thing speaks for 
itself,) claims for damages could be made when accidents 
took place. To obtain justice within all legal systems, a 
plaintiff must be able to prove their claim against the 
alleged party responsible for the loss, called a defendant. 
This must be accomplished before the law will allow a 
plaintiff to receive compensation from the "wrongdoer" 
defendant (Madole, 1987). 
"Proving the claim" invariably required factual 
evidence concerning the accident. Under the government 
controlled system of aviation accident investigation, only 
the NTSB, and the parties that the NTSB designated to join 
in the investigation, were allowed access to accident sites 
(49 CFR, Part 800, 1994). Theoretically, all of the 
factual evidence collected during the investigation process 
would be made public. This usually occurred about 14 months 
after the accident when the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) released it's Form 6120.4, "Factual Report of 
Aviation Accident/ Incident." 
7 
Questions had been raised by M.K. Hynes (1990), 
Waldock (1992), Wolk (1993), and others about the 
timeliness and the quality, (accuracy and content) of NTSB 
reports. These writers had shown that the biases of the 
investigators who conducted the investigation, and the 
influence of the parties whom the NTSB utilized during its 
factual investigation process, created quality problems and 
conflicts in the preparation of NTSB accident reports. 
If by oversight or on purpose, the data collected or 
used by the NTSB contained errors, when the public was 
given access to this data, it did not serve the needs of 
the interested parties (Shipman 1992, Wolk). To add to 
this problem, in the early 1990s, additional steps were 
taken to restrict public access to government acquired 
factual data on aviation accidents. Such a restriction 
resulted from the Iowa District Court ruling during the Air 
Crash at Sioux City litigation (Re., 1991). The passage by 
Congress of other restrictive legislation in 1992 expanded 
this limitation concept into the area of military accident 
investigations (Public Law 102-396). 
The policies and procedures which impacted aviation 
accident investigations, seemed to reflect the teachings of 
aviation accident investigation schools and appeared to 
follow a very narrow tradition. This tradition was based 
on seeking technical information to determine "probable 
cause", the final objective of all publicly released, 
government aviation accident reports (NTSB, 1992). 
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However, by the early 1990s, the major use of these reports 
was to fulfill the requirement to prove "fault" when 
seeking relief under the US legal system of torts (Miller, 
1993). The terms, probable cause and fault, have very 
different meanings in a court of law (Black). Thus, 
conflicts existed between the technical motivation (finding 
probable cause) and the social motivation (finding fault) 
of the aviation accident investigation process. These 
conflicts resulted in a diminishing of the quality of 
aviation accident investigation efforts and reports. 
Most instructors of aviation accident investigation 
schools were former military, Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) or NTSB employees who taught the 
policies and philosophies they had learned and worked under 
prior to entering an academic institution to teach this 
subject (Transportation Safety Institute [TSI] 1990). For 
40 years, since the formation of the first formal aviation 
accident investigation school in California in the early 
1950s, there had been little or no change in the 
philosophies being taught at these schools. 
As pointed out in Legal Breakdown (Elias, Randolph, 
Repa, & Warner, 1990), with the increasing trend of 
litigation in America, the need for rapid access to correct 
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and complete factual data was critical. The teaching of 
the art and science of aviation accident investigation, 
especially as it addressed, or failed to address, conflicts 
between the technical and social needs of this activi~y, 
was considered important. 
As discussed by Transportation Secretary Pena in an 
aviation trade journal (Lavitt, 1995), there had been a 
continuing public interest in maintaining a high level of 
safety within the air transportation system. The aviation 
accident investigation process was a key factor in 
achieving that goal. Therefore, the quality and usefulness 
of aviation accident reports was important to the public. 
Based on the trends in litigation, and the government's 
policy of limiting access to aviation accident sites, the 
conflict between technical and social needs of the 
investigation process was becoming more critical. 
Statement of the Problem 
Conflicts exist between the technical and social 
aspects of the aviation accident investigation process. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research was to identify, 
document, and analyze the conflicts that existed between 
the technical and social aspects of the aviation accident 
10 
investigation process. The results of the research would 
then be brought to the attention of the institutions that 
taught aviation accident investigation courses and to the 
government agencies that conducted and controlled aviation 
accident investigations. 
Overview of the Study 
This study traced the development of aviation and the 
aviation accident investigation process from the early 
1900s to the mid 1990s. The goals of an aviation accident 
investigation, both technical and social, were examined. 
This was accomplished by researching how aircraft accident 
investigation schools were formed; how investigators were 
trained; how investigations were conducted; and how 
investigation findings were used. 
This latter issue--how investigation findings were 
used--was the motivation for this research. The public's 
perception of the lack of quality of the NTSB's 
investigations had become an issue in the 1990s. The 
public was demanding a safer air transportation system and 
seeking compensation through the courts whenever th.e 
aviation system failed to maintain an acceptable level of 
safety. 
With the knowledge gained as a result of this 
research, the aviation community, both civilian and 
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government, could become more aware of the technical and 
social aspects of the aviation accident investigation 
process. Openly discussing these conflicts would encourage 
debate on the need for changes to the existing accident 
investigation system. In this manner, legal and 
philosophical improvements could be made to enhance the 
value of aviation accident investigation techniques and 
reports. Improvements to the existing system would better 
meet the needs of society. 
The results of the study were presented to allow 
discussion of the findings and recommendations contained 
therein. It was hoped that this would result in 
improvements to the present aviation accident investigation 
system and in the teaching of this activity. By doing so, 
the value of the findings of these investigations might be 
increased. 
Limitations of the Study 
There were several limitations to this study. First 
of all, the data and the problem were related only to 
activities in the US. While similar conflicts of the 
aviation accident investigation process existed in other 
countries, they were not addressed in this study. However, 
for historical reasons, some reference was made to 
activities outside the US. 
The second limitation of the study was that most of 
the reviewed literature had been written by people within 
the system which was being called to question. This may 
have resulted in an imbalance of the discussion of the 
conflicts between the technical and social needs of the 
users of aviation accident reports. 
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The third limitation was the strong influence of the 
government, both civil and military, on aviation policy and 
training. The first aviation laws required military 
officers to "do a tour of duty" within newly created 
government agencies. In the late 1930s, the government 
sponsored a Civilian Pilot Training program (CPT). This 
became the CAA War Training Command during World War II. 
It organized and trained the aviation expertise which had 
governed the policies of aviation ever since. The 
following generations of aviation administrators, 
technicians and pilots mirrored the philosophies and work 
habits of these military trained experts. 
A fourth limitation of the study was that few 
organizations offered training in aircraft accident 
investigation. Limitation number five, was the small 
number of instructors who were qualified and available to 
teach at these schools (Embry Riddle Aeronautical 
University [ERAU], 1992). These instructors, by training, 
age, and experience, shared common views on many aspects of 
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the aviation accident investigation process. It was very 
natural for them to continue teaching what was historically 
always done during previous investigations. By human 
nature, they might be expected to resist any suggestion 
that social needs, as well as technical needs, should be 
considered during the aviation accident investigation 
process. 
A fina1 and important limitation of this study was a 
strong "anti-litigation" bias that existed in much general 
public interest (Elias et al) and technical literature in 
the field of aviation (A. Lewis, 1993). Non-airline 
aircraft production in the US was less than 500 units in 
1994 (FAA Aviation News, 1994). In the mid 1960s, annual 
production rates were in excess of 17,800 aircraft 
(Bulkeley, 1993). This decline in production was blamed on 
product liability litigation and monetary judgments against 
aircraft manufacturers (Tripp, 1993). 
The content of much of the aviation literature seemed 
to reflect this bias. Because of this, a large segment of 
the aviation community, including aviation accident 
investigators, had no interest in considering the merits of 
making any changes to the accident investigation process 
that might prove helpful to potential plaintiffs or the 
litigation process (Miller, 1992). 
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For these reasons, it is possible that some of the 
recommendations may not be welcomed by the aviation 
community. If history repeats itself, perhaps the needed 
changes to the aviation accident investigation process 
would come in response to the needs of the public, and not 
from either the aviation community or the legal profession. 
Assumptions 
The following assumptions were made: 
(1) that the organizations and academic institutions that 
offer Aircraft Accident Investigation training 
programs were identified and successfully contacted; 
(2) that the information furnished in school catalogs and 
course outlines on Aviation Accident Investigation 
programs was accurate and complete; 
(3) that respondents to written, or personal contacts 
expressed their views fully and in a truthful manner; 
(4) that to the public, the technical (probable cause) and 
social (finding fault) needs of the aviation accident 
investigation process have equal merit. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND OTHER ACTIVITIES 
Introduction 
In tracing the evolution of mankind, researchers have 
concluded that first man crawled upon the earth; then he 
learned how to walk upright; then he tamed wild animals to 
the point where he could ride upon them. Next, the wheel 
was invented and harnessed to an animal. Later, as 
technology developed, the animal was replaced by a motor or 
engine. From this crude beginning, man's desire to travel 
further and faster has brought forth new and different 
means of transportation. During this same time span, man 
had been fascinated by the concept of flight which was 
considered the ultimate mode of travel (Rotor, 1991). 
If one reviewed ancient history from many parts of the 
world, it would be apparent that man has nad a strong 
interest in flight for thousands of years. This interest 
was reflected in art, myths, songs, and religious beliefs 
dating back to at least 3,500 BC. It should not be 
surprising that history has recorded many attempts of man 
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trying to fly. These efforts ultimately led to the 
invention of "flying machines." Perhaps in no other science 
except aeronautics had the dreams of man remained so strong 
for such a long period of time. These dreams were still 
driving man in 1994 as he tried to fly further into space 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 
1994) . 
By the late 1800s, glider flights were being conducted 
in Europe, North and South America, and in other foreign 
lands (Ward). Once lightweight gasoline engines were 
invented, powered flight began (Walsh). The experiments of 
the Wright Brothers, from 1903 through 1908, were 
considered by many to be among the earliest such activities 
( Josephy) . 
In the beginning years of flight, air crashes were 
fairly common and seemed to be an acceptable outcome of 
attempts to fly. Investigations of these accidents played 
an important role in the development of the art, science 
and mechanics of flight. As aviation matured, the use of 
aircraft became more common and accide.nts were no longer an 
acceptable risk of air travel. In response to public 
concern over aviation safety, in 1926 the federal 
government began regulating aviation activities and 
investigating accidents as a means of improving safety (Air 
Commerce Act). 
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The initial goal of accident investigation was to meet 
technical needs, that is documenting causes of accidents. 
In this manner, improvements were made to materials, 
designs, fabrication methods and support systems; such as 
radio communication, navigation, training, airports, and 
weather reporting (Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938). 
However, in the 1990s, the results of government 
investigations were not primarily being used to improve 
aviation safety. The social needs of accident 
investigation, that is to determine fault, had become the 
most sought after information (Miller, 1993; Wolk). 
This change, from technical to social needs, created 
conflicts in the teaching and carrying out of aviation 
accident investigations. These tasks were of great 
importance to public safety. The NTSB stated in its Fiscal 
Year 1994 Budget, "the Safety Board's independent 
investigative role is essential to the Board satisfying the 
public's demand for [a safe aviation system]" (p. 101). 
The review of the literature begins with the 
development of flight, from man's early interests to 1994. 
This is followed by reviewing the data on the use of 
accident information to develop and perfect technologies 
that were being used to carry out successful flight 
activities such as aircraft structures, engines and 
aviation support systems. It also addressed the public's 
reaction to flight and concern with threats to public 
safety as a result of aviation activities. This concern 
was reflected in the actions taken by government 
organizations which responded to the public's desire for 
aviation safety. The government's response to public 
concern was the creation of laws or policies which were 
designed to ensure the welfare of its citizens. Also 
reviewed were the aviation industry's responses to the 
public's interest in aviation accident investigations. 
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The research identified the various academic 
institutions, military organizations, government agencies, 
and commercial businesses that operated schools or 
conducted formal courses on the art and science of Aviation 
Accident Investigation. Data from these organizations was 
collected and analyzed for course objectives, content, and 
any administrative factors that might have been of 
significance to the study, such as limitations on who could 
attend various schools. The review then discussed the 
social needs, or legal aspects of the aviation accident 
investigation process. Information on the conflicts and 
quality problems that existed during the investigation 
process were then documented. 
In this manner, the conflicts between the technical 
and social needs of aviation accident investigations became 
obvious. The existence of conflicts was measured by 
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reviewing the content of aviation legal decisions, trade 
journals, newspapers, public speeches by leaders of the 
aviation community, and other similar sources of 
information that addressed this subject. 
The summary of the research recaps the factors which 
had created the conflicts between the technical and social 
needs of aviation accident investigations. The "findings" 
were intended to provide the reader with a logical basis 
for understanding the aviation accident investigation 
system as it existed in early 1995. It supported the 
recommendation that changes were.needed in the philosophies 
being taught and used by aircraft accident investigators, 
and in the laws and government policies that regulated this 
activity. 
Rand, a well-known author and lecturer, stated that a 
full and complete understanding of history should help us 
to be able to realize what factors influenced the 
development of society as we now see it. Rand said, 
The study of history is important when trying to 
determine why certain events took place ... It is 
important that any study of history cover a large 
enough time period so that one can see a true 
trend within the events that seem to be taking 
place. Perhaps what I am seeing is a fad, or the 
result of unusual events ... to really understand 
man's actions, I must know what preceded his 
visible acts that I am looking at. History must 
be studied from a long term perspective" (Rand 
quoted by Peikoff, 1985). 
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Since one of the factors studied in this research was 
aviation and how it developed, a review of aviation history 
literature was selected as the starting point. 
Aviation History 
As Taylor and Munson stated in History of Aviation, 
the "image of the winged object ... repeats itself the world 
over, in the legends and folk stories of many nations for 
many centuries" (1972, pg. 9). At various times during 
history, man looked up into the sky "to envy the flying 
bird soaring freely overhead" (Ward, p. 10). This might 
have been more than envy. "Perhaps man only sought to 
escape from the wild creatures of that time period; 
creatures which desired to eat both man and bird" (M.K. 
Hynes, 1991, p. 8). 
Aviation is a modern undertaking, less than 100 years 
old. However, the fascination and interest among mankind 
about the concept of flight had been well documented for 
several thousand years. The "dream of human flight is 
displayed throughout art, myths and religion" (Ward, p. 
10). In about 3,500 BC, Babylonian artists had carved into 
stone the story of Etana, the shepherd who flew on the 
wings of eagles. In the history and culture of ancient 
Japan, the War-God Maris, and in China, the flying chariot 
of Ki-Kung-Shi are mentioned. The Persian King Kai Ka'us, 
in 1,500 BC, had a "Flying Throne" (Ward). In Greek 
mythology, and halfway around the world, in Peruvian 
writings of the Inca civilization, myths existed about 
Kings who flew (Vivan, pp. 8-9). On every continent 
records of "flight" by special men or gods can be found. 
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The invention of a kite, large enough to support the 
weight of a man, was technically possible more than 2,000 
years ago in China or Southeast Asia (Boyne, 1987). Even 
the Bible, both in the old and new Testaments, included 
many references to flight. Based on these widespread 
literary discoveries, it was obvious that man, from the 
first moments of recorded history, had an intense interest 
in flight. Considering the diversity of locations and 
social cultures that have had depiction's of flight in 
their art, myths, songs and religious literature, the 
interest in flight can be considered universal. 
By the early 1500s, da Vinci was writing about the 
concept of flight from a more scientific viewpoint, but his 
writings were not made public for several hundred years 
(Richter, 1970). In about 1670, the writings of Lana, from 
Spain, included some material on flight which also 
reflected a high level of scientific research (Vivan). 
Perhaps Lana foresaw the social impact of flight when he 
wrote, "God would surely never allow such a machine to be 
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successful, since it would create many disturbances in the 
civil and political governments of mankind" (Vivan, p. 31). 
On the South American continent, in the very early 
18th century, de Gusmao, a Brazilian, was also conducting 
aeronautical studies and may have made a birdlike model 
that glided (Boyne). The earliest official record of 
"flight" was the Montgolfier brothers, who on June 4, 1783, 
near Lyon, France, built and flew in their balloon (Boyne). 
Many other examples could be cited to prove this unbroken 
chain of man's interest in aeronautics for several thousand 
years. 
Moving to the beginnings of "modern" aviation, by the 
late 1800s, more formal and organized interests in 
aeronautical matters were appearing. For example, the 
Royal Aeronautical Society of Great Britain (RAeS) was 
founded in 1866 (Josephy). In America, the Aerial 
Experiment Association was founded in 1903 by Dr. and Mrs. 
Bell and others, including Army Lt. Selfridge (Ward). In 
France, the Federation Aeronautique International (FAI), 
the world's oldest, still in existence aviation 
organization, was formed in 1905 (Burnham, 1977). The Aero 
Club of America was also formed in the same year to promote 
the safe, scientific development of aviation in America. 
The club actually certified pilots and issued flying 
licenses some 20 years before the federal government's 
activities in this area. (Robie, 1993). These 
organizations acted as clearing houses for technical 
aeronautical writings. They also published detailed 
information on experiments that were being conducted. In 
some cases they funded design efforts which were then 
freely exchanged from one inventor to another, as was 
common practice at that time. 
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To most Americans, the phrases "flight" and "Wright 
Brothers" were strongly connected and implied that the 
Wrights' efforts in the early 1900s were the beginning of 
the modern era of flight. However, a study of early 
aeronautical history, which includes activities connected 
with kites, balloons, gliders, helicopters and airplanes, 
"shows an amazing parallel of efforts among many people, at 
far apart locations, all taking place at the same time" 
(M.K. Hynes, 1991, p. 13). In all cases, the lack of a 
small, lightweight engine was the delaying factor to 
accomplish powered flight (Combs, 1979). 
In the late 1800s, only steam engines were available. 
They produced about one horsepower per 100 lb. of engine 
weight, much too heavy for use in an aircraft. The Wright 
Brothers designed and built their own light weight gasoline 
engine which produced about one horsepower for each ten 
pounds of weight. 
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When one considers the distances between the 
geographic locations of the various inventors of flying 
machines, and the existing means of transportation and 
communication at that time, it was amazing how many parties 
were coming to the same discovery at similar times. Listed 
in the first edition of Jane's All the World's Air=ships, 
[sic] were aeronautical activities in 15 different 
countries, not including Canada, Mexico, Central and South 
America (1909, pp. 372-373). 
For financial reasons, once the Wright Brothers 
thought they had learned how to control an aircraft in 
flight, they no longer shared the results of their 
experiments with the aviation community. Therefor from 
1903 to 1908, the Wright flights were conducted in secret 
to protect their pending patent applications (Garrison, 
1993). Meanwhile, other aviators were busy flying their 
own designs. By 1909, Jane listed some 91 such efforts in 
the US and over 350 inventors in other countries (pp. 372-
373). Many of these early aviators were making public 
flying demonstrations of their designs and aeronautical 
skills, winning fame and fortune while the Wrights flew in 
secret. For example, Curtiss was awarded the prize for 
making the first flights over New York in June 1908, some 
five years after the Wrights flew at Kitty Hawk 
(Shamburger, 1968). It was felt that perhaps the 
preoccupation of the Wright Brothers with the monetary 
aspects of their invention actually held back the 
development of aviation in America. 
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During the five year peri~d, from 1903 the date of the 
Wright's first flights, to 1909 when they secured a 
purchase contract from the Army, other a~iatois were 
conducting most of the world's flight demonstrations and 
flight training. In 1909, Jane had some 170 aeronautical 
projects listed underway in France~- only 91 in America 
(pp. 372-373). By 1912 Jane listed 30 countries (p. 5). 
The center for this activity was Europe, especially France. 
The Germans brought the novelty of the airplane into 
the reality of current events. "Like a tale from ancient 
mythology of 2,000 BC, fire raining down from flying 
vehicles became a reality during World War I" (M.K. Hynes, 
1991, p. 24). Germany, in preparation for war, had a fleet 
of almost 600 airplanes which they used in their initial 
military planning (Vivan). Other countries had only 
limited aviation resources. In 1914, just before the US 
entered the war, there were only 23 aircraft in America's 
military fleet (Bridges, 1993). 
World War I brought the "fun" aspect of flying to a 
halt because most aeronautical activities were directed 
toward the war effort. The first "mass" training of 
aviators was conducted by military organizations in 
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Germany, France, Italy, England and America. At the end of 
the war, these aviators became the foundation for "the age 
of commercial aviation." Aircraft manufacturing techniques 
were also improved to meet the needs for military aircraft. 
During the last year of the war, 1918, US aircraft 
manufacturers were capable of producing 21,000 airplanes 
per year (Bilstein, 1984). Some 29,000 aircraft were 
produced during an 18 month period, 1917-1918 (Haggerty, p. 
1). Howevei, the end of the war caused the new aviation 
industry to collapse just as it was getting started. 
The daring and romantic military pilots of the day did 
not wish to give up the thrill of f~ying and return to the 
lifestyles or tasks of mere earth bound mortals. "It's not 
that flying is the most important thing in life, it's just 
that all other pursuits of man are so trivial" (Rotor p. 
7). Surplus military aircraft, available for very low 
prices, were bought by these pilots and the famous 
magnificent men and their flying machines began their 
barnstorming in America (Josephy). 
About twenty years later, the airplane again became 
the catalyst for a World War in spite of an earlier 
prediction by Orville Wright in 1918 that, "The aeroplane 
has made war so terrible that I do not believe any country 
will again care to start a war" (Cited by Bilstein, p. 39). 
In 1939, World War II started when Germany used airplanes 
27 
to attack Poland (Rhodes, 1993). Two years later, on 
December 7, 1941, the world again saw fire raining down 
from flying vehicles like a tale from ancient mythology. 
Japan used airplanes to attack Pearl Harbor, bringing the 
US into World War II. This war lasted longer than WW I and 
needed large quantities of equipment. Therefore, it was 
necessary to create a new aviation industry to meet the war 
needs (Ward). 
As part of this planning, in early 1940, President 
Roosevelt signed into law the CPT Act. While it was 
publicly stated that this was to "foster the growth of the 
new aviation industry," (The CPT Act of 1939, Preamble, p. 
4), some believed that its true purpose was to train pilots 
for the coming war. Pisano wrote that the CPT was ~to 
serve as an economic panacea for private aviation, a 
neglected segment of the industry, and as a bulwark in the 
national defense that would provide trained pilots in the 
event of a war emergency" (1988). America did not want to 
enter into a second world war as ill-prepared as it was for 
World War I. 
According to the Civil Aeronautics Journal, in 1939 
the first year of the CPT program, some 9,350 civilians 
were taught how to fly at 435 American colleges and 
universities. By 1940, 700 non-college flight schools had 
joined the pilot training program (1940, p. 3). With the 
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initiation of World War II, the CPT program was placed 
under the direction of the CAA, War Training Service. From 
December 1941 to August 1945, some 435,165 pilots were 
trained under this program (FAA, 1974). 
As a result of the war effort, the engineering, 
manufacturing and operational aspects of aviation were also 
greatly advanced. For example, the rate of airplane 
production peaked at 96,318 aircraft in 1944, over 9,000 in 
the month of May. However, the end of the war brought a 
repeat of the aviation industry collapse which took place 
after World War I. In 1944, two million people were 
manufacturing aircraft; less than 12 months later, only 
219,000 people were so employed, and the number was still 
dropping rapidly (Ward, p. 158). A good percentage of 
military aviators, like their counterparts of almost half a 
century earlier, wanted to stay in aviation. While 
potential growth was there, it was not until over 20 years 
later that civilian aviation really became a major industry 
in America and other countries. 
The collapse of the aviation industry after World War 
II was similar to what happened after World War I. A major 
difference between the two events was the fact that the 
quantity of aircraft manufactured and number of pilots 
trained in the early 1940s was far greater than what took 
place during World War I. Also, the state of the art of 
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aviation was at a much higher level of development, almost 
reaching the "jet age" by 1945. 
Less than five years after the war ended, de Havilland 
began flying the Comet jet liner in England. The plane was 
certified in January 1952 and put into service by British 
Overseas Airways Company five months later (Ward, p. 168). 
The Boeing Airplane Company began testing its model 707 on 
July 15, 1954. After four years of extensive tests, this 
aircraft was put into commercial service and air travelers 
were able to fly in an American jet airliner for the first 
time (Josephy, p. 375). Industrial diversification in 
America, the GI Bill flight training programs, general 
economic prosperity, and filling the dreams of thousands of 
ex-military aviators combined to form the roots of a modern 
air transportation system. Even the market for small 
aircraft prospered. The Cessna Aircraft Company was 
producing over 10,000 aircraft per year, and by 1978 six 
firms produced 17,811 small aircraft in the US (Bulkeley). 
By the mid 1990s, millions of people were traveling by 
air (Pena, 1995). This mode of transportation had matured 
to a level never imagined by the Wright Brothers or any of 
the other dreamers who lived centuries before them, or 
during the 90 years after the first flights in 1903. 
However, in the early 1990s, the blue sky of aviation 
was not without some dark clouds. In the preceding ten 
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years, the "general" aviation industry, that is the 
manufacturers of small aircraft, had seen their industry 
collapse for a third time. This collapse was not connected 
with the end of another war with some foreign power. 
According to Aarons (1993), this collapse was connected 
with an ongoing war with America's consumers, social system 
and legal community. 
In spite of the fact that there were over 700,000 
pilots in America in 1993 and about 85,000 new pilots 
starting flying lessons each year, (Aircraft Owners and 
Pilots Association [AOPA], 1993) from its peak production 
of 17,811 airplanes per year in 1978, it was estimated that 
fewer than 300 new "small" aircraft would be manufactured 
in the US in 1994 (FAA Aviation News). The blame for this 
reduction in manufacturing activity was directly placed on 
the existing system of aviation accident investigation and 
how the results of these investigations were used in the 
American legal system (Tripp). 
In 1993, during congressional hearings, Boeing's T. 
Collins said defense of liability claims resulted in the 
lack of new aviation developments and the destruction of 
the small-plane market (AIA NEWSLETTER, 1993, December, p. 
4). Ever since Meyer announced in 1986 that Cessna, the 
world's largest aircraft manufacturing firm was stopping 
the manufacture of all small aircraft because of product 
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liability problems, the aviation coinrnunity had been trying 
to get legislative relief for this problem (AIA, 1993). 
Millar, President and owner of Piper Aircraft, in an 
article for the firm's newsletter Piper Today wrote, 
" ... the iilllilense cost of defending unmeritorious lawsuits 
and paying unreasonable jury awards erodes assets and 
resources (time, people and money) that could and would 
otherwise be spent on the advancement of personal aviation" 
(1989, p. 1). Thus, these and similar statements 
documented and supported the seriousness of the problem 
being studied by this research. 
Aviation Accident Investigation History 
Anyone who read Greek mythology should be familiar 
with Daedalus and his son Icarus. Daedalus was considered 
a great scientist and inventor of a few thousand years ago. 
His engineering studies and inventive efforts were among 
the first recorded accounts of mechanically assisted manned 
flight. 
Upon finding himself and his son imprisoned on the 
Isle of Crete, Daedalus invented and built wings so they 
could fly to freedom. During their daring escape, "the 
son, Icarus, imprudently climbs too high in the sky, the 
heat of the sun melts the wax which holds the feathers 
(wings) together, and the young man plunges to his deathfl 
(Bonnefoy, 1991, p. 388). 
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This might be considered the first detailed aviation 
accident report. However, one could ask several questions 
about this event. Was this pilot error? Was this a 
failure to warn? Was this a failure to properly train the 
pilot? Was this a design defect? Was this a failure to 
test properly? Was this a material failure (remember the 
wax melted)? Was this improper assembly (the feathers came 
loose) or a defective design since it failed to incorporate 
a "fail-safe" design concept? Since Icarus drowned in the 
sea, it is obvious that the necessary emergency equipment 
was not on board the aircraft. 
A proper accident investigation process must consider 
all aspects of an accident and then eliminate as many of 
the potential causes as. possible. During the January 1995 
NTSB public hearings on the USAir Flt 427 accident of 
September, 1994, McGrew stated that Boeing identified 85 
potential causes for this accident and had eliminated 34 of 
them as of the time of the hearings. 
However, at this hearing, Brunner, spokesperson for 
the families of Flt 427, and others expressed their 
feelings that the investigation should pursue as an 
ultimate but perhaps unpleasant goal, the determination of 
"who" was at fault. According to the literature, it 
appeared that not everyone in the aviation community and 
accident investigation system was willing to accept this 
concept. 
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The conquest of flight had not been without constant 
risks. For centuries, since man first leapt from high 
buildings in an attempt to glide down to earth, or went 
aloft in hot air balloons, accidents took their toll in 
broken bones and occasionally human lives. However, it was 
not until 1908, when Selfridge was killed during a flight 
at Ft. Myer, Va. that an ~official" aviation accident 
investigation took place. 
Selfridge was an accomplished inventor and aviator in 
his own right, having designed and built the "Red Wing" and 
the "White Wing" in early 1908. According to Selfridge's 
Army records, he was the first military aviator of a 
powered aircraft as a result of his flight in the "June 
Bug" on May 19, 1908. Selfridge had gained flying 
experience while he was a member of the Aerial Experiment 
Association. 
The accident in which Selfridge was killed occurred at 
about 5:18 p.m. on September 17, 1908. At 10:15 a.m. the 
next day, an Aeronautical Board of the Signal Corps 
convened at Fort Myer, VA, "for the purpose of 
investigating and reporting upon the cause of the 
accident." By the end of the business day, a span of about 
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six hours, the investigation was complete. During this one 
day investigation, "The Board visited the scene of the 
accident, questioned witnesses very carefully and examined 
the machine" (Squier, p. 2). 
Because the aviation industry was new, there were no 
tax funds available to enact and enforce any national 
aviation laws or create a system which might include 
investigating accidents. Thus, the aviation community did 
not have any uniform regulation or accident investigating/ 
reporting system until the mid 1920s (Shamburger, p. 100). 
Whenever an airplane accident took place, usually only the 
pilots, inventors and perhaps their financial backers, had 
any interest in what caused the accident. Any "official" 
government investigations were limited to military aviation 
accidents. 
After World War I, with the beginning of the 
barnstorming age of aviation, the public began to be 
exposed to, and were becoming victims of, air crashes. In 
some cases, when the accident took place within city 
limits, or near populated areas, the city police or local 
sheriff would conduct an "investigation", but at best, this 
was a non-technical undertaking. 
As the frequency of these events increased, it brought 
about public demands for more restrictive aviation laws 
which drove the enactment of the 1926 Air Commerce Act. 
This law provided for the investigation of civilian 
aviation accidents, and the public reporting of the 
findings of these investigations. 
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Under the provisions of the 1926 Act, in an effort to 
placate the military, a major portion of the staff of the 
new aviation section, which was part of the Department of 
Commerce (DOC), were military aviators. This tradition 
remained for the next half century or more as each "new" 
government agency created to supervise aviation continued 
to employ large numbers of ex-military personnel. 
Beginning with the knowledge of the early Army 
aviators, who might have investigated an aviation accident 
while they were in the military, some non-military federal 
employees became more skilled at the investigation task by 
"on the job training." The skill levels of some of these 
government investigators began to develop to a very high 
level of expertise. In 1995, ~learning by doing" was still 
the "official" method of training government aviation 
accident investigators. 
With the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, 
a new agency of the government, called the Air Safety Board 
(ASB), was created in November of that year. This group 
was disbanded but reformed as the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) under the provisions of the Government Reform Act of 
1939 (Journal of Air Law and Commerce, 1939). Over the 
next few years, the staff of the CAB truly became the 
"first detectives of the sky" (Dorman, p. 13). For 
example, they pioneered the concept of using x-ray 
equipment to find failures in aircraft parts. 
36 
In 1958, after several airline accidents, the public 
demanded more government control of aviation to improve 
safety. President Eisenhower called upon Congress to 
create a new branch of government, the Federal Aviation 
Agency, "to foster, promote, and regulate aviation" (FAA 
Act of 1958). As Dunbar stated, "The FAA's mission is 
paradoxical" (1994). This new organization did not acquire 
any of the accident investigation functions of the CAB. 
Eight years later, in 1966, again in response to 
public concern over several major airline accidents, 
President Johnson proposed a new "super" government agency, 
the Department of Transportation (DOT). This was 
accomplished by the passage of the DOT Act of 1966. Within 
the structure of this organization, a "new" Federal 
Aviation Administration (the second FAA) was also created. 
Unlike the first FAA, this new DOT/FAA was given the duties 
of investigating accidents. A special section of the DOT 
was set up for this purpose. This new group was called the 
NTSB and took over the accident investigating functions of 
the CAB. 
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On April 1, 1967, with the nationwide transfer of only 
185 technical and clerical personnel, the CAB ended its 27 
year history of investigating aviation accidents and began 
functioning as the DOT-NTSB (NTSB INtsb Newsletter, 1992). 
Importantly, there was a major difference in this group's 
function. These former CAB investigators, now working for 
the NTSB section of the DOT, were responsible for 
investigating accidents that took place in any of the five 
transportation modes that the DOT regulated: air, water, 
rail, highway, and pipeline. Their workload quickly became 
overwhelming. 
Because of intra-agency conflicts within the DOT, this 
organizational structure of the NTSB did not work smoothly. 
In 1973, the NTSB testified before Congress that ~unless it 
is totally separate and independent from any other agency" 
it cannot function properly (NTSB 1994 Budget, 1992, p. 
101). In hopes of resolving these conflicts, Congress 
passed the Independent NTSB Act of 1974 saying: "No ..• 
agency can ... perform ... [accident investigations] unless it 
is totally separate and independent ... " 
This act created a fully independent agency which was 
the only government organization that had the legal right 
and power to investigate aviation accidents. Thus, the 
concept of improving safety through the investigation of 
aviation accidents, which originated with the Air Conunerce 
Act of 1926, was carried into the modern age of air 
transportation. 
Control of Accident Investigations 
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There had been many stages during the formation of the 
existing government control of the aviation accident 
investigation process. Outside of the military, initially 
there was very little government regulation of aviation, 
let alone any process of accident investigation. Some 
communities responded to their citizens concern for safety 
and did enact "local" laws (Jericho, 1991). Because of the 
mobility of the airplane, the aviation industry and the 
legal profession realized the complexity of complying with 
dozens of local or state aviation laws. These two groups 
joined forces and organized a campaign to make Congress 
aware of the need for national aviation laws. 
In 1911, Gov. Baldwin of Connecticut asked the 
American Bar Association (ABA) to promote federal aviation 
laws. This campaign took on a formal status at the ABA 
convention, which was held at Cheyenne, WY in 1921. Of 
importance was the fact that these first laws, in 
combination with the other aviation laws enacted over the 
next 74 yearsi greatly expanded federal control over 
aviation and the accident investigation process. 
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The 1926 Act gave the federal government the authority 
for investigating and reporting on aviation accidents. The 
first such published document on aviation accidents in 
America was a DOC report to the Senate dated February 24, 
1931. This was a recap of the information received by 
government authorities of aircraft accidents that had taken 
place between May 20, 1926 and May 16, 1930. 
Prior to this, there was no system in place for 
recording aviation accidents, nor any staff to investigate 
or analyze them (DOC, 1931). Along with the technical and 
statistical data contained in this report, there was a 
letter from Young, the Acting Secretary of Commerce. His 
letter stated the limitations of these accident reports. 
It also outlined the philosophy that existed when the 
concept of government aviation accident investigation was 
founded. 
In his letter Young wrote: 
1. No authority has been granted the (Commerce) 
Department to hold hearings ... preserve 
evidence or engage in other similar procedure 
in the matter of investigating accidents. 
2 .... in many cases ... evidence of the cause of 
the accident does not exist. 
3. Therefore, the assignment of causes as shown 
are to a substantial extent premised upon 
opinion and conjecture. (pp. ii) 
Several of these limitations still existed in 1995 and 
were causing the conflicts being researched. It might be 
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of note that according to the 1931 report, in the early 
days of aviation, pilot error caused about 43.3% of the 
accidents and material failure was about as frequent. By 
the 1980s, Nelson felt that pilot error accounted for over 
80% of all aviation accidents (1983, p. 19). In 1990 
Taylor claimed that it was up to 90%. 
Twelve years after the 1926 laws, Congress passed the 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. This created the ASB, and 
in 1940, the formation of the CAB. For the next 26 years, 
until 1966, the CAB investigated and issued reports on 
aviation accidents. A new federal government organization, 
the Federal Aviation Agency, was formed to "foster, promote 
and regulate" aviation by the FAA Act of 1958. Because of 
the importance of accident investigation, the CAB continued 
to carry out aviation accident investigations and publicly 
report their findings on the causes of these events. 
In 1967, with the formation of the DOT, a "new FAA" 
(Federal Aviation Administration) was created. (The first 
FAA was an agency.) Also created within the DOT was the 
NTSB. All of the CAB accident investigators and their 
supporting staff, 185 persons, (NTSB, INtsb) were 
transferred into the new DOT/FAA to fill the needs of the 
NTSB. Because of the expanded role of multi-modal 
transportation system investigations, it was obvious that 
the former CAB investigators would have to rely upon other 
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agencies for manpower. Therefore, the FAA and the other 
transportation agencies, water, rail, highway, and 
pipeline, provided manpower to the NTSB to conduct accident 
investigations. 
From the enactment of·the Air Commerce Act of 1926 to 
the Independent NTSB Act of 1974, and up to the time of the 
study, the federal government acting through one of several 
different agencies had acquired the sole "right" and 
authority to investigate aviation accidents. Existing laws 
not only gave the NTSB this right, it excluded all other 
parties from having access to accident sites, physical 
evidence, and witnesses. In some cases, the written 
reports of NTSB staff that contained the results of 
investigations were not available for public use (The 1974 
Act). 
The power of the NTSB to carry out their investigative 
tasks, and to maintain exclusive control of their work 
products had been challenged in various State and Federal 
courts on many occasions. The law firm of Gardere & Wynne, 
in their Aviation Law Newsletter, quoted many cases, such 
as Miller v. Rich, where parties challenged the refusal of 
the NTSB to allow access to accident evidence (1990, p. 3). 
The public's need for factual information for 
litigation purposes, the social aspect of the aviation 
accident investigation process, did not seem to have been 
addressed by either the academic community or government 
authorities. 
Aviation Accident Investigation Schools 
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For the last 90 years, from 1906 to 1995, the two 
major centers for aviation accident investigation expertise 
were the military and the civilian sector 6f the Federal 
government. The military's role began with the Army 
Aviation Corps which was expanded through the formation of 
Naval aviation in the early 1900s and the creation of the 
Air Force in the late 1940s. The civil government's role 
began with the formation of the National Advisory Committee 
on Aeronautics (NACA) in 1915 and the CAA in 1926. This 
was later followed by the CAB in 1938 and the first FAA in 
1958. The DOT, with its new FAA and the NTSB, was created 
in 1967. The NTSB then became an independent organization 
in 1974. Because the federal government, acting through 
either the military or a civil agency, was the major money 
source for aviation research and buying the technology 
developed, it had an interest in accident investigation. 
The CAB, with its roots being formed by the Air 
Commerce Act of 1926, was well established in the aviation 
accident investigation business at a very early stage of 
aviation development. In spite of the various changes to 
its structure, the civil aviation accident investigation 
function of the federal government had remained fairly 
intact as the transitions were made from the CAA, to the 
ASB, to the CAB, to the DOT/NTSB, and then to the 
independent NTSB. 
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Since about 1919, many Army aviators felt they were 
"step-children" of the artillery and other branches of the 
Army. This was especially true when it came to funding and 
trying new combat techniques that would give aviation a 
more important role. For the most part, Army aviators were 
anxious to gain independence from their "ground thinking" 
superior officers. This dissatisfaction deepened and was 
discussed by Rearden (1960) in the History of the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense. This problem and conflicts 
between the Army and Navy over "air power" was resolved by 
creating a new branch of military aviation, called the "Air 
Force." This was accomplished when President Truman, 
through enactment of the Key West Agreement, formed the Air 
Force, a new military aviation unit. 
With this newly gained freedom, and advanced 
technology at hand and on the horizon, the Air Force began 
to take a new look at how they investigated accidents. In 
the early 1950s, the Air Force commissioned a study on this 
subject. The University of Southern California (USC) was 
the successful bidder for this contract (USC, 1993). 
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After the USC study was completed, the Air Force 
formalized the aviation accident investigation training 
process by the creation of a special school to teach this 
skill to its personnel. Since the Air Force was pleased 
with the work USC had performed on the original study, it 
was not surprising that USC was awarded a contract to teach 
this subject to Air Force personnel (USC, 1993). For the 
next 40 years, USC taught aviation accident investigation 
at the ~usAF Flight Safety Officer S~hool." The first 
classes were taught at the USC.campus in Los Angeles, but 
later classes were at Norton AFB in CA. By 1993, over 
5,000 students were trained under this program (ISASI 
Newsletter, 1993). 
The long relationship between USC and the Air Force 
was broken in 1993 when two events took place. First, 
Norton was one of the military installations selected by 
Congress to be closed, forcing the relocation of this Air 
Force Mission. Second, in 1993 USC was not the "low 
bidder" on the contract for this program. (G. Parker, 
personal communication, October 19, 1993). The program was 
moved to Kirtland, AFB where it was taught by the Southern 
California Safety Institute (K. Kinkle, personal 
communication, November 9, 1993). 
At one time, other branches of the military sent their 
staff to the Air Force School operated by USC. However, in 
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a very short time, the Army was creating its own "air 
force" and opened a school at Ft. Rucker, AL. The Army 
wanted a school which was directed more to teaching 
accident investigation of the type of equipment operated by 
the Army, such as attack helicopters and small 
observation/transport aircraft vs. the Air Force type of 
aircraft (DeLear, 1977). The Navy also developed their own 
school, called the "Post Graduate School," at Monterey, CA 
(Navy, 19 5 7 ) . 
As stated in the Navy's aviation accident course 
guide, "The very tap-roots of the safety effort are the 
aircraft accident investigators .... The investigation must 
be pursued for the dual purpose: to determine the cause of 
the accident, and to discover any malpractice and faulty 
procedures or equipment associated with the cause" (1957, 
p. iv) . 
Because of the rapid turnover of personnel in the 
military and the temporary nature of military accident 
investigation teams, no long term or highly experienced 
staff of investigators had been formed within the military 
services. For example, in 1992 at Norton AFB, the Air 
Force Safety Agency had a staff of about 220 persons, of 
which 160 were clerical or administrative in nature. This 
organization was the center for all Air Force accident 
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investigations (D. Alberico, personal communication, August 
29, 1994). 
Only 16 pilots, 12 engineers and two maintenance 
specialists were assigned to this mission (Forum, 1992). 
To help offset this under staffing, outside contractors, 
suppliers of hardware, and in some cases even FAA or NTSB 
staff, have worked with the military during some accident 
investigations (Kolstad, 1991, p. 2). Considering the 
worldwide nature of the Air Force's operations, and the 
fact that some 50 accidents and 5,000 incidents occurred 
and were investigated each year (Alberico), the size of 
this staff seemed to be very small. 
The military had excellent accident record keeping 
abilities and modern, computer driven statistical 
analytical systems. They also had engineering staff and 
other specialists, such as medical and human factors 
engineers, who gave support to major accident 
investigations. Military accident investigation schools 
had a very narrow focus, few long term or repeat students, 
and their curriculum addressed highly specialized 
equipment. These schools were not open to the general 
public. 
The other organization with extensive experience in 
aviation accident investigation was the CAB, known as the 
NTSB since 1967. Having begun its operations with a 
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nationwide staff of less than 30 investigators, no large 
scale training program was ever undertaken by the CAB. New 
CAB investigators received their training "on the job," 
working under the supervision of experienced investigators. 
This was the method of training accident investigators that 
was still used by both the FAA and the NTSB in 1995. 
Using "on the job training" when dealing with highly 
experienced aviation personnel may have been acceptable in 
the past, but conditions had changed. With the FAA and 
NTSB's affirmative action hiring programs of the 1960s and 
1970s, this was no longer the case. The FAA and the NTSB 
began to employ persons who had no aviation background and 
at times limited education. Attempting to use on the job 
training to teach these employees such an important and 
technical task as aviation accident investigation did not 
result in the desired outcome. This situation accounted 
for some of the quality problems that were being 
experienced within the investigation process (R.J. Gross, 
personal communication, July 28, 1992). 
In 1963, a "National Aircraft Accident Investigation 
School" (NAAIS) was jointly established by the CAB and the 
Federal Aviation Agency. As stated in the literature 
connected with this event: 
The School served as a common training facility 
for CAB and FAA personnel having a responsibility 
in the investigation of civil aircraft accidents. 
The curriculum was based on methods and 
procedures essential to support the most probable 
cause and contributing factors of aircraft 
accidents, the reporting of the findings of the 
accident investigation, and the development of 
recommendations to reduce, eliminate, or prevent 
recurrence of accidents. (1967, p. 2) 
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The school was located at the FAA Aeronautical Center, 
Will Rogers World Airport, Oklahoma City. This was an 
ideal site as the FAA had recently created the Mike 
Monroney Aeronautical Center, also known as the FAA 
Academy, at this location. The buildings and equipment 
were new and modern, and the complex contained many 
technical schools. Staff from other FAA schools were 
available to teach at this new "National Aircraft Accident 
Investigation School." 
TSI, a new unit of the DOT, was formed and began to 
operate Aircraft Accident Investigation schools for the 
FAA, NTSB and other government agencies at Oklahoma City. 
The FAA was interested in finding fault or violations 
connected with accidents, and the NTSB was interested in 
finding probable cause to improve safety by preventing 
future accidents. This made it difficult to teach both of 
these philosophies at the same time to a combined group of 
FAA and NTSB investigators. Therefore, separate classes 
for each group of investigators became the norm (G. Walker, 
personal communication, June 6, 1992). 
From time to time, for political and financial 
reasons, the relationship between TSI, the FAA, and the 
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NTSB had been modified. At the time of this research, the 
NTSB was conducting its own training at Washington, DC, 
something it had also done in the past. The content of the 
training had not changed significantly as a result of the 
move from Oklahoma to Washington. 
The NTSB conducted training sessions about once per 
year with an average class size of less than 30 persons. 
Some foreign government staff and military personnel often 
completed the NTSB courses, but the general public was not 
allowed to attend (B. Strauch, personal communication, July 
25, 1993). 
The FAA, like the NTSB, seemed to modify its 
relationship with TSI and withdrew from using TS! staff. 
The FAA followed a policy similar to the NTSB and allowed 
foreign government staff and military personnel to attend 
their schools. FAA schools were not open to the general 
public (TSI, 1993). 
Some government agencies, such as the Forest Service 
(USFS), the Customs service, and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), utilized TS! or USC for most of their 
training (R. Johannesen, personal communication, October 
10, 1992). These agencies also sent their staff to the FAA 
or NTSB schools, and sent representatives to the new ERAU 
school which opened in 1992 (B. Minter, personal 
communication, May 25, 1992). 
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The major non-government aviation accident 
investigation school, operated by any academic institution, 
was the USC school at Los Angeles. In an effort to 
generate additional income, and to capitalize on its work 
for the Air Force, USC created a civilian version of the 
Air Force Aviation Accident Investigation training program 
in about 1956. This school, which was open to the public, 
marketed its programs to aviation insurance companies, 
aerospace manufacturers, airlines, and safety personnel of 
aviation firms that had employees who needed this 
specialized training (USC). 
The school was called the "Institute of Safety and 
Systems Management." Course schedules normally allowed for 
the teaching of aviation accident investigation classes 
approximately three times per year. By 1992, the aviation 
program had about 15,000 alumni (USC). 
Over the last 30 to 40 years, other colleges or 
universities had started and stopped similar programs, but 
they were all small and/or short-lived. For example, 
Arizona State University, working with a Tempe, AZ aviation 
consulting firm, conducted an aviation accident related 
course. This program was discontinued after several years 
of operation (J. Tilson, personal communication, October 
28, 1993). 
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The newest academic entry into this field was ERAU 
which was the world's largest and best known aviation 
training institution. Their main campus was located at 
Daytona Beach, FL and they opened a branch at Prescott, AZ 
in the 1980s. ERAU began an Aviation Accident 
Investigation School at Prescott in 1992, working with the 
same firm that previously worked with Arizona State. Among 
the colleges and universities of America, only USC and ERAU 
were found to have full time, "stand alone" courses devoted 
to the subject of aviation accident investigation 
(Schukert, 1982 and Williamson, 1994). 
In the area of commercially operated, technical 
education institutions, the only school found was located 
in Phoenix. In 1960, the Robertson Research Group, which 
was the firm that previously worked in conjunction with 
Arizona State University, offered an independent 
"commercial" course in Aviation Accident Investigation. 
When Arizona State University withdrew from teaching this 
program, Robertson continued offering the course as a 
separate business activity under the name of "The 
International Center For Safety Education" (ICSE). 
Robertson's main business activity was conducting 
research into aircraft fuel/fire containment. Because of 
this, the training emphasis of Robertson's programs, as 
taught by ICSE, were in the areas of fuel containment and 
fire prevention. Robertson expanded into manufacturing 
some of the systems it designed as a result of government 
funded research. By the early 1990s, manufacturing was a 
major part of its commercial activities (H. Robertson, 
personal communication, August 25, 1992). 
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ICSE was the same organization that assisted ERAU in 
the formation of its program at the Prescott campus in mid 
1992. Robertson staff also taught at the ERAU school. In 
the latter part of 1993, the ICSE training programs were 
purchased by Simula, a California firm. Other than a 
change in ownership, and moving from Tempe to Phoenix, the 
school continued the same programs (Tilson). 
Similar to USC, ICSE offered their courses only a 
limited number of times.per year. They had a "Basic Crash 
Survival Investigation School" and an "Advanced Crash 
Survival Investigation School." Each program was offered 
twice a year (ICSE, 1995). Of note should be the emphasis 
on the words "crash survival". While this school did teach 
investigative techniques that were to be used in aviation 
accident investigations, there was much emphasis placed on 
the survival aspect of accidents rather than other 
disciplines important to accident investigation. 
Simula, the owner of ICSE at the time of this 
research, manufactured aircraft seats and interiors. Thus 
its training programs were somewhat slanted toward seats, 
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interiors, and crash dynamics vs. the fuel/fire hazard area 
specialties of Robertson. Staff from Robertson taught at 
the ICSE facility, therefore the continuity of the program 
was maintained (Tilson). 
Non-US Schools 
Since this research was limited to activities 
conducted within the US, little information was reviewed on 
schools conducted in other countries. The United States 
was the world's largest aviation market and supplier of 
aviation products. For this reason, and the fact that the 
CAB, NTSB, FAA and the US military made their schools 
available to foreign governments, very little development 
of aviation accident investigation schools had taken place 
in foreign countries. This was especially true on an 
academic or commercial level of technical education. 
It was not unusual for the governments of some 
countries to have "short" courses on aviation accident 
investigation for their nation's investigators. In 
addition to having their staff complete these courses, they 
sent their staff to US schools. For example, in the first 
class at ERAU, one student was from the French equivalent 
of the NTSB, the Bureau Enquetes Accidents (J. Bernard, 
personal communication, August 6, 1992). 
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The best known, and most highly respected aviation 
accident investigation school outside of the US was the 
British school, ~Cranfield Institute of Technology." The 
programs offered by Cranfield were very similar to the 
programs offered in the US by USC and ERAU but took longer 
to complete (Cranfield, 1993). 
On a broader scale, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), which maintained its headquarters in 
Montreal, had a strong interest in aviation accident 
investigation. This organization was the oldest and only 
international body that dealt with aviation laws and other 
aviation matters on a worldwide basis. ICAO also had 
"official" or legal status among some 182 nations around 
the world (Lenorovitz). 
Formed in the 1920s, the ICAO had drafted many 
regulations that dealt with aviation, especially aviation 
accidents. The most famous ICAO activity was the "Warsaw 
Convention," held in 1929. As a result of this historic 
meeting, a set of international aviation laws, the Warsaw 
Treaty, was adopted and later ratified by member states. 
These laws were still in effect, and they almost always 
were invoked when an aviation accident involved 
international travel (Erickson, 1992, p. i). 
As Martineau-Comeau, of the ICAO Public Information 
Office wrote in his letter of September 17, 1992: 
ICAO develops Standards and Recommended 
Practices, and guidance material in various 
technical fields of aviation through a 
consultation process with States; 
administrations, international organizations and 
other aviation experts. Insofar as the 
Secretariat of ICAO handles the process of rules 
development, it is up to the States to put these 
rules and guidance material into practice. 
(personal communication, p.1) 
Another set of agreements, known as the Chicago 
Convention, were adopted approximately 20 years later. 
Under these agreements, each State (Nation) has the 
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responsibility to investigate aviation accidents within its 
territory, or of its aircraft when the event takes place 
over international waters. 
ICAO had not formed or conducted any aviation accident 
investigation schools, but beginning in 1949, did publish 
an Aircraft Accident Investigation Handbook [sic.] (Navy, 
1961, P. 128). In 1992, Appendix 18, of ICAO's Manual of 
Aircraft Accident Investigation, "Investigators' selection, 
training and courses", listed 42 countries with schools. 
The US, England, Australia, Canada, and Sweden had formal 
schools. The most frequently attended schools were located 
in the US, England and Beirut. The Beirut school, very 
popular among middle eastern nations, was known as the 
"Beirut Civil Aviation Centre." 
Technical Requirements of the 
Investigation Process 
When the aviation accident investigation process 
began, the main purpose of investigations was to find out 
why the accident took place. With this information, the 
inventor of the aircraft could make changes to his design 
or to the materials that were used to make the aircraft, 
assuming that pilot error was not the cause (Walsh). 
This was a difficult task, as there were many 
potential causes of accidents. The investigating ability 
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of these inventors and early aviators was not yet very well 
developed and no one fully understood the science of 
aeronautics. For example, when the Army conducted its 
first "official" investigation of the "Wright Flyer" 
accident at Ft. Myer, VA, the process took less than one 
full day. The investigating team did not even talk to the 
pilot, Orville Wright (Squier, p. 2). Because of this, and 
the briefness of the investigation, there existed several 
versions of why this accident took place. 
It takes time, and lots of thinking, before the 
various potential and actual causes of accidents are fully 
discovered. Orville, the pilot during the accident, wrote 
to his brother Wilbur (1909, p. 955) to give him some of 
the details about the cause of the accident. Seven months 
later, Orville wrote about the accident in a letter to 
Chanute, a well-known engineer and enthusiastic supporter 
of aeronautical efforts, who was also a friend of the 
Wright Brothers. 
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Chanute was at Ft. Myer at the time of the crash and 
he "was consulted by the Board" during the official Army 
investigation (Squier, Appendix #1). Chanute was therefore 
interested in learning more about the accident from 
Orville. In his June 6, 1909 letter to Chanute, Orville 
gave a very detailed explanation of why the aircraft 
crashed. These technical details were different than those 
contained in the November 1908 letter that Orville wrote to 
Wilbur. 
The "official" cause of the crash was different from 
the explanation Orville gave in either one of his two 
letters. Many historians failed to read Orville's final 
technical analysis of the accident and used other "probable 
causes" which are incorrect. Using this first fatal 
accident as a "case history," it can been seen how complex 
the technical aspects of the accident investigation process 
can be. 
Initially, engine failures were the most common causes 
of accidents. Senate Report No. 185, Safety in the Air 
stated, "Almost every commission or congressional body that 
has investigated aeronautics during the past generation, 
and investigations by governmental bodies have averaged at 
least one a year since 1916, has found that ... aeronautics 
needs, for safety and for other reasons, more powerful 
engines" (Copeland, p. 2). 
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The gasoline engine was a new invention which added to 
the potential for failure. Trying to make an engine that 
was able to produce sufficient power for an airplane, and 
still be very light in weight, was difficult. No prior 
"flight" testing could be accomplished before taking to the 
sky with one of these new engines on an airplane. 
The most common materials used to build aircraft were 
wood and fabric, with wires bracing the wings and tail 
parts. "Box and beam" construction, similar to what was 
used in bridge building was a preferred design. This may 
have been an indication of the influence of Chanute, who 
was a famous bridge builder. Chanute was an active advisor 
to almost every aeronautical inventor, including the Wright 
Brothers. Chanute closely monitored the experiments that 
were taking place in the late 1800s, both in the US and 
Europe. In 1889, Chanute "wrote a scholarly little book, 
Progress in Flying Machines, which won him recognition as 
this country's best authority in the field [of aviation]" 
(Roseberry, 1972, p. 14). 
Before the powered flight era, moderate wind 
conditions were sought out for early flying experiments 
(Walsh). By flying into the wind, the length (time) of the 
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flight was extended, but the distance covered was shorter. 
Also, the speed over the ground was kept very slow, a safer 
condition in the event of a crash landing. (Air speed 
minus the wind speed equals a lower ground speed.) 
With only low powered engines available, and the high 
"drag" (wind resistance) of the airframe, maximum airspeeds 
were also very low. These low speeds did not require very 
much strength in the airframe. However, vibration from the 
engine and the roughness of the take-off and landing areas 
were causing fatigue damage to the airframe. If this 
damage was not detected during maintenance or pre-flight 
inspections, serious accidents usually resulted. 
As available engine power increased, airplanes became 
larger and heavier. They began to fly faster, higher and 
over longer distances. Aerodynamic stress was now added to 
the fatigue equation. Fuel, cooling, lubrication, and 
other systems were also getting more complex. When these 
auxiliary systems failed, often the aircraft was forced to 
land away from an airport and on unsuitable terrain. 
Landing in trees and in newly plowed farm fields did great 
damage to aircraft. 
In some cases, in order to save money and to get the 
flying experiments back under way as quickly as possible, 
hasty and incomplete repairs were made to aircraft which 
had crashed. This often resulted in later failures during 
60 
flight at high altitudes which then had very drastic 
results. These factors meant it was important to learn new 
skills in accident investigation so similarly caused 
accidents would not take place. The ability to discover 
"pre" accident vs. "post" accident failures became a major 
goal of accident investigations (TSI). 
Prior to the first aeronautic laws of 1926, the Naval 
Appropriations Act of 1915 called for the formation of the 
NACA. The NACA did extensive studies on many aspects of 
aeronautics, such as aerodynamic airfoil testing, strengths 
of materials, and airframe construction methods. This 
organization did outstanding work and was considered "the 
chief factor in the recent remarkable development ... of 
aircraft ... the world over" (Copeland, p. 6). Copies of 
NACA reference documents from the 1920s were still being 
published and sold by the Navy in 1995. 
Information contained in these NACA studies was often 
the result of investigating "failures" that took place, 
either before or as a result of air crashes. As stated in 
the Copeland report, "a thorough and searching inquiry 
should be made into the causes of the wreck ... for the 
prevention of accidents of like character" (p. 1). At this 
time in history, all aviation accident investigation skills 
were still being learned "on the job". Young, in his 1930 
letter to Congress, indicated that the "state of the art" 
/ 
61 
of aircraft accident investigation in the era of 1926-1930 
was almost nonexistent. 
Until the Act of 1938 created the Air Safety Board, 
which became the CAB in 1939, investigations were limited. 
As a result of the CAB's efforts, a clear set of 
technologies and techniques were developed which would be 
useful to the accident investigation process and could be 
taught to others. However, according to Lederer in a 
lecture on April 20, 1939, the industry still had a long 
way to improve. He stated, "airlines are not yet as free 
from danger as are our railroads, and it may be sometime 
before they are" (p. 4). 
The curriculums of the first military Aviation 
Accident Investigation Schools seemed to reflect the 
improvements in the state of the art of the aviation 
industry. In reviewing the course outline of one of these 
early schools, "The US Naval Post Graduate School," (1957) 
at Monterey, CA, it was noted that the following subjects 
were being taught: 
1. Command Responsibility 
2. The Investigator 
3. Essentials of Good Investigation 
4. Pre-Accident Planning 
5. Organization of an Investigation 
6. Procedures at the Scene of the Accident 
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7. Wreckage Recovery and Investigation (there were 42 
sub-headings under this section such as airframe 
structure, engines, aircraft systems-electrical, 
etc.) 
8. Witnesses 
9. Records 
10. Aero-medical 
It should be remembered that this school was an 
offshoot of the Air Force program developed and taught by 
USC about five years earlier. According to an early 
graduate of the school, much of the material used for 
teaching at Monterey still had the USC name on it (D. 
Robinson, personal communication, November 8, 1993). 
Reviewing non-military government schools, it was 
discovered that the "National Aircraft Accident 
Investigation School" (NAAIS) was formed about ten years 
after the military programs were started in California. 
This school was jointly operated by the FAA and CAB in 
Oklahoma City starting in 1964. In addition to 
administrative matters unique to each government 
organization, the NAAIS "Course Outline and Contents" 
(1967, p. 2) of this school listed the following topics: 
1. Aircraft Accident Investigation Philosophy 
and Policy 
2. Aeronautical Statutes and Regulations Pertaining 
to Accident Investigation 
3. Management of the Investigation 
4. FAA Handbooks - Accident Investigation, Reporting, 
Notification, and Service Responsibilities 
5. CAB Manual - Air Safety Investigation 
6. Photography 
7. Structures Investigation 
8. Operations Investigation 
9. Reporting the Investigation 
10. Maintenance and Records Investigation 
(Air Carrier) and also (General) 
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11. Powerplants Investigation (Reciprocating-Turbine) 
12. Systems Investigation 
13. Witness Investigation 
14. Human Factors Investigation 
15. Legal Implications 
16. Accident Prevention 
17. Public Hearings and Depositions 
18. Student Seminars 
19. Special Lectures (Nonscheduled guests, 
evaluation conferences, and field trips) 
This course was scheduled for 240 classroom hours over 
a six to eight week period. 
The first non-government, civilian version of an 
aviation accident investigation school was taught at USC. 
It began in 1956 and was similar to the Air Force school 
but the civilian courses took a shorter period of time to 
complete. A few years later, USC had broken down the 
original course into several smaller segments, each one of 
which was offered in addition to the "Aviation Accident 
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Investigation Course." Some of the names given to these 
shorter courses were: 
Gas Turbine Engine Accident Investigation 
Helicopter Accident Investigation 
Photography for Accident Investigation 
Human Factors in Aviation Safety, etc. 
There were 15 such courses. The logic behind this 
move was to generate more revenue for the school by making 
the length of each course shorter, thus more appealing to 
the market for this type of instruction. These courses 
often lasted only two or three days making them easier to 
attend (USC). 
The newest Aviation Accident Investigation School in 
the US, was at ERAU in Prescott. In reviewing ERAU's 1995 
course content, the following was found: 
1. Overview of Aircraft Accidents/Incidents 
2. Analysis of Causal Factors/Accident Models 
3. Investigative Organizations, Statutes and 
Regulations 
4. Investigation Management and Preparedness 
5. Aviation Records 
6. Accident Photography 
7. Case Studies (a total of four at various 
points in the course) 
8. Witness Interviewing 
9. Witness Interviewing Simulation 
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10. Anatomy of an Accident 
11. Initial Actions (upon an accident) 
12. Investigation Techniques 
13. Fire Investigation 
14. Structures Investigation (academic) 
15. Structures Investigation (at a Crash Laboratory) 
16. Propulsion Systems (Recip Engines/Propellers) 
17. Propulsion Systems (Turbine Engines) 
18. Electrical System Investigation 
19. Flight Control System Investigation 
20. Instrument System Investigation 
21. Composite Material Investigation 
22. Rotorcraft Investigation 
23. Establishing Facts - Human Factors 
24. Establishing Facts - Aircraft 
25. Establishing Facts - Airport/Facilities/Weather 
26. Cockpit Voice Recorder & Flight Data Recorder 
27. Accident Liability/Legal Implications 
28. Probable Cause 
29. Crashworthiness (Crash Laboratory) 
30. Survival Factors (Crash Laboratory) 
These items were taught at the first ERAU program in 
August 1992 which was conducted at Prescott and called 
"Aircraft Accident Investigation Course." They were still 
in the curriculum in early 1995. The first class, in 1992, 
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was intended to be a combination of both a basic and 
advanced course (Minter). 
By the summer of 1993, the name of the course had been 
changed to "Aircraft Accident Investigation and 
Management." Other courses titled Aviation Human Factors, 
Advanced Accident Investigation, Crashworthiness, CFR 
Emergency Response, and Aviation Safety Program 
Management/System Safety Management were also offered. The 
curriculum of these courses were not much different than 
the original 1992 courses, but incorporated several 
additional subjects such as Corrosion Damage, Rejected 
Take-offs, Wind Shear, Icing, and Rotorcraft Accident 
Investigation. By 1994, ERAU required students to complete 
at least three of these courses to meet the curriculum 
requirements for an Aviation Safety Certificate Program. 
The only "commercial" or private organization which 
offered a course on Aircraft Crash Investigation was ICSE. 
This school offered a Basic Course which contained: 
1. Introduction to Crash Survival 
2. Terminology and Basic Crash Force Calculations 
3. Crash Dynamics; Crash Test Films, Case Studies 
4. Ejection Seats; Parachutes 
5. Team Approach to Accident Investigation 
6. Human Tolerance Mechanisms, Medical Inventory 
Procedures 
7. Crash Survivability 
8. Fire Environment (two different sessions) 
9. Crash Force Transmissions to Seated Occupants 
10. Crash Dynamics, Acceleration, Velocity, and 
Displacement (plus other class sessions on 
Calculations, Energy Absorption, the 
Kinematigraph, etc.) 
11. Structural Container Design for Impact Survival 
12. Restraint Systems 
13. Helmets 
14. Energy Absorbing Seat Design 
15. Fire Threat and Human Tolerance 
16. Crash Survival Evaluation 
17. Accident Photography 
18. Fire Investigation 
19. Accident Investigation Procedures 
20. Evacuation 
The "Advanced" course taught at ICSE covered much of 
this same material, but added the following: 
1. Crashworthy Fuel System Design 
2. Current Status, Aviation Crashworthiness 
3. NTSB Damage Estimate Techniques 
4. New NTSB Forms 
5. Accident Investigation Procedures - NTSB 
6. FAA Crashworthiness Programs 
7. US Army FDR Program 
8. Legal Considerations 
9. Safety - The Manufacturer's View 
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10. NASA Crashworthiness 
There was much emphasis on teaching the "survival" 
aspects of an aviation accident. The subjects of fire, 
fuel system, and seat design covered several hours of the 
course. A major group that attended the ICSE courses were 
doctors and other medical personnel (Tilson). 
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The similarity among all of these schools was obvious 
and reflected the military and CAB (now NTSB) influence. 
As the technology of aviation and apparent causes of 
accidents changed over the years, so did the curriculums of 
these schools. For example, the first updating of course 
content observed was influenced by the arrival of the "jet 
age." This required courses on turbine (jet) engines, 
advanced aerodynamics, and high altitude weather. During 
the early 1990s, wind shear, the cause of several major 
airline accidents, was added to the curriculums. 
As a result of military needs and government research 
and development (R&D) grants, new materials, called 
composites, began to appear on the scene and were 
incorporated into airframe structures. This called for 
teaching investigators about "composite" materials. With 
the airline mid-air collision over southern California, and 
more recently the collision accident in Philadelphia which 
killed Senator Heinz, the topic of "mid-air collisions" 
came into the curriculum. The topic of "ground deicing," a 
direct reflection of the several airline accidents that 
took place in the winters of 1991 and 1992, was added in 
1993. The crash of an airliner in late 1994 brought "in-
flight" icing into sharper focus in 1995. 
The technical needs of the aviation accident 
investigation process were easy to identify, and as 
documented in the literature review, seemed to be uniform 
throughout the schools that taught the highly technical 
subject of aviation accident investigation. 
The Social Needs of the 
Investigation Process 
This section of the research addresses the social, 
legal liability aspects of aviation accidents. It traces 
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some of the legal philosophies and court decisions from the 
1800s to the mid 1990s. Also addressed, were some of the 
debates that took place during the writing of aviation laws 
that would regulate the accident investigation process and 
the funding of aviation related government agencies. Of 
particular importance was the usage of the terms probable 
cause and fault. How these terms were used, and included 
or omitted from legal discussions about aviation accident 
investigation and litigation laws, had led to the formation 
of the conflicts being studied by this research. 
While the aviation community seemed to think the legal 
system's impact on aviation was a recent phenomenon, the 
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first significant law case of record in America was Guille 
v. Swan. This took place in 1822, almost 100 years before 
the Wright Brothers first flew (John's, 1912). This was a 
New York case that was taken all the way to the New York 
State Supreme Court (Johnson cited by Tyler, 1929). 
Of note was the judge's philosophy toward aviation as 
he ruled on this case. He stated that an aircraft "was 
something in the nature of a dangerous instrumentality 
which ... was the absolute responsibility of its owner-
operator as far as any damage [caused by the aircraft] was 
concerned" (Cited by R. Wright, 1968, p. 105). The wording 
of this decision, made over 170 years ago, would certainly 
seem to fit the logic of many of the legal decisions that 
were taking place in US courtrooms in 1994 (J. Collins, 
personal communication, November 10, 1994). 
As mentioned earlier, airplane mishaps were frequent, 
but seldom serious during the early years of aviation 
development. It was obvious that after the first powered 
aircraft fatality in 1908 (Selfridge), other deaths soon 
followed. Aviation fatalities had begun much earlier, as 
reported by Bruggink (1991), the first fatal balloon 
accident claimed two lives in 1785. Powered aircraft had 
introduced a much higher level of flying activity and fatal 
accidents became the norm. In 1913, Jane's All the World's 
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Air-craft [sic], listed 16 American pilots killed in 1911, 
23 in 1912, and this number rapidly increased (p. 296). 
At the San Diego Army Air School, the death rate was 
eight our of 14 students (57%) in 1915 and the life 
expectancy of an Air Mail pilot was only four years 
(Shamburger, p. 100). From May 15, 1918, when the Army 
first began to fly the mail, until the enactment of the new 
civilian air mail routes a few years later, 31 out of the 
first 40 air mail pilots were killed (Bilstein, p. 52). 
Similar accident rates were seen by the civilian aviation 
community. 
As might be expected, this meant that the litigation 
of aviation matters became more common. As early as 1920, 
Frederick Stokey Company had published Woodhouse's Textbook 
of Aerial Laws. In 1928, Wingfield and Sparkes wrote The 
Law in Relation to Aircraft which referred to many early 
aviation laws including the Treaty of Versailles. 
This treaty was adopted by 27 signature countries in 
October 1911 and is an example of the world wide interest 
in aviation at a very early point in aviation history. In 
the early years of aviation, in addition to accident cases, 
there were many legal actions dealing with low flying 
aircraft and the operation of airplane landing areas (R. 
Wright). 
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The interest in aviation litigation and law in America 
became so great that in 1929 the Air Law Institute was 
founded at Northwestern University in Chicago. The Journal 
of Air Law and Commerce began to be published by the 
University shortly thereafter. Fagg and Wigmore were the 
first editors of this publication which contains much early 
aviation legal history (Larsen, 1991). These early 
editions of the Journal contained articles such as McNair's 
"The Beginning and the Growth of Aeronautical Law." This 
article documented aviation laws starting with the 1906 
activities of the Institute on International Law (1930, 1 
(4), p. 383). 
Considering the fact that the Wright Brothers were 
keeping their flights secret (Combs), other aviators were 
obviously catching the attention of the legal communities 
around the world. According to McNair, the first 
international aviation laws were adopted on October 13, 
1919. 
Southern Methodist University (SMU) assumed the 
responsibility for publishing the Journal in 1961 and began 
holding an "Air Law Symposium" in 1965 (Jerico). According 
to Tarpley, who spoke at the opening of the 1995 meeting, 
the SMU symposium is now the world's largest aviation legal 
meeting of its type. By 1995, the symposium had been held 
annually for 29 years. 
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"If one accepts a law in action concept, it is easy to 
believe that law is not simply a collection of cases, 
statutes, articles, and treatises. Law is a fluid social 
activity that changes with time and society" (R. Wright, p. 
x). The changing social concepts of law, especially as 
they related to aviation accidents and litigation, had 
placed new importance on the concepts of "cause" and 
··- -· ..., 
"fault." The public had changed the way they expected the 
legal system to protect them, or help them obtain 
compensation in the event of a loss. 
Ogburn (1945) wrote The Social Affects of Aviation, 40 
years prior to the public's acceptance of mass air travel. 
His comments on the social affects that aviation was having 
on society could be magnified ten fold in 1995. The 
literature clearly indicated that, contrary to the adverse 
publicity the legal community was receiving from 
manufacturers and opponents of consumer rights or product 
liability litigation, it was society that was driving these 
changes. Fleming, speaking before the ABA in 1991 said, 
"We are not per se the most litigious society in the 
world ... the primary reasons for an increase in litigation 
... has been civil rights, consumer, and environmental-
orientated legislation." Society, acting through juries 
and/or judges, not attorneys, interpreted laws, decided 
cases and awarded or denied damage claims. Aviation law 
seemed to be following the general social trends of 
society. Claims for damages that were not allowed years 
ago were being found more worthy of litigation in the 
1990s. 
74 
According to former Vice President Quayle, in a speech 
before the ABA, America was the world's leader in consumer 
protection and tort litigation (1991). Many countries 
around the world did not share America's philosophy in 
these areas. For example, in 1990, a 727 airliner with 16 
persons aboard disappeared into the ocean about 160 miles 
from the south-eastern coast of Canada (Aviation Week & 
Space Technology [AW&ST], 1990, September 17, p. 42). 
Since the aircraft was of Peruvian registration and flying 
over international waters, under ICAO rules, the 
responsibility for any investigation rested with Peru 
(Annex 13). Peru took no action to investigate this loss 
because they did not wish to spend funds on this effort. 
Since Peruvian laws did not offer compensation to persons 
who might have suffered losses due to this accident, there 
was no perceived benefit from an investigation. 
In spite of the fact that some of the passengers were 
US citizens, the US did not wish to spend any money on an 
investigation either. Since the accident took place under 
Canadian air traffic control, Canada had a legal right to 
investigate the accident. For economic reasons, Canada, 
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like Peru and the US, elected to ignore the accident. As 
of May 1995, no investigation had been conducted. 
Aviation accident investigation activities can be very 
expensive. For this reason, economic justification, not 
technical objectives is often the prime motivation for 
investigations. In discussing this philosophy with NTSB 
staff, they pointed out that the NTSB requires the answers 
to three questions before it spends funds on an accident 
investigation (Schleede). The three questions the NTSB 
considered were: 
1. Why do you want to conduct this investigation? 
2. Who is going to pay for the investigation? 
3. Who will benefit from the investigation? 
Using the Peruvian 727 accident as an example, the 
NTSB explained that the 727 model was over 25 years old and 
no longer in production. The NTSB, Boeing and the world 
~already knew everything there is to know about a 727, 
there is nothing new to be learned from investigating this 
accident. It was just a random event" (Schleede). Peru 
had no funds for an investigation, and the US and Canada 
did not wish to fund an investigation on behalf of a 
country that had no strong political ties to the US or 
Canada. As far as the US passengers that were aboard the 
aircraft were concerned, the families of these people were 
mostly citizens of Peru who did not have access to a system 
of justice similar to that which we enjoy in the US. 
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Political and economic ties often influenced the 
NTSB's decisions to investigate international accidents. 
For example, Air India Flight 182 fell out of the sky on 
June 23, 1985, 110 miles from the coast of Ireland (Clark & 
Mukheajee, 1987). Since the flight originated in Canada, 
and there were claims made about a failure of the Canadian 
airport security system to detect a bomb, Canada spent six 
million dollars on the investigation. When the project 
"ran out of money" the FAA, NTSB, and India joined together 
and furnished 1/3 million more dollars each, the necessary 
funds to finish the investigation (Schleede). The NTSB 
maintained a one million dollar reserve fund for just such 
purposes (NTSB FY 1993 Budget, 1991, p. i). 
From time to time, the NTSB has participated in 
international aviation accident investigations only because 
of political overtones. When congressman Mickey Leland was 
killed in an airplane accident in Northern Africa, the NTSB 
was asked to participate in the investigation (Wadell, 
1990). 
If countries wealthier than Peru or India have an 
aviation loss, they are more willing to spend funds for an 
investigation. This is especially true when there are also 
political implications to an aviation loss. For example, 
in 1987 a South African 747 crashed into the Indian ocean. 
Because of the large liabilities associated with this loss, 
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and claims that the aircraft "was carrying smuggled US 
rocket fuel," the South African government spent 12 million 
dollars in an unsuccessful attempt to find the cause of the 
accident (Schleede). According to a February 1995 report 
in The Aviation Safety Monitor, "All 159 aboard perished in 
the crash, which has been officially attributed to a fire 
of undetermined origin." (p. 4.) 
Another example of how economic factors can drive th~ 
effort expended to find the "probable cause" of an accident 
is the United Flt. 811 incident over the Pacific in 
February of 1989. A 747 lost a forward cargo door and nine 
people died as a result of damage to the cabin area caused 
by the departing door. Even though the door was not 
recovered, in April 1990 the NTSB issued its report on the 
accident. The NTSB found that an "improperly latched cargo 
door" and "inadequate maintenance by United" was the 
probable causes for the accident (AAR-90/01). 
United did not agree with the NTSB's findings. With 
millions of doltars in liability claims at stake, United's 
motivation of "finding fault" was greater than the NTSB's 
motivation of finding "probable cause." This prompted 
United to attempt to recover the missing door which laid 
under 14,100' of water (AW&ST, 1990, September 17, p.42). 
It was determined that it would cost about 280 thousand 
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dollars to look for the door. United, Boeing, the FAA, and 
NTSB agreed to equally split the cost of finding the door. 
The door was found after spending only 193 thousand 
dollars. The door was then recovered at a cost of an 
additional 250 thousand dollars. The FAA and NTSB each 
paid 21.5 thousand and Boeing and United each contributed 
103.5 thousand dollars. The actual cost of the recovery 
activities was much higher, but the US Navy furnished the 
equipment to find and recover the door at a "very low cost" 
(Schleede). 
Upon inspection of the recovered door, the NTSB 
changed its probable cause findings from "an operational 
and maintenance error by United" to "a design error by 
Boeing." The NTSB issued a revised report on this accident 
in March of 1992 (INtsb, 1992, p. 8). The 152 thousand 
dollars spent by United, to find and recover the door, 
allowed it to save millions of dollars by avoiding the 
liability claims that were made against United as a result 
of the accident. 
This is an example of where the NTSB did not wish to 
spend their funds to find the door because of the three 
question rule discussed earlier. In the mind of the NTSB, 
the cost of finding the door outweighed the public benefit 
of knowing why the door came off. Obviously even wealthy 
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countries sometimes limited the resources they were willing 
to expend on an aviation accident investigation. 
If the true cause of the door failure was improper 
maintenance by United, the NTSB's decision may have been 
acceptable. However, in view of the later finding that the 
door design was defective, thousands of airline passengers 
were at risk while 747s were flying around with unsafe 
forward cargo door locks. 
The economics of accident investigation were still a 
major factor in 1995. Chairman Hall, during the January 
1995 public hearings on USAir Flt. 427, acknowledged that 
Boeing and others were spending over a million dollars on 
work the NTSB could not afford to pay for (1995). It 
should be easy to understand how a third world country such 
as Peru, did not have the resources to conduct any 
extensive aviation accident investigations. Perhaps, as 
reflected in "NTSB Proposes no-growth Plan (AW&ST, 1995, 
February 20, P. 34), this would become a trend in the US. 
The economic issue of accident investigation was even 
more of a problem when it came time to investigate "small 
airplane" accidents. The NTSB utilized a system of 
assigning all aviation accidents to one of five categories: 
Major; Public Confidence; Prevention/Selected Safety 
Issues; Delegated; and Limited (property damage only). The 
public was very familiar with the "major" category, that 
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was what was seen on TV; the Washington, DC ~go team" and 
many other investigators at work, public hearings, and much 
media coverage. The 1994 USAir Flt. 427 Pittsburgh 
accident was an example of a "major" investigation. All 
airline accidents were in the major category. 
The rapid growth of the "corrunuter" and other airlines 
had created a logistical problem for the NTSB. As 
reflected in the AW&ST January 1995 article, "Regional 
Hiring, Purchasing Reflects Vigorous Growth," (p. 24) the 
expectation of the industry was that this growth would 
continue for some time. While the major air carriers were 
losing millions of dollars and cutting routes, closing 
hubs, selling airplanes, and reducing staffs, in 1993 there 
were 146 new airlines started (Reed, 1995). The corrunuter 
segment of the industry was seeing unparalleled growth. 
Corrunuter airlines had more frequent crashes and might 
only be a five or six passenger airplane. To control the 
economics of investigating these events, the NTSB conducted 
"field office" investigations. The growth of the corrunuter 
airline market had been much larger than what the FAA or 
NTSB had planned. Some of these corrunuter planes were 
carrying 60 passengers in jets that were larger than what 
major airlines operated only ten years ago. When one of 
these airplanes went down, as happened in Indiana in the 
fall of 1994, what was the NTSB to do? 
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McCarthy, chairman of ALPA's national Accident 
Investigation Board, told the NTSB at its March 1994 Safety 
Symposium, these field investigations ufrequently fail to 
uncover valuable safety information." He also felt that 
many of the problems with these investigations can be 
traced to lack of resources available to the NTSB. He 
further explained, uneither public interest nor significant 
safety issues are initially apparent" when these field 
investigations are conducted. 
Steenbilk, 1994, P. 35.) 
(McCarthy, quoted by 
Some accidents had a high public interest, such as the 
accident that killed Senator Heinz in 1991. This 
investigation received almost as much NTSB effort as a 
major accident would require (NTSB: DCA91MA031A/B). 
Normally these high profile accidents were in the upublic 
confidence" category and received varying amounts of the 
NTSB's resources to investigate. The investigation budget 
depended upon the media attention the accident attracted. 
(B. Bahler, personal communication, February 17, 1994). 
The uPrevention/Selected Safety" category varied from 
time to time. In 1995, flight instruction and helicopter 
accidents were in this category. At best, this meant that 
special statistical data was being kept on these accidents, 
but no extra resources were being expended on investigating 
these types of events (Gross). 
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The "delegated" and "limited" investigations were 
almost always performed by the FAA, or perhaps a "phone" 
investigation effort was made by the NTSB. Almost all 
"general aviation" accidents were placed into one of these 
last two categories. This meant that the investigation 
effort would be subject to all of the quality problems 
previously mentioned or yet to be discussed. When one 
considers that more people get killed in "small airplanes" 
than in airliners, shouldn't the public need for factual 
information on this category of accidents be at least equal 
to the public's interest in a major investigation? With an 
annual average of about 1,200 lives lost in small 
airplanes, and less than 200 lives lost in airliners, a 
larger return on the "investigation" dollar in safety could 
be gained by better investigations of small airplane 
accidents. 
During its 28 years of operation, as of April 1, 1994, 
the NTSB had investigated 100,332 aviation accidents 
(Steenblik, 1994). Over 99.8% of these investigations were 
of general aviation aircraft. Only 155 accidents were 
airliners (NTSB 25th Annual Report, 1993, pp. 142-145). If 
the NTSB's expenditures for aircraft investigations are 
divided by the number of investigations undertaken, the 
average investigation costs about $3,000 (NTSB, 1994, p. 
15). It is obvious that not much of an investigation can 
be conducted for $3,000 (M.K. Hynes, in press). Exact 
dollar amounts per investigation are not made public and 
the NTSB's accounting system is not organized in a manner 
that would allow that type of data to be accurately 
determined (Bahler). 
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In some cases tnvestigations were conducted only "by 
phone" (Re. Audie v. Heli-Lift). When the FAA performed 
the full investigation for the NTSB, only the time it takes 
to review the FAA's input was needed. The NTSB's "cost" of 
these investigations were probably much less than the 
$3,000 average. 
With requests for limitations on legal liability, such 
as Lowe wrote in support of Senate bill S.67 (1993), many 
people felt that laws should be passed that would further 
restrict aviation litigation that resulted from aircraft 
crashes. In reviewing aviation litigation efforts, it 
appeared that "finding fault" was frequently a stronger 
motivating force than "finding probable cause." This 
"higher motivation" of litigants often resulted in finding 
different causes of accidents than what the NTSB found as a 
result of their efforts (Wolk, Miller). Perhaps the public 
needs to rethink the concept of limiting litigation efforts 
which are the only means of challenging the NTSB's quality 
of investigation efforts. 
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The major driving force behind aviation litigation was 
economics (Madole). Aircraft accidents often involved 
people with considerable net worth or earning power, and 
the defendants were usually perceived as being capable of 
paying large claims (Millar). In aviation, the legal "deep 
pocket" theory, that is, going after the defendant who had 
the most money, was almost always at work. In addition to 
the social aspects of pain and suffering associated with 
aviation accidents, the economic factor supported the 
pursuit of justice for wrongs. According to the FAA's 
Economic Values for Evaluation of FAA Investment and 
Regulatory Programs, the value of a human life was 1.7 
million dollars (1989, p. i). In an aviation accident 
death case, this monetary prize was worthwhile to pursue. 
As new technologies came into use and new legal 
theories were developed, a larger need for attorneys who 
were skillful in dealing with aviation litigation became 
apparent. America's tort system was not perfect, but at 
the time of this study there was no other system available 
to resolve disputes that arose from aviation accidents (B. 
Wagner, personal communication, June 10, 1994). 
For the last ten years there were about 3,000 aviation 
accidents per year in the US, over eight per day. O'Connor 
stated in 1994 (p. 4), there were several hundred more 
accidents each year which were not reported to the FAA or 
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NTSB. Boeing estimated that a major air crash will occur 
every eight days (UAA Newsletter, January/February 1995, p. 
10). When public use aircraft and military aviation 
mishaps were added to these totals, it was clear that there 
would be no shortage of potential litigation connected with 
aviation accidents in the future. 
This large level of litigation represented a major 
social need for accurate and prompt factual information on 
aviation accidents. This was pointed out by Flinn in 
Burden of Proof (1992). In view of the fact that any 
litigation must be based upon facts connected with the 
accident, how are these facts to be acquired by the parties 
that need them? Documenting the conflicts that existed 
between the technical and social aspects of the aviation 
accident investigation process was the purpose of this 
research. 
It was apparent that society also wanted to find fault 
rather than just find probable cause when they went to 
their government for factual information about accidents. 
This was clearly demonstrated by the public statements of 
Brunner, one of the spokespersons for the families of the 
victims of USAir flight 427. She called for more openness 
of the accident investigation process (1995). 
By law, the public was restricted from having access 
to accident sites, inspecting evidence connected with an 
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accident, contacting any witnesses, and communicating with 
the "official" government employees who were looking at the 
accident first hand. Of particular importance was the 
definition of "public" by the NTSB. The NTSB had exclusive 
legal control of the accident investigation process. It 
also had the power to allow certain parties to help it with 
its investigative task (49 CFR Part 800). These persons, 
called "designated parties", had almost full access to 
everything the NTSB was investigating, and in many cases 
were major sources of input into the "factual" reports that 
the NTSB would issue. Were these parties the "public"? 
These parties were almost always manufacturers of the 
aircraft, or some of its components. The background of 
this tradition originated when the CAB first started 
investigating accidents. In the early years of its 
existence, the CAB investigators did not know the many 
technical aspects of the aircraft that were then in 
operation. The manufacturer was a logical source for this 
information, and their assistance during an investigation 
was not only helpful, ih many cases it was an absolute 
necessity. 
In theory this seemed logical, but it must be pointed 
out, that in the event of design errors, manufacturing 
defects, and many other potential accident causes, it would 
be the manufacturer who might later be held "at fault." 
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Did this present a potential for conflicts of interest as 
the manufacturer worked with the NTSB investigators? Did 
the fact that manufacturers, likely to be future defendants 
of litigation, had access to information not available to 
plaintiffs, tip the scales of justice out of balance? Was 
it possible that a manufacturer might actually mislead the 
NTSB, or even hide evidence from government investigators 
during the fact finding phase of an investigation? 
Heller, an aviation reporter from Tampa, wrote the 
novel Maximum Impact in the fall of 1993 that addressed 
these very questions. While the book was considered 
fiction, there were some aviation experts who felt there 
may have been more truth in the book than the NTSB and 
other members of the aviation community would like to 
admit. Overly wrote a review of Heller's book in The 
Aviation Safety Monitor. This is a publication that many 
professional accident investigators and other members of 
the aviation community read. Overly stated, "Whether 
Maximum Impact is a book about airplane crashes or 
journalism--read it ... get Maximum Impact and read it--just 
put your other appointments off" (October, 1993, p. 3). By 
the general tone of his review, it was obvious that there 
should be some industry concern with the theme of the book. 
Heller utilized Galipault, a well-known and respected 
aviation safety expert, for technical assistance on the 
book. Considering Galipault's reputation in the aviation 
community, it was thought that he would not have helped 
Heller unless he felt the book had a "message to deliver" 
(J. Heller, personal communication, October 27, 1993). 
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In addition to Heller, consumer advocates Nader and 
Smith, teamed up to write Collision Course-The Truth About 
Airline Safety (1993). According to Overly, who also wrote 
a review on this work in November 1993, the book contained 
a blistering attack on the FAA and NTSB. Overly said the 
book asked several important safety questions, such as, 
"Why does the FAA cower to the airlines and manufacturers 
on important safety issues?" (p. 4). Anyone who was 
familiar with Nader knew he was quite willing to 
aggressively attack any organization on a consumer issue 
that was' safety related. Nader and Smith's book did not 
fail to continue this tradition as it attacked both the 
NTSB and the FAA on many of the points discussed in this 
research. 
As an indication that these two books had a Valid 
theme, in the early 1980s, several aircraft manufacturers 
and their suppliers, had formed a company, called 
"Aerospace Management Services International (AMSI) ." In 
the interest of efficiency, this organization employed well 
trained aviation accident investigators who were paid to 
"help the NTSB during investigations." The NTSB granted 
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"party status" to AMSI employees and allowed them full 
access to accident sites and other data. However, other 
duties of AMSI staff during the investigation may have had 
a higher priority than helping the NTSB. AMSI was told "to 
protect the interests of the aerospace manufacturers who 
were the owners of AMSI. It was conunon practice for AMSI 
to submit reports to manufacturer's legal departments. In 
some cases, these reports were different than the reports 
given to the NTSB." (L. Keerfoot, personal conununication, 
February 26, 1994.) 
The influence of AMSI was protested by others who were 
denied party status. The definition of allowable "parties" 
was subject to much debate. The role that AMSI was playing 
became too obvious for the NTSB to ignore. After much 
discussion, on July 9, 1985, NTSB Chairman Barnett wrote to 
Stimpson, the President of the General Aviation 
Manufacturers Association (GAMA) that "it has come to our 
attention that some persons who were not employees of the 
manufacturer may have had or may have represented interests 
beyond the Safety Board's investigation." On July 10, the 
NTSB issued a notice to bar AMSI from investigations and 
conducting any tests for the NTSB. The FAA sent a similar 
notice to its investigators on July 15th. As of August 15, 
1985, the effective date of Barnett's notice to GAMA, only 
employees of manufacturers would be granted "party status". 
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According to many, "at best this only reduced the 
efficiency, not the influence, of GAMA members to influence 
the NTSB during accident investigations" (Keerfoot). 
Lest one think that Nader and Smith's, and Heller's 
books were two isolated cases of writers finding fault with 
the FAA/NTSB aviation accident investigation system, a 
further review of the literature found a series of articles 
that addressed this same topic. Lederer, who was 
previously mentioned as a leader in aviation safety as far 
back as 1939, wrote several more recent papers. One was 
titled, "Is Probable cause(s) Sacrosanct?" (1992, pp. 8-
11). Here he questioned the narrow focus of aviation 
accident investigations and their failure to address the 
questions of cause and fault more equally. Lederer was 
recognized as a "fouriding father" and active leader of the 
International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI). 
This organization was the world's only such group of 
individuals who worked at the task of aviation accident 
investigation. Lederer had also been a mentor of many who 
later worked in the field of aviation accident 
investigation. 
Another long time member of ISASI, and a recognized 
"dean" of aviation safety and accident investigation, was 
Miller. He was at one time head of the CAB investigation 
branch and later formed his own company, System Safety, 
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which did extensive accident investigation work. He, like 
others who performed aviation accident investigations on a 
private basis, often had to re-examine evidence and take 
other steps to disprove the official "NTSB Probable Cause 
Report" on an aviation accident. Miller, especially 
because of his skills and reputation in the aviation 
industry, was a frequent speaker and writer on aviation 
safety, usually connected with the accident investigation 
process. 
A small sample.of Miller's writings, such as, "Down 
with Probable Cause" (1991), "Probable Cause: The Correct 
Legal Test in Civil Aircraft Accident Investigations?" 
(1992), and "Compatibility of Air Safety Investigations and 
Civil/Criminal Litigation" (1993), all reflected concern 
about two very important aspects of aviation accident 
investigations. These concerns were the quality of the 
reports and the use of the reports by attorneys during 
litigation. Litigation was the obvious theme of the latter 
of the articles mentioned. Both Miller's and Lederer's 
material also contained a strong anti-litigation bias. 
These writings also supported the existence of conflicts 
within the aviation accident investigation system. 
In June of 1992, Air Line Pilot magazine published an 
article by Steenblik titled, "Probable Cause: Help, or Red 
Herring?" The thrust of Steenblik's message was well-
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expressed in the editorial highlighting of the author's 
comments, "The Safety Board's fundamentally flawed mandate 
must be changed, and only Congress can do that" (p. 20)'. 
Of interest was Steenblik's reference to a statement by 
Ender who had said, "The 70 or so percent of fatal accident 
causes--primary or probable--ascribed to pilot or flight 
crew error is now being unmasked as a misleading statistic" 
(p. 23). Ender was vice-chairman of the nonprofit, 
independent Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) and had made 
these remarks at FSF's "Fourth Annual European Corporate 
and Regional Aircraft Operators Safety Seminar" (1992). 
Ender's statement seemed to address the point raised in 
this research that questioned the accuracy of the FAA/NTSB 
aviation accident statistical data base, particularly the 
"pilot error" accident causation category. 
In December 1992, Air Line Pilot magazine ran another 
article that addressed this same subject. "NTSB: Friend or 
Foe?," by Shipman, an airline pilot for USAir who was also 
a former NTSB accident investigator. Shipman reviewed and 
confirmed some of the same points discussed in this review 
of the literature. He made an interesting quote of 
Schleede, the head of the NTSB's accident investigation 
division, 
Our (the NTSB's) primary constituent is the 
airline passenger, and our primary goal is 
ensuring his or her safety. We are an 
independent agency with no ax to grind. It 
doesn't matter to us if the cause of the accident 
is material failure, inadequate aircraft design, 
pilot error, or whatever. We only want to 
investigate the accident thoroughly so we can 
identify and try to correct problems. (p. 51) 
Schleede's comments seemed honorable and certainly 
reflected the desires of society in the formation of the 
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NTSB. However, as questioned by this research, was society 
getting what they wanted, in both quality and content? 
Air.Line Pilot magazine had a narrow but significant 
readership, some 45,000 professional pilots, most of whom 
were employed by the airlines. The decision of this 
publication, to print articles on this subject, reflected 
on both its reader's interests, and the fact that the 
publisher of this magazine was the Air Line Pilots 
Association (ALPA), the world's largest pilot union. ALPA 
was the only non-government organization in America that 
had a formal and trained aviation accident investigation 
team. ALPA was at times granted "party status" by the NTSB 
during investigations. This gave ALPA a first hand view of 
how the NTSB functioned. ALPA also had a credible 
reputation for technical expertise within the aviation 
accident investigation community. 
Following this line of thought, an article by McCabe, 
published in the LPBA Journal in 1991, also focused on the 
content of NTSB reports. The title, ~The Unreliability and 
Inadmissibility of Government Aviation Accident Reports," 
clearly addresses the two major questions being studied by 
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this research effort. McCabe clearly stated "it is 
important for people having an interest in the civil 
liability aspects of an air crash to get involved, if at 
all possible, early in the investigation" (p. 5). He then 
went on to discuss the NTSB policies that gave access to 
defendants but not to plaintiffs, something addressed by 
this research. 
The Lawyer Pilots Bar Association (LPBA) was a unique 
group of people who were both lawyers and pilots. This 
organization, through its LPBA Journal, meetings, and 
seminars, was just beginning to openly discuss the 
existence of conflicts between probable cause and fault, 
something that this study undertook to document. One might 
hope that during their discussion of this topic, the LPBA 
maintained a high level of objectivity. A review of the 
writings (1988-1995) in the LPBA Journal, and reports of 
their discussions on this topic, failed to disclose any 
rebuttal or disagreement with McCabe's comments made in 
1991. 
The Aviation Consumer, which as its name implies, is a 
magazine that targets its content to the aviation 
community. The publication recently began to feature 
articles about the technical and social conflicts that 
existed within the aviation accident system. For example, 
in ~The Great Turn-around, More Thoughts on Reversing the 
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Downward Plunge of General Aviation," managing editor 
Weeghman wrote, "Unfortunately, the FAA and NTSB seldom pay 
attention to the much later [and often better] 
investigation that attends a serious product trial" (1994, 
pp. 18-20). This was a clear indication of the need to 
question the quality of FAA/NTSB accident investigations. 
If properly motivated, the NTSB can quickly respond to 
both the technical and social needs of an aviation accident 
investigation. This was proven when the NTSB responded to 
the loss of the space shuttle Challenger. It was ironic 
that initially NASA had no major "in house" accident 
investigation capability (Wadell, 1991). This was publicly 
disclosed as a result of the space shuttle Challenger 
accident which took place on January 28, 1986. Six days 
after the accident, on February 3rd, President Reagan 
formed a Special Commission to investigate the Challenger 
disaster. 
The mandate to the Commission was "to establish the 
probable cause or causes" of this accident. The 
investigation was completed and the report issued on June 
6th. As a result of this order, some 1,300 NASA employees, 
plus 1,600 persons from other government agencies such as 
the NTSB, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Navy, joined 3,100 
contractor personnel to complete the task (Challenger 
Report, p. 1). At the request of the Commission and NASA, 
the NTSB managed the investigation and it was estimated 
that over 400 million dollars were spent on the 
investigation (M.K. Hynes, in press). 
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When discussing the conflicts between the technical 
and social aspects of aircraft investigations, the 
military's approach to this problem is of interest. The 
military services did not utilize a concept of a 
centralized system for aviation accident investigation. As 
explained in the Flight Safety Handbook (USAF, 1993), when 
military aircraft mishaps occurred, special investigation 
teams were formed, usually by the Base Commander who had 
jurisdiction over the aircraft or the accident site. This 
team was formed for the temporary purpose of investigating 
the event. When the investigation was complete, teams were 
disbanded. Membership on these teams was rotated among 
military personnel and efforts were made to get different 
individuals for each investigation. 
The reasons for this approach to the investigation 
process were threefold. First, local knowledge of the 
individuals, equipment, and mission connected with the 
event was valuable. Secondly, this was thought to be a 
type of "peer" review and useful in educating other 
aviators in safety lessons learned during the investigation 
process. An additional benefit was achieved by maintaining 
a "fairness," as aviators judged the acts of other 
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aviators, while seeking both "probable cause" during the 
safety investigation and "fault" during the collateral 
investigation (J. Johnson, personal communication, June 2, 
1992). 
The military conducted two investigations for each 
accident. One, called the cause investigation was for 
safety reasons, and one called the fault investigation was 
for liability reasons (USAF, 1993). The two investigation 
concept was used in the civilian world, but the cause 
investigation was conducted by the NTSB and the fault 
investigation was accomplished only in connection with 
litigation. Because of the NTSB's policies, the second 
"fault investigation" was often attempted without access to 
factual data obtained during the taxpayer paid for 
"official" NTSB investigation. 
The 1991 Court ruling in the Sioux City, United Flt. 
232 case seemed to reignite the issue of admissibility of 
NTSB data into civil tort litigation. The background of 
Judge Conlon's decision .extends back to 1941 when congress 
debated Investigating Air Accidents in HR Report NO. 933. 
The beginning of any discussion on admissibility of 
NTSB's work products should start with the statutes that 
contain the exclusionary provisions being challenged. 
Title 49 USC, Section 1441(e) states: 
No part of any report or reports of the National 
Transportation Safety Board relating to any 
accident or the investigation thereof, shall be 
admitted as evidence or used in any suit or 
action for damages growing out of any matter 
mentioned in such report or reports. 
This wording was adopted as part of the FAA Act of 
1958. When the DOT/NTSB was first formed, and later when 
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the NTSB was made independent of the DOT in 1974, the legal 
wording was kept almost identical (PL 93-633, Section 1903, 
c.). This concept dated back to the original 1938 Civil 
Aeronautics Act, Section 701 (e). Before the testimony of 
any NTSB employee, this wording is read "into the record." 
One of the first major tests of this law was seen in 
1951 during the Universal Airline v. Eastern Airlines case. 
At trial, a CAB investigator was asked to testify about his 
investigation of the accident. No effort was made to have 
his or the CAB's report used during the trial. The CAB 
protested to the Court of Appeals, claiming under statutory 
exclusion, the investigator should not have been made to 
testify. The Court ruled against the CAB, and said, the 
CAB's rules were "sound so far as the Board and its work 
are concerned", but that had to be balanced against the 
governmental function of the administration of justice. 
The court seemed to be saying that the need of a plaintiff 
to have access to factual evidence was stronger than the 
need of the CAB to keep its work products out of court. 
This practice--of letting investigators testify within 
limits, while still excluding written CAB reports--seemed 
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to be more frequent as time went by. As might be expected, 
aviation litigation was fairly common in US courts. There 
was not much uniformity as to how each court addressed the 
inadmissibility question~ the permitting of CAB employees 
to testify, sometimes even using the prohibited CAB reports 
to refresh their memory. In Lobel v. American Airlines, 
the Court of Appeals commented: 
The fundamental policy underlying (the rule) 
appears to be a compromise between the interests 
of those who would adopt a policy of absolute 
privilege in order to secure full and frank 
disclosure as to the probable cause and thus help 
prevent future accidents and the countervailing 
policy of making available all accident 
information to litigants in a civil suit. 
For the last 30 years, that has been the question 
before the courts, the CAB, which is now the NTSB, and the 
aviation community. Are investigators able to discover 
more about accidents because people believe there is some 
form of immunity in talking with NTSB investigators? 
According to the results of a poll taken by the NBC TV show 
Dateline, this may be optimistic thinking. When asked 
about a major error they made, the public would admit it 
12% of the time, ignore it 13% of the time, 28% would lie 
about it, and 43% would opt to blame someone else (October, 
1994) • 
With millions of dollars of liability at stake, even 
with an assumption of immunity, most attorneys and 
professional accident investigators doubt the "average" 
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person was going to be willing to admit to doing wrong. 
The Dateline poll seems to confirm this observation. This 
inherent conflict during aviation accident investigations, 
the fear of losing millions of dollars by being "at fault" 
or receiving a violation from the FAA, keeps most people 
from fully cooperating with either the FAA or NTSB 
investigators. 
Perhaps the NTSB could improve on its investigating 
quality to the point where its efforts would fill the dual 
needs of the public, both technical and social. The 
military seemed to be doing this with its two investigation 
system. Most people seem to only be asking that the NTSB 
improve its quality and be more thorough and neutral in its 
reports (Wolk, Miller, Waldock). The public would also 
like to have full access to factual information which was 
gathered by the NTSB at taxpayer's expense. If NTSB work 
products were of higher quality and "neutral", determining 
the causes of accidents and then finding out who was "at 
fault" would be easier. Many felt that this would decrease 
the need for litigation, something everyone wanted to 
happen. If FAA or NTSB work products had a more than 50/50 
chance of being in error, the economic odds of spending 
money to "go to court" are reasonable. The undertaking of 
litigation assumes that the risk of losing is lower than 
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the reward if one should be the winner (M. Lessin, personal 
communication, April 10, 1994). 
While this research had found many similar articles of 
interest, they all ·seemed to follow two lines of thought. 
One, the quality of the NTsB·reports seemed to be suspect, 
and two, the fairness and ethics of the investigation 
system seemed to be in doubt. It was felt that the content 
and tone of the material already reviewed herein had 
adequa_tely conveyed the existence and seriousness of the 
problem being researched. 
Problems Within the Process 
Based upon the literature that was reviewed and 
confirmed by communications with approximately 125 persons 
who had worked, or were still working in the field of 
aviation accident investigation, several problems existed 
within the accident investigation process. 
For example, the FAA played a very large role in many 
accident investigations. It was important to note that the 
FAA was not legally authorized to conduct accident 
investigations for safety purposes (49 CFR Part 800). 
However, for enforcement purposes, the FAA did investigate 
any aviation accident of which they became aware (14 CFR 
Part 13). According to the NTSB 1993 Report to Congress, 
the FAA had some 2,575 inspectors who investigated 
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accidents, a number almost 50 times larger than the NTSB 
investigation staff (1994, p. 23). 
The FAA's legal right and obligation to conduct 
aircraft accident investigations comes from the mandate of 
Sections 313(a) and 601(b) of the Federal Aviation Act. 
While the FAA may participate with, or actually conduct an 
investigation for the NTSB, it "does not make such an 
investigation a joint one in the sense of sharing 
responsibility (49 CFR Part 831.2b) ." (FAA Order 8020.11, 
Chapter 1.) 
The FAA's role "in aircraft accident investigations 
was to determine if any of our (FAA) nine areas of 
responsibility were involved." (TS!, 1990, p. 1.) The nine 
areas of FAA concern were: 
1. FAA Facilities 
2. Non-FAA Facilities 
3. Medical Qualifications 
4. Competency 
5. Airport Operations 
6. Airport Security 
7. FAR Inadequacy 
8. FAR Violations 
9. Airworthiness 
FAA inspectors, in addition to helping the NTSB, 
completed its own FAA Form 8020.16. Section 22 of this 
form deals with the nine areas listed above. Inspectors 
must fill out this form on all accidents. However, "He/she 
will not be held responsible for determinations that are 
deemed wrong. In fact, there is no follow-up to see if the 
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FAA's (cause) identification of areas match that of the 
NTSB's, which will be published about a year later [after 
the accident]" (TSI, 1990, pp. 1-2.) 
While conducting its investigations, the FAA, upon the 
first sign of any irregularity, usually opened an 
Enforcement Investigative Report (EIR) and began to collect 
evidence of violations so enforcement action might be taken 
at a later time (14 CFR, Part 13). Because of the 
enforcement powers of the FAA, and the absence of civil 
liberty protections for the accused, the aviation community 
was strongly motivated to avoid all contact with the FAA 
and were encouraged not to discuss any aspect of an 
accident with FAA staff. 
In 1990, Likakis wrote, "Trial of Steve Faber: When 
the Feds want your ticket, there are no holds barred." It 
was intended to be a clear warning to all aviators who were 
involved in even minor aviation accidents or incidents. 
"Fighting City Hall," by A. Lewis (1993) also addressed 
this problem. This philosophy was often extended to 
refusing to disclose information to the NTSB when it was 
attempting to determine "probable cause" in an effort to 
improve safety (P. Huggins, personal communication, 
November 15, 1993). 
Because of the FAA's approach to aviation accident 
investigation, serious conflicts developed between the 
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parties involved in the accident and the "official" 
government investigators who may have been FAA and not NTSB 
employees. When the FAA was wearing their "NTSB hat" on 
top of their "FAA enforcement hat", it might be considered 
an effort by the FAA to hide its enforcement intentions. 
The "FAA hat" worn alone would have warned an aviator of 
the potential enforcement intentions of the accident 
investigator. 
FAA investigators were trained to look for evidence of 
violations and their legal function was to enforce 
regulations. These two goals influenced FAA investigative 
efforts. Obviously, these goals did not match well with 
the NTSB's goal of promoting safety by finding the 
~probable cause" of accidents. Because of these 
conflicting goals, cooperation between the aviation 
industry and the FAA, in obtaining factual data on 
accidents, was often compromised. 
The NTSB acknowledged this problem when they stated to 
Congress, "FAA investigators were focused on finding 
operator violations, sometimes at the expense of the 
inspector's objectivity." To add to this problem, the NTSB 
also stated, " ... not all of the FAA inspectors have been 
trained in accident investigation; for those who have, 
necessary refresher training has been nearly nonexistent" 
(NTSB 1994 Budget, 1992, p. 102). In spite of the NTSB's 
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complaints about the FAA, in 1995 the FAA was still being 
asked by the NTSB to conduct investigations, but in a 
discreet manner. There was some degree of irony in the 
NTSB's comments about the experience and training of the 
FAA's accident investigators since the same observations 
applied to many NTSB aviation investigators. 
Under the DOT Act of 1966, the NTSB had the legal 
right to ask the FAA for help in investigating accidents. 
When the FAA did the investigation for the NTSB, it was 
called a "delegated option" or "delegated investigation." 
When the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 was passed, 
the NTSB lost its right to ask the FAA for help. The 
passage of this law did not seem to influence the working 
relationship between the FAA and the NTSB. 
As the FAA's workload increased and demands for budget 
reduction were made by Congress to the FAA, the working 
relationship between the FAA and NTSB stayed the same but 
an agreement for NTSB to provide funding to the FAA was 
signed (NTSB Public Notice 1, December 19, 1986). Prior to 
1982, about 75% of all aviation accident investigations 
were delegated to the FAA (NTSB 25th Annual Report, 1993, 
p. 19). In 1993, similar levels of FAA activity were still 
being seen (NTSB 1993 Report to Congress, 1994, p. 28). 
While it was not obvious by the paperwork, from a "labor 
viewpoint" the NTSB was still utilizing FAA personnel for 
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many of its aviation accident investigation tasks in early 
1995. However, with all branches of government under 
pressure to reduce staff and operating costs, the FAA had 
been doing less and less accident investigation work for 
the NTSB. This greatly increased the workload of NTSB 
investigators, while at the same time the NTSB was not 
increasing staff positions. During the 1980s, the NTSB 
staff was reduced to approximately 300 employees." The 
NTSB staffing "has never exceeded 400 employees" and was 
being reduced again in 1995 (NTSB, 1994, p. 11). According 
to its annual budget requests, the NTSB had also reduced 
staff in 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. 
The NTSB had remained one of the smallest government 
agencies in Washington and had no industry or public 
support for growth. Growth would require a larger budget, 
a necessary step prior to increasing the size of the NTSB's 
staff. As partial justification for its "no-growth plan" 
(AW&ST, 1995, February 20, p. 34), NTSB administrators felt 
additional staff and larger budgets would make the NTSB 
more subject to accountability, political pressure, and 
more vulnerable to outside criticism (Bahler). 
With thousands of accidents occurring each year, it 
was difficult for the NTSB staff to keep up with their 
workload. For the last ten years or more, there were less 
than 60 NTSB aviation accident investigators assigned to 
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six regions. Their actual duty locations were further 
spread around the US (NTSB FY 1993 Budget, 1991, p. 75). 
NTSB investigation reports were often completed by FAA 
personnel, and then sent to the nearest local or regional 
NTSB office for processing. If one considered vacation 
time, training, and personal sick leave, on any given day, 
there were less than 45 NTSB personnel "on duty" to respond 
to accidents or to provide guidance to the FAA investigator 
who was working an accident file for the NTSB (Gross). 
With approximately 3,000 aviation investigations to 
conduct, or at least review the FAA reports on them, NTSB 
investigators had an average of 50 case files to process 
each year. Based on the average case cycle time, which the 
NTSB reported as 14 months, at any one time each 
investigator might have 55 to 60 open files to manage 
(Hall). From the six regional offices, these reports were 
forwarded to Washington, DC as NTSB work products. In some 
cases, the report had been completed without any FAA or 
NTSB personnel ever visiting the accident site or 
inspecting the aircraft that was involved in the accident 
(Re. Audie v. Heli-Lift). This certainly supported claims 
by Wolk and others that the quality of NTSB investigations 
was suspect. More than once, problems with the validity or 
content of NTSB reports were discovered during ~fault 
finding" litigation. 
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The NTSB admitted that this was not an ideal work 
environment. In 1993, the NTSB stated to Congress that it 
sensed conflicts within the ranks of its investigators, 
especially when it utilized FAA staff who "were more 
concerned with law enforcement than accident prevention" 
(NTSB FY _1~_9~_Bul!g_et, 1992, p. 102). This also affected 
the accuracy and content of many NTSB reports, a situation 
which had been called into question by many aviation 
experts. 
Several people complained about this problem in 
various legal and aviation trade journals. ~Misconceptions 
About FAA/NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations" appeared 
in Experts at Law (M.K. Hynes, 1990) and McCabe (1991), in 
the_ LPBA Journal used the title, "The Unreliability and 
Inadmissibility of Government Aviation Accident Reports." 
Both of these articles cited legal cases where the quality 
of NTSB accident reports became a major issue during 
litigation. The title of Hynes' and McCabe's articles were 
meant to be a general reflection of the opinion of the NTSB 
that was held by many members of the legal community. 
Waldock also wrote about this problem, but the existing 
NTSB/FAA policies and work practices remained unchanged. 
The number and tone of these writings increased with 
time. Two years later, in 1993, a well-known aviation 
attorney, Wolk, openly criticized the quality of the NTSB's 
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investigations in several major publications, including the 
Wall Street Journal. 
The Washington, DC laboratories of the CAB, which 
became part of the NTSB in 1968, played a major role in 
attempting to prevent accidents and improve safety by 
determining "probable cause" for many aviation accidents. 
As the NTSB stated in its 25th Annual Report to Congress, 
"The Board's laboratories are world renowned and its 
technical staff is considered to be among the most 
experienced in accident investigation techniques" (1993, p. 
101). The quality of the work of these labs was very high 
and had been a major factor in achieving the existing level 
of safety seen in the world's air transportation system. 
However, NTSB labs had a very small staff, less than 
ten people (NTSB FY 1993 Budget, 1991, p. 85). Lab 
technicians had a high workload from the approximately 
3,000 air crashes that occurred each year, plus major 
accidents in the other modes of transportation. Therefore, 
only a small fraction of aviation accidents, less than 2%, 
were considered worthy of review by these highly trained 
but overworked specialists (NTSB, 1993, p. 90). Because of 
this, as Wolk, Miller, and Waldock claimed, the quality of 
many of the NTSB's accident investigations was sub-
standard. Perhaps the existing statistical data on 
accidents was masking some of the true causes of aviation 
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accidents and important aviation safety trends were not 
being detected (S. Houghton, personal communication, July 
25, 1992). 
It was logical then for the NTSB to compensate for its 
manpower shortages by utilizing other parties to conduct 
critical tests and technical analysis of suspected failed 
parts. It was a matter of policy for the NTSB to utilize 
the services of "interested" parties for this testing. 
These parties were frequently potential defendants in 
future litigation. Many felt this created a high potential 
for conflicts of interest during the testing process 
(Heller). Plaintiffs felt it would be better to use 
"neutral" parties to conduct the tests, or at least let 
plaintiffs watch defendants conduct any necessary tests 
(Wolk) . 
Often it is easy for "outsiders" to complain about any 
government agency, especially people who seem to be 
adversely affected by the activities of the agency being 
discussed. Most of the writings and comments that were 
reviewed so far were from outsiders "who may have had an ax 
to grind." What did the FAA and NTSB think about the 
quality issue? 
In October 1991, Del Gandia, who was the Manager of 
the FAA's Quality Assurance Division, Office of Accident 
Investigation, wrote, "37% of the delegated accident 
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reports reviewed were unsatisfactory." He was referring to 
a sample of work activities that took place from April 1 to 
June 30, 1991 (1991, October, pp. 1-2). Twelve months 
later, NTSB Chairman Vogt spoke before the Washington, DC 
meeting of the ABA's conference on "Litigation in 
Aviation." Vogt said before he became a member and 
Chairman of the NTSB, he was an attorney who dealt with 
aviation accident cases. He had made a sample check of 
NTSB findings and litigation outcomes, the results of which 
indicated to him that the NTSB's efforts were seldom up to 
his expectations and often were of poor quality (1992, 
October) . 
In February 1994, ISASI held a meeting in Washington, 
DC, which had as its theme, "Impact of Federal Aircraft 
Accident Investigations Upon Civil Litigation." This theme 
was almost a duplication of the theme of the research being 
undertaken here. Two of the featured speakers were 
Campbell, the General Counsel of the NTSB, and Dillman, the 
Assistant Chief Counsel for the FAA. The speakers panel 
had four other well known aviation attorneys. It was a 
surprise when Campbell openly stated he felt a NTSB report 
on an accident could be a "blueprint for some blood sucking 
attorney" so why make it helpful to them. He admitted that 
the NTSB does not want to help any litigation efforts. He 
also stated that there was "no public policy gain" by 
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investigating general aviation accidents. He also stated 
that "perhaps the NTSB should get out of the accident 
investigation business" when it came to small aircraft. 
While this philosophy was whispered by many NTSB 
investigators, this was the first time such a statement was 
made in public. The audience consisted of about 50 
professional accident investigators. However, because of 
the Washington, DC meeting location, most of the 
investigators were either FAA or NTSB staff. 
When Dillman addressed the group, he emphasized the 
fact that in his opinion, "over half of all of the accident 
reports the FAA does for the NTSB contain errors, some of 
them pretty major." He felt "with odds like that, no 
wonder so many lawyers want to litigate aviation accidents, 
even when reports seem to blame their clients." Without 
more investigators who are better trained, Dillman saw no 
hope for improvements. More staff, for either the FAA or 
NTSB, would mean more funding would have to be provided. 
Funding for aviation accident investigation efforts 
had been a problem for many years. Referring to the "Air 
Safety Board Recommendations" issued on March 22, 1941, it 
was noted that, "in many instances a lack of funds has 
restricted desirable activities on the part of the 
Authority (CAA)" (p. 1). About four months later, this 
issue was addressed again. A special report titled 
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"Investigating Air Accidents" was presented to the House of 
Representatives (HR #933) on July 10, 1941. While this 
report clearly stated, "It is manifest that no stone must 
be left unturned in the interest of air safety (p. 3)," 
funding for the expansion of CAB staff to investigate 
aviation accidents was not forthcoming. 
Over 50 years later, the lack of expansion funding was 
still an obstacle to the growth of the NTSB and was 
preventing it from carrying out this important safety task 
of accident investigation (Koistad, 1991). Spence lamented 
this trend in his article, "Cuts loom for the NTSB, too" 
(1993, p. A-6). This trend continued as the NTSB not only 
remained very small, but even reduced staff. This was not 
going unnoticed by the aviation community, but the general 
public was not aware of this situation. 
It was obvious that much literature existed to 
document man's interest in flight and how that means of 
travel had grown. Accidents were part of the growing pains 
of developing a safe air travel system. Society wanted a 
very high level of safety within the air transportation 
system and looked to their government to provide it (Hall, 
1995). Government actions seemed to reflect a reasonable 
response to this concern for safety. 
Various social needs, such as the public's desire to 
receive compensation for losses that resulted from aviation 
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accidents, did not seem to be accounted for within the 
existing system of teaching aviation accident investigation 
or when investigations were carried out. Thus the high 
level of technical capabilities in finding probable cause 
were not matched by the ability or willingness to find 
fault. This led to conflicts between the technical 
(probable cause) and social (finding fault) aspects of the 
aviation accident investigation process. If, by the 
observations documented in this research, an open debate on 
these conflicts would take place, it was felt that the 
research effort would have been justified and that the 
effort had served a worthwhile social service. 
As a closure, an attempt to look into the future was 
made. To do so, the remarks of Vogt, a recent Chairman of 
the NTSB, were selected. Vogt had addressed the Royal 
Aeronautical Society during the 1993 "Sir James Martin 
Lecture," given in London (RAes Journal, August, 1993, pp. 
8-14) . 
In addition to reviewing the history of the NTSB, from 
the 1920s to 1993, Vogt made some interesting points that 
applied directly to the topic of this research. He said, 
"The accident site belongs to us [the NTSB] under the law. 
We exclude lawyers, who can make a mess of it at this 
stage." Vogt also went on to say that NTSB investigators 
use "experts from manufacturers, operators, unions and the 
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FAA ... Every fact is shared with them, and the opportunity 
therefore exists to dispute the evidence and share their 
perspectives. Indeed, we invite these parties to offer us 
their own analysis" (p. 14). It was obvious that these 
comments confirmed some of the observations that were 
presented in this research. His comments were also an 
indication that changes within the NTSB were not likely. 
Summary of the Literature and other activities 
The findings of the review of the literature and other 
activities can be summarized as follows: 
The interest in aviation has been long term. 
Man's fascination with flight has been recorded in his 
art, myths, songs, and religion for thousands of years. 
Today, as he reaches into outer space, he is reconfirming 
his desire to travel further and faster by flight. 
Aviation accidents have played a role in aviation's growth. 
From the first failures of the Wright brothers and the 
death of Selfridge in 1908, accidents have played an 
important role in perfecting aviation designs, techniques 
of manufacturing, and the operation of a safe 
transportation system. Even the spectacular accident of 
the space shuttle Challenger had knowledge to give to the 
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engineers of NASA as they continued their work to prepare 
for a future that might include the public's journey into 
space. 
The public has a high concern for aviation safety. 
The state aviation laws of the early 1900s reflected 
the public's expectation of government protection from 
unsafe aviation activities. The federal government 
responded to the public's concern by passing the aviation 
laws of 1926, 1938, 1956, 1967, and 1974. Almost every 
day, millions of people traveled billions of air miles, all 
in expectation of a safe journey. In 1995, the public 
still supported the strong regulation of aviation in hopes 
of the continued enjoyment of safe air travel. 
The Federal Government controlled the accident 
investigation process. 
Beginning with the laws of 1926, civil aviation 
accidents began to be investigated by the federal 
government. With the formation of the ASB in 1938, the CAB 
in 1940, the DOT/NTSB in 1967, and the independent NTSB in 
1974, the government had acquired exclusive control of the 
investigation process and preempted all other parties from 
participating in the investigation of aviation accidents. 
Accident investigation schools developed in a normal 
manner. 
Historical data reflects a logical and natural 
formation of schools to teach the technical subject of 
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aviation accident investigation. The schools that taught 
this subject were driven by government needs and funding. 
Need for this technical training resulted from a desire to 
prevent future aviation accidents by investigating past 
events. 
Technical requirements of investigations were well 
developed and met the public's needs. 
The literature confirmed that the technical changes of 
the aviation industry had been incorporated into the 
teaching and conducting of aviation accident 
investigations. 
The quality of investigations and reports was not 
acceptable. 
Some investigations were conducted in an unacceptable 
manner. The public questioned the quality, validity, and 
content, of aviation accident investigation efforts. These 
problems existed during NTSB investigations and in the 
reporting of the NTSB's findings. 
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Not all investigation efforts were equal. 
With the exception of airline accidents, unless 
investigations had high public awareness, the NTSB usually 
did not expend much manpower or resources to investigate 
the accident. Even in some airline accident cases, it was 
the investigations conducted in connection with litigation 
(the fault finding process) that produced what was later 
found tb be the "real" cause of the accident. 
The timeliness of NTSB reports was not acceptable. 
The public felt that the delay that takes place prior 
to the NTSB releasing their reports was unacceptable. 
The usefulness of NTSB reports was not acceptable. 
The public felt that the legal limitations that courts 
are placing on the uses and admissibility of NTSB reports 
was unacceptable. 
Conflicts existed between the technical and social 
aspects of investigations. 
The NTSB, in attempting to avoid the concept of 
"finding fault" during their investigation process, allowed 
the quality of finding factual reasons or "probable causes" 
for accidents to be compromised. The public allowed the 
federal government exclusive access to aviation accident 
sites and sole responsibility for investigating accidents. 
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With these privileges must also come the responsibility to 
meet the needs of the public when the investigation process 
is carried out. The needs of the public encompassed both 
technical (probable cause) and social (finding fault) 
aspects of accident investigation. 
Investigations did not meet social needs. 
Based on America's use of litigation to meet the 
social need for compensation to persons who suffered losses 
from accidents, the existing system of accident 
investigation, at the academic and government levels, did 
not meet the needs of society. 
For technical quality and social reasons, changes were 
needed. 
As society moves toward the twentieth century, air 
travel will increase and accidents will continue to happen. 
This will result in litigation to compensate the public for 
losses. Changes were needed in the accident investigation 
process to meet these needs. 
The government and academic conununity were not responding 
to the conflicts between the technical and social 
aspects of accident investigations nor the public's 
concern over these issues. 
The review of the literature and other activities 
confirmed the existence of the findings previously 
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mentioned. These findings confirmed the existence of 
conflicts and that these conflicts were affecting the 
quality, validity, and content of accident reports. 
However, there did not seem to be any effort being made, by 
the government or academic community to change the system. 
Changes may be forthcoming. 
With the recent rash of airline accidents in 1994, the 
American public's eyes were turned toward their government 
and their voices were calling for stronger safety 
enforcement by the FAA. Also being called into question 
were some of the NTSB's accident investigation methods and 
policies. 
The concept of forming accident "survivor groups" 
after airline accidents seemed to be well developed. These 
groups, which individually represent several hundred 
people, were joining their voices into a stronger and more 
collective effort to bring about changes in the aviation 
accident investigation process. These groups receive much 
media attention which increases the public awareness of the 
complaints being made. When these citizens were joined by 
prominent members of the legal community who represent 
plaintiff's interests, the level of public attention become 
even higher. 
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These groups are calling for changes to the existing 
NTSB investigation system which was causing conflicts 
between the technical and social needs of the aviation 
accident investigation process. These groups are 
questioning the quality, validity, content, timeliness, and 
usefulness of th~ NTSB's accident investigation efforts. 
In the 1950s and the 1960s, public fear of and concern with 
airplane accidents resulted in major changes to aviation 
laws. Perhaps the accidents of the mid 1990s would also 
result in changes. 
Thurston (1995) emphasized the importance of accident 
investigation in his book, Design for Safety. He utilized 
accident reports and statistics for every technical point 
in his book and even dedicated his book to accident victims 
by saying, 
This book is dedicated to members of the aviation 
community who have contributed to accident 
statistics and records. The misfortunes of this 
unwilling group have pointed the way toward 
design and operational improvements benefiting 
all who fly now and in the years ahead. (p. iii) 
Aviation accident investigations and the data obtained 
from them continue to be an important part of aviation 
safety. The literature seemed to indicate that 
recognizing, understanding and solving the technical and 
social conflicts that existed in aviation accident 
investigations would be beneficial for society. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research was to identify, 
document, and analyze the conflicts that existed between 
the technical (probable cause) and social (finding fault) 
aspects of the aviation accident investigation process. 
In order to do this, it was necessary to review the 
history of aviation and its impact on American society. 
This included the public's concern about safety in air 
transportation. The roles that accidents and accident 
investigations had in the development of aviation were also 
important. Public interest in aviation safety was 
reflected by the laws, regulations, and government policies 
that were put into effect in response to the public demand 
for higher levels of safety over the years. Also 
considered was the aviation industry's and government's 
response to the public's concern with the aviation accident 
investigation process. 
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Of equal importance to the public was what rights they 
had to compensation when aviation accidents caused losses. 
Aeronautical activities presented new challenges to 
America's legal system as the technologies of flight 
presented questions that had never before been addressed by 
the courts. To understand the concepts of "property 
rights", compensation for losses, and "full access to 
justice", special attention needed to be given to legal 
literature associated with aeronautical activities. 
Academic institutions, military organizations, 
government agencies, and commercial businesses that 
operated schools or conducted courses on the art and 
science of Aviation Accident Investigation were contacted. 
Data from these individuals and organizations were 
collected and analyzed for course content, objectives, work 
techniques and administrative factors that might be of 
value to the research. 
To confirm the need for this research and as a form of 
a quality check of NTSB investigation efforts, some 
aviation accident reports were reviewed. Where possible, 
these reports were analyzed to compare the government's 
technical "probable cause" with the outcome of litigation 
efforts to "find fault." The technical and social 
conflicts within the aviation accident investigation 
process were observed. 
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To supplement the literature on these conflicts, 
correspondence and interviews were used to obtain comments 
from government agencies and law firms that dealt with 
aviation accidents. They were asked to comment on the 
research as it progressed, including being requested to 
make comments on the findings and recommendations. The 
comments and suggestions of these people were incorporated 
into the study. 
The research utilized a combination of historical, 
developmental, and descriptive research methods. The 
findings were analyzed from an ethnographic perspective to 
identify the technical and social conflicts that existed 
during the formation of aviation accident investigation 
philosophies, principles, and techniques. This data was 
then used to show how these conflicts were affecting the 
quality, validity, content, timeliness, and usefulness of 
the investigation process. 
The results of the study were utilized to make 
recommendations that might result in improvements to the 
aviation accident investigation system. For historical 
accuracy, the aviation data researched included material 
from the early days of aviation, the 1900s, to events that 
were taking place in 1995, approximately a 95 year period. 
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Preliminary Procedures 
Sources of historical data on aviation and the 
development of the aircraft accident investigation process 
were identified. Some of the facilities used for this 
study were libraries and other resource centers that held 
data on aviation related subjects. (See Appendix A.) 
A list of government, military and civilian 
organizations, including academic institutions, that once 
had, or did have at the time bf the study, programs or 
formal courses on the subject of Aviation Accident 
Investigation was developed. Schukert's, Collegiate 
Aviation Directory and the University Aviation 
Association's Collegiate Aviation Guide (Williamson), which 
contained the curriculums of over 450 academic 
organizations were principal reference sources. 
Also listed in Appendix A, were the names of aviation 
manufacturers, air transportation companies (airlines), 
aviation organizations, government agencies, and law firms 
that provided input to the research. 
While this study was limited to the US, data from 
other countries such as Australia, Canada, and England were 
included. These countries were thought to have well-
developed capabilities in the area of aviation accident 
investigation. This information was reviewed for 
historical and technical content. Information from !CAO 
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was also utilized to analyze the international aspects of 
aviation accident investigation. !CAO also had information 
on aviation accident investigation schools in 17 countries. 
Operational Procedures 
Executing the activities just mentioned was the first 
step in the operational phase of the research. Various 
government agencies, technical libraries, and aviation 
accident investigation schools were visited as shown in 
Appendix A. Literature from these sources was grouped in 
chronological order by topic. Meetings, correspondence, 
and telephone conversations were used to supplement the 
literature reviewed and to expand the study's content. 
Personal interviews also formed a network of resource 
contacts. 
Some of the people contacted were founders of aviation 
accident investigation schools and senior members of the 
International Society of Air Safety Investigators who had 
active roles in teaching and/or developing the curriculum 
for these schools. Current and former FAA and NTSB staff, 
who were active in the area of aviation accident 
investigation, were sought out for their comments and 
suggestions as the research progressed. (See Appendix A.) 
The aviation industry's response to the government's 
control of the aviation accident investigation process, and 
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the conflicts that developed between the technical and 
social needs of this activity were researched by reviewing 
the content of aviation trade journals and newspapers. 
Transcripts and reports on public speeches by persons 
within the aviation community were also reviewed. 
To document the public's interest in the aviation 
accident investigation process, a review of laws, 
regulations and policy manuals of government agencies was 
made. Material on aviation litigation, and comments from 
the legal community, were utilized to determine the 
existence of technical and social conflicts during the 
aviation accident investigation process. 
These social needs, or litigation aspects of aviation 
accidents, were identified by reviewing the content of 
legal publications as shown in Appendix A. The Lawyer 
Rilots Bar Association, the American Bar Association, and 
tµe American Trial Lawyers Association provided input for 
the identification of conflicts between the technical and 
social goals of aviation accident investigations. 
To supplement the information obtained from these 
sources, interviews were conducted with nationally 
recognized trial lawyers who specialized in aviation 
litigation and with the Chief Counsel of the FAA and NTSB 
as shown in Appendicies A and D. 
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Note taking, photocopying, and collecting course 
outlines and school catalogs were the foundation for some 
of the technical content of the study. The data was 
arranged in chronological order so that a common time line 
could be used to determine what influence each segment of 
the research might have had on some other aspect of the 
conflicts being studied. Using a combination of 
historical, developmental, and descriptive research 
techniques, data was analyzed from an ethnographic 
perspective. 
Research Design and Analysis 
The research was designed to identify, document, and 
analyze the conflicts that existed between the technical 
and social aspects of the aviation accident investigation 
process. 
Information on the history of aviation, and how 
accident investigation activities impacted upon the 
development of this industry and American society was 
analyzed. Data on schools that had taught or were still 
teaching courses on aviation accident investigation was 
included in the study. Input from active and retired FAA, 
NTSB, military and civilian accident investigators was also 
used. 
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An additional task was the comparison of several NTSB 
accident reports, both factual and probable cause, with the 
outcome of litigation connected with the accident, called 
finding fault. Personnel from government agencies and 
members of the legal community also furnished insight on 
the social aspects of the accident investigation system. 
Information from these sources was used to further 
document and analyze the technical and social conflicts 
that existed during the aviation accident investigation 
process. This activity supplemented the findings of the 
review of the literature. The research was designed to 
answer questions about the public's perception of the 
quality, validity, content, timeliness, and usefulness of 
aviation accident investigation efforts. The research 
results were then used to formulate recommendations that 
would improve on the value of the aviation accident 
investigation process. 
A combination of historical, developmental, and 
descriptive research methods were followed to conduct the 
research. An ethnographic technique was utilized to 
analyze the material. The findings of the study were 
presented in a descriptive format that included details of 
the elements which would contribute to the understanding of 
the problem being researched. These research methods and 
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techniques allowed the reader to comprehend the logic of 
the summary, conclusions, and recommendations of the study. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
The literature review and other activities conducted 
as part of this research identified .the conflicts that 
existed between the technical (probable cause) and social 
(finding fault) aspects of the aviation accident 
investigation process. After analysis of this data, it was 
apparent that these conflicts and other factors created 
quality problems within the American system of aviation 
accident investigation. These conflicts and problems were 
influencing the quality, validity, content, timeliness, and 
usefulness of aviation accident investigations. 
This situation was aggravated or magnified by the 
enactment of complex laws and the formation of government 
agencies which controlled every aspect of the aviation 
industry. These government actions had been taken over a 
75 year period in response to the public's request for 
government "protection from aviation activities." 
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From time to time, this request for protection had 
been more vocal by either the anti-aviation component of 
society, the providers of air transportation, or the users 
of the system. The government's response was an expected, 
normal, legitimate and necessary attempt to provide safety 
to both the users and non-users of air transportation, 
while at the same time providing some form of "fostering 
and promoting" of what was thought to be a nationally 
important industry (Truman). 
Findings and Discussion 
The review of the literature and other research 
activities can be summarized as follows: 
The interest in aviation has been long term. 
Written history and physical documentation over a 
period of several thousand years confirmed man's innate 
fascination with the concept of flight. In art, songs, 
literature and religion, flight had been an important part 
of man's conscious thoughts (Ward). In more recent times, 
flight has become an integral part of modern man's means of 
everyday existence. Flight, or transportation by air, has 
become an important part of society's need to move people 
and objects rapidly from point to point (Truman, Pena). 
The concept of a global economy had taken on a new meaning 
through the use of air transportation to move people and 
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goods rapidly to any location upon the earth, especially to 
locations that were not accessible by other means of 
transportation except air (Hall). 
As Taylor and Munsen stated in History of Flight, 
"Human flight is the supreme achievement of our 20th 
century" (p. 7). Today, as American taxpayers support 
travel into outer space, they are reconfirming their desire 
to travel further and faster (NASA). 
Aviation accidents have played a role in aviation's growth. 
From the first crashes of the Wright brothers and the 
death of Selfridge in 1908, accidents have played an 
important role in perfecting aviation. New designs, 
techniques of manufacturing, and the operation of a safe 
air transportation system have evolved from the 
investigation of accidents (Copeland, Thurston). Even the 
spectacular accident of the space shuttle Challenger had 
knowledge to give to the engineers of NASA as they 
continued to prepare for a future that will include the 
public's flight into space. 
Any undertaking as difficult and complex as flight 
must undergo a long period of experimentation prior to 
reaching an acceptable level of safety. Mishaps and 
accidents were therefore a natural part of aviation history 
and development (Walsh, Thurston). As is often said, 
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"experience is the best teacher." Unfortunately, 
"experience" gives the test prior to teaching the lesson to 
be learned. Only by documenting the causes of previous 
mishaps and accidents can the teachings of experience be 
put to beneficial use (Navy, 1957). 
In the case of aviation, the lessons of previous 
accident experiences were being used as a means of learning 
how to avoid the repetition of similar accidents. This was 
emphasized in Pope's 1992 article, "Learning from 
Accidents: It may keep you from having one", (pp. 17-19). 
The concept of using accident investigations for such a 
purpose was therefore both logical and necessary for the 
development of a safe air transportation system (Copeland). 
The public has a high concern about aviation safety. 
The history of aviation's impact on society and the 
government's impact on aviation and air safety, indicated 
the following pattern: first there was public disbelief, 
fear of the unknown and anti-change philosophies working 
against the development of aviation (Josephy). Soon, 
societies or organizations were formed to protect, promote 
and mildly regulate aviation during its formative years. 
One such organization was the Aero Club of America, founded 
in 1905, which actually issued "licenses" to aviators in an 
effort to promote safety (Robie, 1993). 
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In the early 1900s, cities, townships, and boroughs 
enacted laws to protect their citizens from "aviators." 
Individual community actions were then supplemented by a 
collage of state aviation laws (D. Hynes, 1995). New 
Jersey in 1913, Idaho in 1917, Texas in 1919, are examples 
states that took such actions. Lawmakers realized the 
mobility of aircraft required aviation regulation on a 
state wide scale rather than the narrow geographic approach 
being used by cities or towns (Forlow, et al). These laws 
were passed in response to demands by the non-flying public 
who wanted protection from this new, dangerous, and 
distrusted industry (R. Wright). 
By 1925, some 21 states had passed aviation laws, 
presenting aviators with conflicting rules during a single 
interstate flight (Forlow et al.). It was felt a much 
broader or national approach to aviation regulation was 
necessary. Thus the next step in the historical evolution 
of aviation regulation was enactment of laws on a national 
level to protect aviation from "the public" which were 
passing local laws which were often thought to be harmful 
to the development of aviation (Act of 1926). The need for 
laws on a national scale was the realization of the need 
for a wide geographic approach to aviation regulation. 
The operation of aircraft was also thought to be an 
important concept with great national value. Therefore, 
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aviation supporters felt that on the federal level a 
compromise could be reached between protecting the public 
from the aviation industry and fostering and promoting 
aviation development. National laws would also "protect" 
aviators from harsh anti-aviation laws that were being 
passed in many cities and states. 
The state aviation laws of the early 1900s reflected 
the public's expectation of government protection from 
unsafe aviation activities. The federal government 
responded to the public's concern by passing the "aviation 
laws" of 1926, 1938, 1956, 1967, and 1974. Air travel had 
become a common means of transportation. Almost every day, 
millions of people traveled billions of air miles, all in 
expectation of a safe journey. In 1995, the public still 
supported the strong regulation of aviation in hopes of the 
continued enjoyment of safe air travel (Pena, Hall). 
However, the public's perception of the government's 
role in aviation safety was in question. As Feldman 
pointed out in "On Zero Accidents, Safety and Loose Talk" 
(1995, pp. 70-71), the FAA and NTSB were seen as taking too 
much of a political role in aviation accident 
investigations at the expense of their rightful role of 
promoting safety by preventing accidents. 
The Federal Government controlled the accident 
investigation process. 
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Beginning with the first laws of 1926, civil aviation 
accidents began to be investigated by the federal 
government. However, these first investigators had no 
legal rights or power to conduct thorough investigations 
(Young). By passing new laws, the formation of the Air 
Safety Board in 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1940, 
the DOT/NTSB in 1967, and the independent NTSB in 1974, the 
government had acquired exclusive control of the 
investigation process and preempted all other parties from 
participating in the investigation of aviation accidents. 
This absolute control by the federal government, 
acting through the NTSB, has been challenged many times in 
various courts. Each time a court granted some relief from 
this government control, revisions to existing laws, or new 
laws were passed to restore full control back to the 
federal government. With the Sioux City court decision, 
new limits on the use of NTSB reports seemed to be created 
which further extended the exclusive rights of the federal 
government to investigate and report on aviation accidents. 
As Allen pointed out in, "View from Justice-The Independent 
Safety Board Act Amendments of 1990: Changing the Rules" 
(1990, pp. 4-9), the NTSB utilized routine legislative 
activities to enact major changes to the laws that 
protected the NTSB's activities. 
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In 1990, a bill to extend the financial authorization 
of the NTSB for the fiscal years 1991, 1992, and 1993, did 
"far more than merely re-fund the agency for the next three 
years. A far more significant provision of the bill for 
tort litigants is the amendment ... to clarify the Board's 
sole responsibility and authority for determining the 
conduct of post-accident tests, inspections and tear-
downs." Under these "new amendments parties seeking 
[access to information] will have a new statutory obstacle 
in their path" (Allan, p. 4). 
Accident investigation schools developed in a normal 
manner. 
Historical d~ta reflects a logical and natural 
formation of schools to teach the technical subject of 
aviation accident investigation. The development of 
schools that taught this subject were driven by government 
needs and funding. The need for this technical training 
resulted from a desire to prevent future aviation accidents 
by investigating past events (Young). 
The early 1950s Air Force school at Norton was soon 
followed by the Navy school at Monterey and the Army school 
at Ft. Rucker. USC, the contractor for the Air Force 
school, developed a civilian version of its program in the 
late 1950s. The CAB and FAA began operating their schools 
in the early 1960s and supported the formation of TSI, 
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which began to teach this subject to government agencies at 
Oklahoma City in the early 1970s. ICSE formed its 
"commercial" aircraft accident investigation school in the 
early 1970s after working with Arizona State University for 
several years. In 1992, ERAU was the latest entry into the 
group of ten US schools that were teaching aviation 
accident investigation courses in 1995. These schools are 
listed in Appendix C with notations on their availability 
to the general public. 
Technical requirements of investigations were well 
developed and met the public's needs. 
The research confirmed that changes in aviation 
technology had been incorporated into the teaching and 
conducting of accident investigations. The technical 
requirements of the aviation accident investigation process 
were well-known and well understood. The literature review 
showed that they were being taught by the academic 
community, government agencies, and others who were 
training accident investigators. 
Technology changes, such as jet engines and composite 
structures, were rapidly incorporated into teaching 
curriculums. Thus no problems seemed to exist in the 
technical requirements of the aviation accident 
investigation process, that is finding probable cause of 
accidents. Therefore the teaching and undertaking of 
aviation accident investigations was technically correct 
and acceptable, and was meeting the needs of the public. 
The quality of NTSB investigations and reports was not 
acceptable. 
The importance of aviation in society and the 
undisputed need for "the highest standard of care" when 
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providing air travel (14 CFR, Part 121) supported the need 
for high standards and ethics during the investigation 
process. The public was questioning the quality, validity, 
content, timeliness, and usefulness of aviation accident 
investigation efforts (Miller, Wolk). The research 
confirmed that serious quality problems existed in the 
NTSB's investigations and reporting of their findings. 
Proper documentation requires certain conditions to 
exist before the contents of a report can be of any value 
(Wheeler, 1971). As Key indicated in his text, Research 
Design (1993), documentation must be factually correct, it 
must be complete, it must be of sufficient quantity to 
yield trends, and it must be capable of easy retrieval. 
The literature review and other research activities 
indicated that, in the area of aviation accident 
investigation, these conditions--factually correct, 
complete, sufficient quantity, and easily retrieved--were 
below acceptable standards. When one considers the highly 
technical nature of aviation, the fact that the industry 
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was approximately 100 years old, and that it had been 
closely regulated for almost 70 years, the deficiencies of 
quality, validity, content, timeliness, and usefulness 
should not have been present. The research documented 
these shortcomings and then recommended actions that should 
be taken to correct them. 
The practice of official documents, reports, and forms 
being marked "none-found" in response to questions about 
malfunctions, when in fact, tests were not actually 
conducted on the parts or systems in question was a 
problem. Later inspections and tests, conducted by more 
motivated and supposedly neutral experts, often confirmed 
that malfunctions actually did take place (Kelly, 1993; 
Miller). This was a reflection on the lack of quality 
within NTSB activities and reports. 
Having the FAA conduct accident investigations on 
behalf of the NTSB was not conducive to obtaining full and 
candid information from the aviation community. FAA 
enforcement intentions were feared by all who came into 
contact with FAA employees who were wearing NTSB 
"investigator hats." As advised in The View from the Right 
Seat (M. J. Hynes, 1994), "If you are involved in any type 
of incident your order of priorities should be: #1 take 
care of your passengers, #2 take care of you and your crew, 
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#3 call the ... union ... , #4 call the company." (p. 1). The 
advice went on to emphasize staying away from the FAA. 
The NTSB has publicly testified before congress that 
the FAA has played too large of a role in past 
investigations. The need for FAA participation in the 
aviation accident investigation process needs to be 
reviewed and efforts should be made to reduce any role the 
FAA might have in the early stages of this activity. 
An additional deficiency was the NTSB's policy of 
granting "party status" to manufacturers to conduct parts 
of the investigation. If the NTSB routinely granted 
manufacturers and other aviation firms party status which 
gave them full access to NTSB information, did this not tip 
the scales of justice in favor of defendants vs. plaintiffs 
during litigation as Nader & Smith claimed? If the NTSB 
relied upon defendant airlines, manufacturers, and other 
aviation firms to conduct parts of the official factual 
investigation, and to conduct tests, did not the frequent 
opportunity for "cover-up and fraud" occur? (Heller) Many 
people, such as M.K. Hynes, Miller, Steenblik, and Wolk, 
were asking these questions. Perhaps the past practice of 
the aviation industry, and more importantly the government, 
to ignore or downplay these questions could no longer be 
tolerated. 
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Since the NTSB frequently used potential defendants to 
conduct important tests on products that might have had 
malfunctions, it would appear that the correctness of NTSB 
Factual Reports could be compromised. Plaintiffs were not 
only denied "equal access", at times they were denied "all 
access" to factual information obtained by the NTSB (Re. 
Sioux City). As far back as 1941, in HR Report No. 933, 
Investigating Air Accidents, the government took the 
position that, "disclosures [of information] by [airline or 
manufacturers] witnesses might serve to prejudice their 
positions [in future litigation] if this testimony was made 
public" (p. 2) . 
An important factor affecting the quality of the 
NTSB's investigation activities since it was formed in 1967 
was insufficient staffing. The NTSB started its operations 
with a very small CAB staff and immediately saw a much 
expanded work load. The NTSB assumed responsibilities for 
investigating accidents in five modes of transportation; 
air, water, rail, highway, and pipeline. Over the past 30 
years, the NTSB work load has expanded in both variety and 
quantity. During the same period there was a lack of NTSB 
organizational growth. When one considers the increase in 
NTSB's areas of responsibility, the size of the NTSB was 
too small. As pointed out in the March 31, 1995 issue of 
the General Aviation News & Flyer, "as of April 23, the 
National Transportation Safety Board is responsible for 
investigating accidents involving public-use aircraft." 
This would mean several hundred more investigations the 
NTSB would have to conduct each year. The industry was 
asking, "Will [the] NTSB be able to keep up with its new 
responsibilities" (p. 17). 
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In the 1960s, the CAB had 185 technical and clerical 
staff which formed the NTSB. In view of the growth of all 
forms of travel, particularly air, the need for additional 
NTSB staff was obvious. For example, the NTSB had only two 
"helicopter specialists" on their staff. Considering 
several hundred helicopter accidents occurred throughout 
the US each year, this staff could investigate only a small 
fraction of the accidents. Total NTSB field investigator 
staff was less than 60 persons (NTSB Budgets). 
The low staffing problem was not limited to accident 
investigators. According to its reports to congress, 
because of manpower shortages, the NTSB labs are only 
reviewing material from about 2% of all aviation accidents. 
Some experts, such as Wolk, Waldock and others, felt that 
this resulted in an under reporting of "material failure" 
as an accident causation and distorted the statistical data 
base on accidents. 
While it may not be economical for the NTSB to invest 
in high technology lab equipment, the NTSB could contract 
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out more inspection tasks. These inspections could be 
closely monitored by NTSB staff, and as often as possible, 
these tests should not be conducted by parties directly 
connected with the accident. More use of NASA technical 
personnel and facilities would assist the NTSB in 
maintaining a higher level of quality and reduce the 
potential for conflicting input from other sources. 
Not all investigative efforts were equal. 
Major airline accidents were investigated in a 
thorough and uniform manner. Commuter airline accidents 
received varying amounts of NTSB effort depending upon the 
political sensitivity of the public regarding the 
passengers who were on the aircraft when it crashed (M. K. 
Hynes in press). As McCarthy stated, the field 
investigations of commuter aircraft "frequently fail to 
uncover valuable safety information" ... and "neither 
public interest nor significant safety issues are initially 
apparent." (Steenblik, 1994, p. 35). 
The NTSB investigation of accidents by small aircraft 
were usually very limited. The NTSB effort averaged about 
$3,000 per investigation. With an annual average of 1,200 
lives lost in small airplane accidents each year, and less 
than 200 fatalities in airline operations, the need for 
thorough investigations of small aircraft crashes should 
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have high social value to reduce accidents. As Stewart, 
the President of the Canadian Society of Air Safety 
Investigators, pointed out, "According to ICAO, the purpose 
of accident investigation is the prevention of 
accidents ... there must be increased emphasis on developing 
a capability to 'investigate' the system and identify 
problems before they result in a loss" (p. 9). It would 
appear that a larger return on the taxpayers dollar spent 
by the "NTSB's investigation efforts" in safety would be 
gained by better investigations of small aircraft 
accidents. These investigations do not have to be as 
extensive as airline investigations but they do need to 
have the quality, validity, content, timeliness, and 
usefulness that the public is entitled to when it attempts 
to use these reports. 
The timeliness of NTSB reports was not acceptable. 
Failing to issue reports in a timely manner was also a 
problem that needed correction. When the time delay of the 
issuance of NTSB reports was added to the problems of 
missing data, and plaintiff's not having access to the full 
contents of reports, their attempt to undertake litigation 
was made much more difficult. 
It was usually just under 14 months from the time of 
the "smoking hole" to the time of the NTSB report on the 
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accident being made "public" (Schleede). In many issues of 
litigation a one or two year "statute of limitations" 
., 
existed between the date of the event and the last date for 
the filing of a legal action. This meant that litigation 
was often started before factual reports were made 
available to the public. This may explain the origin of 
some of the "unfounded legal claims" about which the 
aviation community was protesting (Flinn). 
Was it a matter of policy for the NTSB to delay the 
public release of their reports in a deliberate effort to 
harass plaintiffs? It was a matter of policy for the NTSB 
to discourage their investigators from cooperating in any 
manner with litigation efforts (Campbell). Investigators 
were to destroy their investigation notes after they sent 
their reports to Washington. 
In addition to the delay that normally precedes any 
litigation, it often takes three to five years for a case 
to "come to trial." With such a long time span between the 
investigation and the trial, it is normally not very 
helpful for parties to the litigation to be questioning the 
NTSB investigator about his several year old report. He 
had no notes, he couldn't remember much, and referring to 
the contents of the "public" NTSB report was usually the 
only basis for his testimony (M.K. Hynes in press). 
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For plaintiffs to hire experts to look for useful 
factual evidence after such a long period of time was very 
expensive and only added to the cost of litigation, 
something everyone seemed to be unhappy about, but not 
willing to resolve (Waldock). These policies, when 
combined with the factual errors and gaps in content of 
NTSB reports, seriously compromised the value of NTSB 
reports (Wolk). 
As proven by the response to the space shuttle 
Challenger accident, the government can act quickly, with 
significant resources, using industry help, and provide 
full disclosure of factual data, when the public demands 
this type of accident investigation activity. 
The usefulness of NTSB reports was not acceptable. 
As mentioned earlier, the federal government had full 
control over the aviation accident investigation system. 
This control excluded potential plaintiffs from the 
investigation process. When, during their fault finding 
efforts, plaintiffs were denied access to and/or the use of 
some of the NTSB factual reports, this resulted in 
expensive and sometimes unfounded litigation efforts. This 
type of litigation hurt plaintiffs and defendants alike. 
The Sioux City ruling has brought new interpretations to 
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the NTSB's powers and the admissibility of factual evidence 
during litigation. 
Using the courts to argue these issues case by case, 
is time consuming and expensive. It also results in 
conflicting admissibility practices from court to court. 
This in turn creates what is known as "forum shopping", 
where attorneys try to bring their cases to trial in courts 
that have previously ruled more favorably to a plaintiff. 
Forum shopping adds to the cost of litigation and detracts 
from the uniformity of justice. Only by clearing up the 
"exclusive right to data" and admissibility questions 
through legislative changes, can these problems be solved. 
Conflicts existed between the technical and social aspects 
of investigations. 
By avoiding the concept of "finding fault" during the 
investigation process, the quality of finding factual 
reasons or "probable causes" for accidents has been 
compromised. This has lead to problems in the quality of 
the investigation process. 
The public has allowed the federal government 
exclusive access to aviation accident sites, and sole 
responsibility for investigating accidents. With these 
privileges must also come government responsibility to meet 
the needs of the public when the aviation accident 
investigation process is carried out. The needs of the 
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public encompassed both technical (probable cause) and 
social (finding fault) aspects of accident investigation. 
The conflicts are serious and are resulting in quality 
problems during the investigating process. The American 
justice system gives every citizen a right to "their day in 
court" (Wagner). Because of these conflicts, as early as 
1984, attorney Wolk made an issue of this situation in 
"Point of Law: Products Liability-Aviation's Nemesis or 
Conscience (A Personal Opinion)" (p. 166). The research 
has indicated that the present accident investigation 
system is still not meeting this public expectation and 
right to justice as Wolk and others were pointing out in 
more recent years. 
Investigations did not meet social needs. 
Based on America's use of litigation to meet the 
social need for compensation to persons who suffered losses 
from aviation accidents, the existing system of aviation 
accident investigation, both at the academic level and at 
the government level, did not meet the needs of society. 
With limited access to accident sites, witnesses, and 
evidence, plaintiffs were at a distinct disadvantage when 
it came time to produce factual evidence in court (Wolk). 
With some recent rulings (Re. Sioux City) that prohibited 
some NTSB data from being used as evidence, plaintiffs were 
without a factual basis for their claims and thus denied 
their ~day in court" (Wagner). 
151 
The concept of torts--that is the courts awarding of 
compensation to offset losses--was deeply rooted in both 
European and American law (Madole). It was changes in the 
social thinking of the public that created the existing 
product liability laws. These changes cannot be ignored 
nor are they necessarily wrong. Society was obtaining what 
society wanted from its legal system (R. Wright). On what 
grounds did the aviation community seek government 
protection from the American justice system? (Wolk) 
More thought and attention should be given to what 
drives the growing frequency and high cost of aviation 
litigation. If public confidence in the quality and 
impartiality of aviation accident investigations was 
falling, disputes as to both probable cause and fault would 
be normal (Miller). Historically, the resolution of these 
disputes required correct, complete and timely reports on 
accidents before the legal system could be used to resolve 
these disputes (Madole, Wolk, Wagner). 
The government should respond to the needs of the 
public during the aviation accident litigation process. 
Who is the public? Is it the aviation community or the 
users of aviation or perhaps the anti-aviation 
constituency? (Campbell.) 
For technical quality and social reasons, changes were 
needed. 
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In 1994, the US air travel industry had its worst year 
for accidents since 1988. The scheduled airlines had 20 
accidents, four of which were major crashes that claimed 
239 lives over a period of less than five months. In 
January 1995, Transportation Secretary Pena called a 
special two day conference to address this problem. He 
challenged airline officials to "elevate margins of safety" 
and to undertake new efforts to reach a zero accident rate, 
which the public has come to expect (Phillips, 1995, p. 
2 6) • 
Pena should also challenge the parties that have a 
role in the accident investigation process. The teachers 
of aviation accident investigation techniques, the 
investigators themselves, the government agencies that 
control investigations, and the legal community that deal 
with this activity, all have a role in improving aviation 
safety. By recognizing the existence of conflicts within 
the system, and how these conflicts are affecting the 
quality of accident investigations, reports and litigation, 
the system can be improved to better serve the public. 
One way of improving the system would be to correct 
the lack of compatibility between the computers that stored 
the FAA and NTSB statistical data on accidents. Not only 
were these computers unable to exchange data, but the entry 
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codes of each system were different. To add to this 
problem, the policies followed by the FAA and the NTSB for 
assigning "key" words to blocks of data, both factual and 
as to "accident cause" were different (Houghton). The 
computer problem had been debated for at least 15 years, 
but for political reasons had never been corrected (M.K. 
Hynes, in press). 
Ari additional factor that was affecting the quality of 
NTSB investigations was the "human factors" side of the 
investigation process. This seemed to have been given 
little attention by the aviation community. The 
psychological stress of investigating one air tragedy after 
another, day after day, placed NTSB investigators under 
great personal strain (Kolstad). While not a part of the 
topic being researched by this study, this personal strain 
diminished the quality of the NTSB's work product and 
therefore was worthy of mention. Recommendations were made 
to address this problem in Chapter V. 
The government and academic community were not responding 
to the conflicts and need for change. 
The review of the literature and other activities 
confirmed the existence of the findings previously 
mentioned. However, there did not seem to be any effort 
being made, by the government or academic community, to 
change the present system (Vogt). 
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The question being researched by this work centered 
around the aviation accident investigation process. Under 
current laws, only a very narrow segment of society was 
being served by the accident investigation reports of the 
NTSB (Campbell). Even then, serious questions were being 
raised by Nader & Smith, Heller, Wolk, and others about the 
philosophies and quality of NTSB investigation activities. 
The social aspects of the investigation process were 
not acknowledged or addressed by either the academic 
community or government agencies that dealt with this 
important task (Miller). Historically, the question of 
fault, vs. the question of probable cause, had been 
recognized and debated for many years. (Miller, Lederer) 
However, the aviation industry supporters and technocrats 
seemed to have prevailed, and the concept of fault was not 
recognized or accepted by either the aviation community 
(Wolk), the FAA (Dillman) or the NTSB (Vogt, Campbell). 
In the last ten years the public has begun to demand 
recognition of fault, not as a priority, but at least on an 
equal footing with the technical concept of probable cause 
(Wolk, 1984). The concept of "torts" was still valid 
(Madole) in spite of the claim that America was preoccupied 
with litigation (Elias, et al.). According to Millar and 
Meyers, the fear of product liability losses had destroyed 
the general aviation industry. However, public safety is 
more important than any one firm's profits. As DOT 
Secretary Pena stated, "we will not settle for anything 
less than zero accidents" (quoted by Feldman, p. 70). 
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How other countries addressed the issue of litigation 
associated with aviation accidents was not of concern to 
Americans. America was founded upon freedoms and the right 
to justice through law (Wagner). American beliefs were 
that the government was supposed to protect citizens not 
oppress them. American citizens would not accept the many 
legal concepts of other nations in the areas of civil 
liberties, consumer rights, and economic freedoms (Nader & 
Smith). The American justice system might not be perfect, 
but it still seemed to be the best system in the world 
(Wagner). 
Some modern industrial countries, such as Japan, did 
not have consumer rights or product liability laws to 
protect its citizens from even obvious harms created by 
dangerous products or business actions. Other countries, 
especially in the Middle East, had religious or social 
systems that used the concept of "it's God's will" to 
explain all misfortunes and to preclude any interest in 
pursuing liability litigation. As found in the literature, 
some countries, such as Peru, were not always interested in 
assisting their citizens by investigating an aviation 
accident. 
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This was pointed out by Tompkins at the ABA Aviation 
and Space Law Conference held in Atlanta in 1991. He 
informed the group that the average "passenger liability 
settlement in the US" was almost $1.2 million per person 
while in countries other than Japan it averaged less than 
$200,000 per person. Even though Japan did not recognize 
"fault litigation" Japanese social concepts allowed its 
government to award citizens a little over $600,000 for 
each loss. Americans were not interested in adopting these 
approaches to the so called product liability litigation 
explosion being complained about by the aviation community. 
(Wagner). 
Changes may be forthcoming. 
Historically it was not always just a numbers game 
where majority ruled. The government had protected 
industries with national value in the past. American laws 
written for railroad development were well-known. The 
radio and TV industry had seen similar treatment. Many 
aviation laws were intended to be pro-aviation such as the 
Act of 1926 and the FAA Act of 1957. For 50 years, 
American presidents, such as Truman, Johnson, Carter, and 
Clinton continued to encourage this philosophy. 
By the mid 1990s, almost 30 years after the last major 
revision to national aviation laws, another generation of 
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voices, such as those of Millar and Meyers, were raised to 
obtain new, more favorable laws for the aviation industry. 
One request called for major revisions to the existing FAA 
engineering requirements for the design approval and 
production of new aircraft. This was accomplished in 1993 
by enacting revisions to 14 CFR Part 21 to provide for a 
simplified aircraft certification process, called "Sport 
Plane Certification." 
The second response was The General Aviation 
Reformation Act of 1993 which was defeated in congress but 
replaced by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 
1994. The major impact of this Act was the creation of a 
limit on manufacturers liability (Fitzpatrick, 1994, pp. 3-
5). The main sponsors were Congressman Glickman (D-KS) and 
Senator Kassebaum (R-KS). Not surprisingly, they both 
represented Wichita, KS, the "Small Airplane Capitol of the 
World" (Chamber of Commerce). The aviation industry's 
pleas for protection from overbearing consumer litigation 
was acted upon by the passage of this law. The 1994 
congressional elections resulted in major changes to the 
government's view toward industry. With this in mind, GAMA 
President Bruner said "GAMA's major legislative focus this 
year is the future of the FAA." He sees a "revitalization 
of the general aviation industry" possible by enacting 
additional FAA policies and regulations. (pp. 1, 11). 
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But what about the needs of the "public?" If history 
repeats itself, changes to the FAA and NTSB may be 
forthcoming. After the major airline crashes in the 1950s, 
the first FAA was created. After the major airline crashes 
in the 1960s, the DOT, with a new FAA and NTSB was created. 
As NTSB Chairman Hall stated on January 23, 1995, when 
opening the public hearing on the USAir flight 427 
accident, "The American public has been shocked in recent 
months by a series of catastrophic airline accidents." 
Will the shock of these airline crashes bring about new 
aviation laws in the mid 1990s? Will another cycle of 
changes be made in how the government conducted accident 
investigations? How should the government respond to the 
public's demand for additional air safety? Was the nation 
in the mood for changes to both the FAA and the NTSB? 
To add to the confusion and doubt as to what 
regulatory changes might actually take place, public 
displeasure with the philosophies of the FAA and the NTSB, 
and their work products, were beginning to come to the 
surface. As Naisbitt wrote in Megatrends (1982), when 
Americans began to see and hear frequent open discussion 
about a national problem, it was a warning of changes about 
to come. While displeasure with the FAA and NTSB had been 
expressed in some aviation circles for several years, 
because of the power of both the FAA and the NTSB over the 
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aviation industry, open discussion of this discontent was 
almost nonexistent within the aviation community for fear 
of reprisals. Thus, the public was not made aware of the 
problem. Beginning with M.K. Hynes in 1991, by early 1995, 
almost every few months a new challenge to the current 
FAA/NTSB safety system was being raised by various people, 
as was reflected in the writings of McCabe and Wolk. 
The review of the literature indicated that the 
potential for changes was indeed appearing upon the 
regulatory horizon of the air transportation system. 
During the course of this research, draft copies of Chapter 
V, "Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations," were sent 
to ALPA. Several of the concepts discussed in Chapter V 
were later presented by ALPA to the NTSB at the March 1994 
"Industry Symposium on Aviation Safety." An early draft of 
Chapter V was also given to the FAA, NTSB and several 
members of the ABA, ATLA, and LPBA for their review and 
comments. In January 1995, when Transportation Secretary 
Pena held the "Summit on Airline Safety," several of the 
recommendations contained in Chapter V were listed as 
industry goals. 
The research identified and documented the conflicts 
that existed between the technical (probable cause) and 
social (finding fault) aspects of the investigation 
process. It then showed how these conflicts were affecting 
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the quality, validity, contents, timeliness, and usefulness 
of aviation accident investigation activities. The 
research attempted to document these observations in an 
impartial manner for the purpose of open discussion. 
There is a need for both technical factual information 
which can determine probable cause and for factual evidence 
which would be helpful in answering the social question of 
finding fault. As society moves toward the twentieth 
century, air travel will increase and major airline 
accidents will continue to happen. Boeing predicts one 
major crash per week by the end of the century (UAA, 1995, 
p. 10). These accidents will be investigated and the 
results of investigations will be used during litigation 
undertaken in an effort to obtain compensation to the 
public for losses that result from accidents. 
Past courts have recognized the importance of the 
NTSB's work rules and have stated that these rules were 
"sound as far as the Board and its work are concerned", but 
that the needs of the NTSB had to be balanced against the 
governmental function of the administration of justice. 
Access to "justice" is a deeply rooted American belief. 
Justice denied by a government agency has been found to be 
intolerable in the past. Wolk, Wagner and others found 
this denial of justice intolerable. 
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Perhaps it was time to remember the Biblical words, 
"Kindness and truth shall meet; justice and peace shall 
kiss. Truth shall spring out of the earth, and justice 
shall look down from heaven." (Psalm 85, 11-12) Based on 
this research, it seemed as if the need for more kindness, 
truth, and justice during the aviation accident 
investigation process was at hand. The consideration and 
adoption of the recommendations presented in Chapter V, 
could fill these needs. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, and RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
This research was undertaken to identify, document and 
analyze the conflicts that existed between the technical 
(probable cause) and social (finding fault) aspects of the 
aviation accident investigation process. 
This might best be described as differences or 
conflicts between the technical reasons for accidents, 
which are referred to as the probable causes of an 
accident, and the social aspect of accident investigation 
which is usually undertaken through litigation, and is 
called finding fault. The research was designed to answer 
questions about the public's perception of the quality, 
validity, content, timeliness, and usefulness of aviation 
accident investigation efforts. 
The aviation accident investigation process has played 
a major role in the development of aviation safety within 
America's air transportation system. The information 
obtained during investigations would continue to be an 
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important element in preventing future accidents. The work 
product, or outcome of these investigations, would also 
continue to be a necessary element of litigation connected 
with an aviation accident. 
The research documented the technical requirements and 
social philosophies being taught and used when conducting 
aviation accident investigations. It compared FAA, NTSB, 
and aviation industry philosophies toward aviation accident 
investigation with the needs of the public for factual 
information regarding aviation accidents. 
The existence of conflicts and the need for change was 
confirmed by the research. The following questions were 
also discussed: How did these conflicts develop? Were 
these conflicts affecting the quality of the accident 
investigation process? Can changes to the investigation 
process resolve or reduce the conflicts and improve the 
system? What changes might be considered? Who was to make 
the changes? 
In order to complete the research, a combination of 
historical, developmental, and qualitative research methods 
were used. The information gained from the review of the 
literature was supplemented by personal contacts with the 
staffs of law firms, government agencies, academic 
institutions, and aviation organizations. Many of the 
people contacted were leaders in the field of aviation and 
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law, who had played key roles in the development of the 
accident investigation system. Personnel from government 
agencies and members of the legal community provided input 
on the social aspects of the investigation process. 
The data was then analyzed utilizing an ethnographic 
approach. As a result of the research, it was determined 
that the investigation process was tightly controlled by 
the federal government. During the past 20 years, major 
social changes had taken place within the American legal 
system. However, the existing philosophies and laws, as 
they addressed the aviation accident investigation process, 
had not been updated or modified to reflect these social 
changes. 
Summary 
Information was acquired and then documented as a 
result of reviewing the literature indicated in the 
bibliography and by making contacts with persons who had 
direct knowledge of the topic being studied. This material 
was then analyzed in the findings and discussion section of 
the research. The research confirmed the existence of 
conflicts between the technical (probable cause) and social 
(finding fault) aspects of the aviation accident 
investigation process. It also confirmed the public's 
perception of the lack of quality in the validity, content, 
timeliness, and usefulness of aviation accident 
investigation efforts. 
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Also documented were other aspects of the accident 
investigation system which contributed to the conflicts or 
were deficiencies in themselves. How these conflicts and 
deficiencies came about, and how they might be resolved 
were then addressed. Young had stated, "the assignment of 
[accident] causes as shown [in reports] are to a 
substantial extent premised upon opinion and conjecture" 
(p. ii). This approach to aviation safety was no longer 
practicable, prudent, acceptable or necessary. Copeland's 
message to Congress that "a thorough and searching inquiry 
should be made into the causes of the wreck ... for the 
prevention of accidents" (p. 1), was even more valid at the 
time of this study . 
. Despite Vogt's statement, "the accident scene belongs 
to us," (1993, p. 14), others had valid and legal rights to 
the factual information gained through NTSB investigations. 
As shown by this research, the current system of aviation 
accident investigation did not meet society's "social" need 
for factual data on accidents. 
Pena's message, that the US airline industry must 
abandon its mindset that "every once in a while we have an 
accident" (p.16), acknowledged that the public is demanding 
a higher level of safety. "[The January 1995] Washington 
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meeting made it clear that air travel within the US has 
become so accepted, sophisticated, and convenient, that 
passengers expect it--even demand it--to be virtually risk 
free" (AW&ST, Ed., January 23, 1995, p. 70). As Feldman 
asked in the April 1995 issue of Air Transport World, ~was 
this just loo~e talk by Pena and Hinson?" (p. 70) 
The research resulted in a comprehensive analysis of 
the system currently in use for aviation accident 
investigations. Readers were given insight into the social 
implications that aviation, and aviation accidents, have 
had on the American public. Also documented was the 
history of the technical and social impact that government 
control had over aviation while providing safety to the 
users of the air transportation system and other citizens 
who were being impacted by aviation. 
As R. Wright stated, one must accept ~a law in action 
concept". He emphasized that law was not a static 
collection of cases or regulations, ~Law is a fluid social 
activity that changes with time and society (p. x) ." 
Conclusions 
This research confirmed that conflicts did exist 
between the technical (probable cause) and social (finding 
fault)aspects of the aviation accident investigation 
process. It also confirmed that serious quality problems 
existed in the validity, content, timeliness, and 
usefulness of aviation accident investigation efforts. 
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Adopting the recommendations of this research would 
diminish these conflicts and improve the value of aviation 
accident investigations. Because of the existing 
regulatory structure of the investigation process, and the 
legal limitations on the use of NTSB work products, the 
adoption of these recommendations will require action by 
several different government agencies. The FAA, NTSB, 
Department of Justice, the Courts, and congress will have 
to adjust their philosophies toward the aviation accident 
investigation process. Such adjustments will only take 
place in response to public demands for change. 
It is up to the public, both air travelers and non-air 
travelers, the aviation industry, the government, and the 
legal community, to debate the issues identified by this 
research. If these parties share in the conclusion of the 
research, that is, that conflicts do exist between the 
technical (probable cause) and the social) (finding fault) 
aspects of aviation accident investigations, change must be 
forthcoming. 
With over 13.0 billion dollars in the Airways Trust 
Fund (Jennings, 1993, p. 65), there are ample funds 
available to undertake these recommendations. With 
thousands of under employed, or unemployed highly skilled 
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aviation personnel available to fill the recommended NTSB 
manpower increase, it appears that now is an opportune time 
for consideration and adoption of these recommendations. 
Recommendations 
Based upon the research, the following recommendations 
are presented for consideration by the public, the aviation 
industry, the FAA, NTSB, and other government agencies, and 
the legal community. 
The recommendations are: 
1. All of the parties that have an interest in 
aviation safety, and who are affected by the aviation 
accident investigation process, should join together to 
support an expansion of the NTSB. They should also support 
changes in laws and policies that limit the usefulness of 
present NTSB investigative efforts. Everyone must agree 
that all accident investigations deserve equal effort, that 
safety lessons can be learned from all accidents, and that 
accidents should not be considered as ~random events." 
2. The organizations that teach accident investigation 
techniques must consider both the technical and social 
aspects of the investigation process and incorporate these 
into their curriculums. Teaching material should address 
the potential for conflicts in the present investigation 
system and openly discuss this as part of the training of 
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investigators. Schools should also emphasize the need for 
high quality, ethical investigation techniques. 
3. Military, civil government, and private sector 
accident investigators must realize that society is now 
placing equal value on the technical and social aspects of 
the investigation process. Investigations should be 
undertaken with this public need in mind and should 
recognize the need to use high quality, ethical 
investigation techniques; 
4. Government, industry and private sector attorneys 
should recognize the existence of conflicts between the 
technical and social aspects of the accident investigation 
process and that these conflicts cause problems with the 
quality of NTSB efforts. The legal community should: 
a. demand a higher level of ethics during 
the investigation and reporting process; 
b. demand reasonable access by plaintiffs 
and defendants to accident sites and 
factual information during the NTSB 
investigation process; 
c. request input from all parties and allow 
NTSB reports to contain minority opinions 
as to conflicting factual evidence; 
d. allow public access to, and use of, all 
factual evidence obtained during NTSB 
investigations; 
5. The NTSB should: 
a. analyze and combine the FAA and NTSB 
accident report computerized data bases. 
This information should be of higher 
quality and stored in a single data base 
with more uniform retrieval capabilities; 
b. begin the collection and storage of 
"incident" and minor mishap data through 
a voluntary reporting system similar in 
nature to the NASA "Aviation Safety 
Reporting System" and programs in use in 
other countries; 
c. review of the outcome of litigation 
undertaken as a result of aviation 
accidents to determine if new factual 
evidence was discovered or errors in NTSB 
data were present .. New evidence or 
corrections should be added to the 
existing NTSB reports and aviation 
accident computerized data base; 
d. restrict the FAA's role in the 
investigation process as much as 
possible; 
e. diminish the role of manufacturers, 
suppliers and other potential defendants 
during the investigation process; 
f. issue reports on a timely basis. Except 
for major accidents, factual reports 
should be issued within 90 days. The 
Probable Cause Report should be issued 
within 60 days of the Factual Report; 
g. stop responding "none found" to questions 
that concern failures and other technical 
issues when no effort was made to find 
this data. The correct answer in such a 
case would be, "Not determined"; 
h. identify missing elements of reports. 
Reasons why information was missing 
should be given; 
i. require investigators to have experience 
in aviation technical subjects and one 
member of each team should have pilot 
experience; 
j. increase investigator staff. 
Investigations should have a minimum of 
two NTSB persons present at the accident 
site; 
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k. increase laboratory staff to conduct more 
tests of critical items and/or utilize 
contractors for testing. Test costs 
should be paid by the party requesting 
the test. The NTSB should be a neutral 
observer and resolver of testing 
technique conflicts; 
1. provide more training of investigators, 
including attendance at non-NTSB 
investigation schools. Training must be 
completed prior to a person acting as the 
NTSB Investigator in Charge. Provide 
continuing education of investigators, 
including non-NTSB courses; 
m. minimize the adverse psychological 
effects on NTSB investigators of constant 
work at the task of accident 
investigation. Provide training and 
counseling to NTSB investigators in this 
area. 
The aviation and legal communities, and the public, 
171 
should join together to debate these recommendations and 
then request that the changes they desire be implemented. 
High quality aviation accident investigations that result 
in valid, complete, timely, and useful aviation accident 
reports are reasonable expectations of the public. 
As a result of a rash of major air crashes in 1994 and 
early 1995, the public confidence in the American air 
transportation system had been lessened. Several times in 
the past, such events resulted in major changes in the 
manner in which the government regulated aviation. Again, 
a series of aviation accidents may be an indication of the 
need for change. 
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Making the recommended changes to the aviation 
accident investigation system would add to the safety of 
air transportation and restore the public's confidence in 
this mode of travel. Some of the 13.0 billion dollars in 
the Airway Trust Fund (Jennings) could be utilized to fund 
these changes at no cost to the taxpayers or the aviation 
industry. 
As it was written several thousand years ago in the 
Old Testament, "Make justice your aim: redress the wronged, 
hear the orphan's plea, defend the widow." (Isaiah I, 17) 
Such a profound obligation still holds true. The adoption 
of the suggested recommendations would help to accomplish 
this ancient but still valid request. 
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APPENDIX A 
DATA ON THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
Listed below are the names of some of the individuals 
and various organizations that were contacted and/or 
surveyed for the purpose of collecting data which could be 
used for this study. 
I. Personal Communications (selected sample of names): 
Abete, E.; aviation accident investigator; 08/01/92, 
Prescott, AZ. 
Alberico, D. Lt. Col. USAF; Director Air Force Safety 
Agency; 08/29/94, Kirtland, AFB, Albuquerque, NM. 
Allan, P. Esq.; private practice; 10/01/94, Dayton. 
Bahler, B.; NTSB Public Affairs Officer; 02/17/94, 
Washington, DC. 
Benson, M.; NTSB Public Affairs Officer; 02/17/94, 
Washington, DC. 
Bernard, J.; aviation accident investigator Bureau 
Enquetes Accidents (France); 08/06/92, Prescott, AZ. 
Bernstein, S.; aviation business owner; 03/03/94, 
Levelland, TX. 
Besco, Dr. R.; aviation accident investigator; 
10/10/94, Dallas. 
Block, M. Esq.; private practice; 10/10/93, Chicago. 
Brune, K. Esq.; private practice; 11/10/94, Tulsa, OK. 
Brunner, M.; Flt. 427 Family representative; 01/26/95, 
Pittsburgh. 
Campbell, D.; Esq. NTSB General Counsel; 02/17/94, 
Washington, DC. 
Carson, J.; Directory of Safety, AOPA; 08/01/92, 
Frederick, MD. 
Carter, D.; Director of Safety, HAI; 01/28/95, 
Washington, DC. 
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I. Personal Conununications: (continued) ... 
Chesterfield, B.; Manager Aviation Safety Division, 
TSI; 04/04/93, Oklahoma City. 
Chu, M.; President, Brantly Helicopter, Inc.; 
02/13/95, Vernon, TX. 
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Ciavanelli, T.; Instructor, Aviation Safety Programs, 
Navy Post Graduate School; 04/04/92, Montery, CA. 
Cochran, G.; Director of Safety, Omni Flight; 
08/01/92, Prescott, AZ. 
Collins, J. Esq.; private practice; 10/20/94, San 
Francisco. 
Conyers, R.; aviation accident investigator, 
Associated Aviation Underwriters; Prescott, AZ. 
Couch, T.; Special Projects, FAA; 10/04/94, 
Washington, DC. 
Culliton, J. Esq.; private practice; 10/17/94, 
Sacramento. 
David, J. Col.; Director of Flight Safety, National 
Defense; 04/04/92, Seattle, WA. 
Del Gandio; Manager, Reconunendations and Quality 
Assurance Division, FAA; 02/02/95, Washington, DC. 
Dillman, J.; FAA Asst. Chief Counsel; 02/17/94, 
Washington, DC. 
Dollar, J. Esq.; private practice; 10/10/94, Monroe. 
Dougherty, S.; aviation accident investigator, NTSB; 
09/09/94, Washington, DC. 
Dudenhefer, F. Esq.; private practice; 10/10/92, New 
Orleans. 
Edwards, B.; Dir. Aviation Programs, Southeastern 
Oklahoma State University; 09/03/93, Durant, OK. 
Ferguson, H. Esq.; private practice; 10/12/94, Corpus 
Christi. 
Fleming, V. Esq.; private practice; 05/29/91, Little 
Rock. 
Gassaway, O.; aviation business owner; 03/03/94, 
Lantana, FL. 
Gillaspie, B.; Director of Safety, PHI; 09/09/92, 
Lafayette, LA. 
Goodrich, M. Esq.; private practice; 10/10/93, Reno. 
Granite, F. Esq.; private practice; 01/20/95, New 
York. 
Grant, R. Esq.; private practice; 02/20/94, San Deigo. 
Gross, R.J.; aviation accident investigator, former 
NTSB; 07/28/92, Frederick, OK. 
Hartsell, Dr. H.; Dir. Technical Education, Western 
Oklahoma State College; 11/11/93, Altus, OK. 
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I. Personal Communications: (continued) ... 
Harvey, D.; aviation accident investigator; 01/28/95, 
Dallas. 
Haueter, T.; Chief Aviation Investigator, NTSB; 
02/17/94, Washington, DC. 
Heater, H. Esq.; private practice; 03/03/93, San 
Deigo. 
Heller, J.; Author, news editor, St. Petersburg Times; 
10/27/93, Tampa. 
Hillmer, R. Lt. Col; Director of Safety Education, 
USAF; 08/25/92, Norton AFB, CA. 
Hinton, T.; Director, Investigations, Transportation 
Safety Board of Canada; 08/15/92, Ottawa. 
Holliday, D.; aviation accident investigator; 
10/19/93, San Diego. 
Houghton, S.; aviation accident investigator, former 
FAA; 07/10/93, Oklahoma City. 
Howland, B. Esq.; private practice; 01/20/93, 
Louisville. 
Huffman, D. Capt.; United Parcel Service; 04/15/95, 
Oklahoma City. 
Huggins, P.; aviation accident investigator, ALPA; 
11/15/93, Herndon, VA. 
Hunt, D. Dr.; ERAU professor, aviation accident 
investigator; 08/06/92, Prescott, AZ. 
Hurt, H.; aviation accident investigator; 10/19/93, 
West Covina, CA. 
Hynes, D. 1st Lt. USAF; pilot; 03/20/95, Langley, AFB, 
VA. 
Hynes, K.; aviation business owner; 03/23/95, Wichita 
Falls, TX. 
Hynes, M. J.; airline pilot, Continental Airlines; 
03/20/95, Houston, TX. 
Jackalus, P.; aviation accident investigator; 
03/04/95; San Diego. 
Janison, J.; Data Analyst NTSB; 08/01/92, Prescott, 
AZ. 
Johannesen, R.; aviation accident investigator, DEA; 
10/10/92, Washington, DC. 
Johnson, J. Capt. USAF; attorney; 06/02/94, 
Washington, DC. 
Key, J. Dr.; Professor, OSU; 10/10/93, Stillwater, OK. 
Keerfoot, L.; accident investigator; 02/26/94, 
Washington, DC. 
Kennedy, D. Dr.; accident investigator; Boulder, CO. 
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Kinkle, K.; Air Force Safety Agency staff; 11/09/93, 
Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque, NM. 
Knisley, B.; aviation manufacturer; 03/12/95, 
Sacramento. 
Koan, N.; Chairperson, National Air Safety Cormnittee, 
Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIF; Rio. 
Lane, A.; Supervisor, Pilot Ground Training, Bell 
Helicopter, Textron; 01/19/95, Ft. Worth. 
Layton, D.; aircraft accident investigator; 11/09/94, 
Menlo Park, CA. 
Lederer, J.; aviation accident investigator, former 
CAB; 11/11/93, New York. 
Lesser, N.; Safety Information Staff, FAA; 02/17/94, 
Washington, DC. 
Lessin, M. Esq,; private practice; 04/10/93, 
Philadelphia. 
Logan, T.; Manager, Flight Safety, Northwest Airlines; 
09/09/92, St. Paul, MN. 
Luke, L.; aviation accident investigator; 08/01/93, 
Lancaster, TX. 
Martineau-Comeau, T.; ICAO; 09/12/92, Montreal. 
Mass, C. Col. USAF; Deputy Director of Aerospace 
Safety; 02/03/93, Norton, CA. 
Melodia, J.; private investigator; 11/01/93, Menlo 
Park, CA 
Meninger, W. Capt.; Chief Safety Branch, USCG; 
08/01/92, Prescott, AZ. 
Miller, C.; aviation accident investigator, former 
CAB; 08/06/92, Phoenix. 
Mills, R.; Air Safety Investigator, NTSB; 02/17/94, 
Wasington, DC. 
Minter., B.; Director of Aviation Programs, ERAU; 
06/10/93, Daytona Beach. 
Murphy, T. Capt.; Air Lingus; 03/20/94, Dublin. 
Murray, R. Dr.; aviation accident investigator; 
06/06/93, Norman, OK. 
Norman, J. Esq.; private practice; 12/12/94, Oklahoma 
City. 
O'Brien, P.; aviation accident investigator; 02/02/95, 
Stratford, CN. 
Pangia, M. Esq.; private practice; 10/26/94, 
. Washington, DC. 
Parker, W. George.; former instructor aviation 
accident investigator school, USN; 10/19/93, 
Monterey, CA. 
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Patterson, R. Capt.; Executive Assistant; 
International Society of Air Safety Investigators; 
03/03/94, Sterling, VA. 
Plevin, F. Esq.; private practice; 03/12/95, San 
Diego. 
Pool, R. Lt. Col. USAF; Contractor Administrator; 
11/09/93, Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque. 
O'Reilly, T. Esq.; private practice; 10/20/94, Menlo 
Park, CA. 
Robertson, H.; President, Robertson, Inc.; 08/23/92, 
Phoenix. 
Robinson, D. Esq.; NTSB practice; 11/08/93, 
Washington, DC. 
Robinson, F.; President, Robinson Helicopter, Inc.; 
01/28/95, Las Vegas. 
Robinson, G.; accident investigator; 04/04/92, 
Tequesta, FL. 
Rodriguez, C. Esq.; private practice; 03/03/92, Corpus 
Christie. 
Schleede, R.; NTSB aviation accident investigator; 
02/17/94, Washington, DC. 
Schweibold, J.; aviation accident investigator; 
Pottsboro, IN. 
Schram, B.J.; aircraft manufacturer; 04/04/93, Tempe, 
AZ. 
Smith, D. Esq.; private practice; 06/06/94, Dallas. 
Snapp, R. Lt. Col. USAF; 11/09/93, Kirtland AFB, 
Albuquerque. 
Specter, H. Esq.; private practice; 01/28/94, 
Pittsburgh. 
Steel, R. Esq.; private practice; 01/22/95, Grand 
Isle, NB. 
Steigch, S. Esq.; private practice; 04/08/94, New 
York. 
Stbpher, E. Esq.; private practice; 05/05/90, 
Louisville. 
Strauch, B. Dr.; NTSB aviation accident investigator; 
07/25/93, Washington, DC. 
Taff, C.; aviation business owner; 01/10/93, Bethany, 
OK. 
Taylor, F.; Director, Aviation Accident Investigation 
Training, Cranfield College of Aeronautics; 
08/31/92, Bedford, UK. 
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Taylor, G. Esq.; TSI aviation accident school 
instructor, private practice; 06/26/92, Oklahoma 
City. 
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Tilson, J.; President, ICSE, Simula, Inc.; 10/28/93, 
Tucson. 
Tomlin, T. Esq.; private practice; 10/17/94, 
Sacramento. 
Tompkins, G. Esq.; private practice; 05/29/92, New 
York. 
Topham, T. Esq.; private practice; 10/10/94, San 
Antonio. 
Turek, K. Esq.; private practice; 01/20/95, San Deigo. 
Vogt, C. Esq.; Chairman, NTSB; 06/02/94, Washington, 
DC. 
Wadell, W.; NTSB Aviation accident investigator; 
06/06/94, Dallas. 
Wagner, B. Esq.; private practice; 02/16/94, Tampa. 
Welch, B.; aviation accident investiator; 01/11/94, 
Jackson, MS. 
Waldock, B.; ERAU professor, aviation accident 
investigator; 08/06/92, Prescott, AZ. 
Williamson, R.; aviation accident investigator; 
03/03/93, Paducah, KY. 
Wolk, A. Esq.; private practice; 02/14/94, 
Philadelphia. 
Yarme, B.; Instructor, Simflite; 02/10/95, Dallas. 
II. Government Agencies: 21 organizations surveyed. 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
Civil Aeronautic Authority, Australia 
Civil Aeronautic Authority, Canada 
Civil Aeronautic Authority, United Kingdom 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Commerce 
Department of Energy (DOE) 
Department of Interior 
Department of Transportation (DOT) 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
National Air and Space Administration (NASA) 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
APPENDIX A (continued) ... 
II. Government Agencies: (continued) ... 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) 
United States Customs and Immigration 
United States Forest Service (USFS) 
United States Postal Service (USPS) 
Only three government agencies had aviation 
accident investigation schools, none were 
open to the public. The agencies were: 
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National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC. 
Federal Aviation Administration (DOT), Oklahoma City. 
Transportation Safety Institute (TSI), Oklahoma City. 
III. Military services: 12 organizations surveyed. 
Oklahoma National Guard 
United States Air Force 
United States Air Force Civil Air Patrol 
United States Air Force Reserve 
United States Army 
United States Army Reserve 
United States Coast Guard 
United States Coast Guard Reserve 
United States Marine Corps 
United States Marine Corps Reserve 
United States Navy 
United States Navy Reserve 
Only three military organizations had schools, 
none were open to the general public. The 
three schools were: 
US Air Force, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM 
US Army, Ft. Rucker, AL 
US Navy, Monterey, CA 
IV. Aviation/Professional: 32 organizations surveyed. 
Aerospace Industries Association of America, 
Washington, DC. 
Airborne Law Enforcement Association, Van Nuys, CA. 
Aircraft Builders Council, Inc., New York. 
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Frederick, MD. 
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IV. Aviation/professional organizations: (continued) ... 
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), Herndon, VA. 
Air Transport Association of America, Washington, DC. 
Allied Pilots Association, Washington, DC. 
American Association of Airport Executives, 
Alexandria, VA. 
American Bar Association (ABA), Washington, DC. 
American Helicopter Society, Alexandria, VA. 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 
Washington, DC. 
American Trial Lawyers Association, Washington, DC. 
Aviation Distributors and Manufacturers Association, 
· Philadelphia. 
Experimental Aircraft Association, Oshkosh, WI. 
Flight Safety Foundation, Arlington, VA. 
General Aviation Manufacturers Association, 
Washington, DC. 
Helicopter Association International, Alexandria, VA. 
Helicopter Club of America, Dumfries, VA. 
Independent Association of Contintental Pilots, 
Houston. 
International Society Air Safety Investigators 
(ISASI), Sterling, VA. 
Lawyer Pilots Bar Association, Washington, DC. 
National Aeronautic Association, Arlington, VA. 
National Association of Flight Instructors, Dublin, 
OH. 
National Business Aircraft Association, Washington, 
DC. 
The Ninety-Nines, Oklahoma City. 
Popular Rotorcraft Association, Clinton, LA. 
Royal Aeronautical Society, London. 
Soaring Society of America, Hobbs, NM. 
Society of Automotive Engineers, Warrendale, PA. 
Sport Aircraft Manufacturers Association, Tempe, AZ. 
Twirly Birds, Oxon Hill, MD. 
United States Ultralight Association, Frederick, MD. 
Only one organization had an aviation accident 
investigation school and it was not open to 
the general public. It was the 
Air Line Pilots Association, Herndon, VA 
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V. Commercial Air carriers: 113 organizations surveyed. 
Airlift International 
Air Atlanta 
Air Logistics 
Air Midwest 
Air New England 
Air Wisconsin 
Air North 
Alaska Airlines 
Allegheny Commuter 
Aloha Island Air 
Aloha Airlines 
Altair 
American Airlines and four American Eagle commuters 
Atlantic Coast Airlines 
Atlantic Southeast Airlines 
Aspen Airways 
Braniff Airlines 
Business Express 
CCAir 
Comair 
Continental Airlines and three Continental commuters 
Cascade 
Capitol 
Crescent. Airways 
Crown/Dorado 
Delta Air Lines and two Delta Connection commuters 
DHL 
Eastern Airlines 
Energy Helicopters 
Expre~s Airlines 1 
Freedom 
Federal Express (FedX) 
Frontier Airlines 
-Golden Isle Airlines 
Golden West 
Hawaiian Air Lines 
Houston Helicopters 
Imperial 
Island Helicopters 
Jetstream 
Los Angeles 
Mark Air 
Mesaba 
Metro (SA! and SUN) 
Modern 
National Airlines 
APPENDIX A (continued) ... 
V. Commercial Air carriers (continued) ... 
New York Air 
New York Airways 
New York Helicopter Airlines 
North Central (Republc) 
Northwest and two Northwest commuters 
Northeast (DAL) 
Overseas National Airways 
Ozark (TWA) 
Pan American Airways 
Pana gr a 
Pennsylvania Air 
Petroleum Helicopters 
Piedmont 
Pioneer 
Pocono 
People Express 
Precision 
Presidential Airways 
Prinair 
Punkin Air 
Reeve 
Republic (NWA) 
Rocky Mountain Helicopters 
Ross 
Roya le 
Saturn (TAA) 
San Francisco 
San Juan 
Simmons 
Sky Airlines 
South Central Airlines 
Southern (Republic) 
Southwest 
StatesWest 
Sun Airlines 
Sunaire Express 
Trans America 
TACA 
TAG 
Trans Caribbean (AAL) 
Trans tar 
Trans States 
Trans World Airlines and Trans World Express 
United Air Lines 
United Parcel Service (UPS) 
Universal 
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V. Commercial Air carriers (continued) ... 
USAir and four USAir Shuttle airlines 
US Postal Service 
Wien Alaska 
WestAir Commuter 
Western (Delta) 
Wright 
Universal 
Zenith (BWA) 
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No commercial air carrier had an aviation accident 
investigation school. 
VI. Manufacturers: 55 organizations surveyed. 
Aerospatiale, Inc., Grand Prairie, TX 
Agusta Aerospace Corp., Philadelphia 
Air Tractor, Inc., Olney, TX 
Allied Signal Aerospace, Torrance, CA 
Allison Engine, Co., Indianapolis 
Astra Jet Corp., Princeton, NJ 
Avtek Corp., Camarillo, CA 
Ayres Corp., Albany, GA 
Beech Aircraft Corp., Wichita 
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Ft. Worth 
The Boeing Co., Seattle 
Brantly Helicopter Industries Ltd., Vernon, TX 
Ken Brock Manufacturing, Stanton, CA 
Cessna Aircraft Co., Wichita 
Collins General Aviation Division, Cedar Rapids, IA 
Commander Aircraft Co., Oklahoma City 
Convair 
Curtiss-Wright Corp., Lyndhurst, NJ 
Douglas Aircraft Co., St. Louis 
EDO Corp., College Point, NY 
Enstrom Helicopter Corp., Menominee, MI 
Fairchild Aircraft, San Antonio 
Falcon Jet Corp., Paramus, NJ 
Farrington Aircraft, Paducah, KY 
GE Aircraft Engines, Fairfiled, CT 
General Dynamics Corp., Ft. Worth 
Gulf Stream Aerospace, Savannah, GA 
Hamilton Standard, Windsor Locks, CT 
Hughes Aircraft Co., Los Angeles 
Jetstream, Inc., Sterling, VA 
Kaman Aerospace Corp., Bloomfield, CT 
APPENDIX A (continued) ... 
VI. Manufacturers: (continued) ... 
Knisley Manufacturing, Loma, CA 
Lake Aircraft, Inc. Gilford, NH 
Lear Jet, Inc., Wichita 
Lockheed Corp., Calabasas, CA 
Maule Air, Inc., Moultrie, GA 
McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, St. Louis 
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., Mesa, AZ 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., New York 
Mooney Aircraft Corp., Kerrville, TX 
Northrop Corp., Los Angeles 
Parker Hannifin Corp., Cleveland 
Piaggio Aviation, Inc. Wichita 
Piasecki Aircraft Corp., Essington, PA 
Piper Aircraft Corp., Vero Beach, FL 
Pratt & Whitney, Hartford, CT 
Robinson Helicopter Co., Torrance, CA 
Saberliner Corp., Chesterfield, MO 
Schweizer Aircraft Corp., Elmira, NY 
Sikorsky Aircraft, Stratford, CT 
Snow Aviation Intl., Inc., Columbus, OH 
Spitfire Helicopter Co. Ltd., Media, PA 
Swearingen Aircraft, Inc., San Antonio 
Teledyne Continental Motors, Mobile 
Textron Lycoming, Williamsport, PA 
None had aviation accident investigation schools. 
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VI. Academic Institutions: Approximately 450 institutions 
were surveyed utilizing Schulert's The Collegiate 
Aviation Directory and the Collegiate Aviation 
Guide (Willimason). Contacts were made with all of 
the institutions that listed any course offerings 
on aviation accident investigation. 
Three institutions had offered an aviation accident 
investigation course. They were: 
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, Prescott, AZ 
University of Arizona, Phoenix, AZ (discontinued) 
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VII. Commercial firms or organizations: 5 firms surveyed. 
Flight Safety International, New York 
International Center for Safety Education, Phoenix 
Simcom, Inc., Orlando, FL 
Simuflight, Division of Southern Air, Ft. Worth 
Systems Safety, Inc. Prescott, AZ 
Only one firm had an aviation accident investigation 
school. It was the: 
International Center for Safety Education, Phoenix, AZ 
VIII. Libraries: 27 libraries were visited as part of 
the research data gathering process. They were: 
Aviation History Center Library, San Deigo 
Civil Aeromedical Institute (FAA), Oklahoma City 
Clarence E. Page Aviation Library, Oklahoma City 
Dulaney Browne Law Library, Oklahoma City University 
East Central State University, Ada, OK 
Embry Riddle Aeronautical Institute, Daytona Beach, FL 
Embry Riddle Aeronautical Institute, Prescot, AZ 
Enoch Pratt Library, Baltimore, MD 
Federal Aviation Administration, Washington 
Federal Aviation Administration, Oklahoma City 
International Society of Air Safety Investigators, 
Sterling, VA 
Library of Congress, Washington 
National Air & Space Museum, Washington 
National Transportation Safety Board, Washington 
New Orleans City Library 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 
University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 
San Diego City Library 
San Francisco City Library 
University of Texas at Dallas 
US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO 
US Air Force, Brooks AFB, San Antonio 
US Air Force, Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque 
US Air Force, Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton 
US Army Safety Center, Ft. Rucker, AL 
Western Oklahoma State College, Altus 
Western Reserve Law School Library, San Diego 
209 
APPENDIX A (continued) ... 
XI. Legal and aviation publications: 57 publications 
were utilized for this research; 35 are listed in 
the Bibliography and the following 22 publications 
were also reviewed: 
ABA Journal (American Bar Association) 
Aeronautical Journal, Royal Aeronautical Society 
Aerospace Engineering (Society Automotive Engineering) 
Air Classics 
Air Progress 
Airbeat (Airborne Law Enforcement Association) 
Airline Executive 
Armada 
Aviation Law Newsletter 
Defense Helicopter World 
Expert & The Law 
Flying 
Helicopter World 
Journal of the American Helicopter Society 
Lawyers Weekly 
Plane & Pilot 
Private Pilot 
Professional Pilot 
Rotors (Helicopter Association International) 
Rotor & Wing International 
Trial (American Trial Lawyers Association) 
Trial Lawyer 
Vertiflite (American Helicopter Society) 
APPENDIX B 
DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
The following definitions and abbreviations apply to 
this study: 
ABA, American Bar Association, Chicago. 
Accident, an occurrence associated with the operation of an 
aircraft which takes place between the time any person 
boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and 
all such persons have disembarked, and in which any 
person (occupant or non-occupant) suffers a fatal or 
serious injury or the aircraft receives substantial 
damage (49 CFR 830.2). 
AFB, Air Force Base (US Air Force). 
AIA, Aerospace Industries Association of America, 
Washington, DC. 
ALPA, Air Line Pilots Association, Washington, DC. 
AMS!, Aerospace Management .Services Inc., Washington, DC. 
AOPA, Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association, Frederick, MD. 
ASB, Air Safety Board (Civil Aeronautics Administration). 
ATLA, American Trial Lawyers Association, Washington, DC. 
AW&ST, Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine, NY: 
McGraw Hill. 
BOAC, British Overseas Airways, Corporation, London. 
Boeing, The Boeing Co., Seattle. 
Bureau Enquetes Accidents, French equivalent of the NTSB. 
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CAA, Civil Aeronautics Administration 1926. 
CAA, Civil Aeronautics Authority 1938. 
Cause~ something that precedes and brings about an effect 
or a result. 
CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board (Act of 1938). 
CEO, Chief Operating Officer. 
CFR, Crash-Fire-Rescue services at airports. 
CFR, Code of Federal Regulations, USA. 
CPT, Civilian Pilot Training (Act of 1938). 
DEA, Drug Enforcement Agency. 
Defendant, the party against which legal action is taken. 
Designated Party, special status given by the NTSB to 
persons during an accident investigation. 
DOC, Department of Commerce. 
DOT, Department of Transportation, Washington, DC. 
EIR, Enforcement Investigative Report (by the FAA). 
ERAU, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, 
FL and Prescott, AZ. 
Enthographic research, a long term, multi-disciplined 
technique for the study of social and technical 
factors which affect history. 
Exposure data, information that indicates the amount of 
opportunity for an event to occur. Cycles, distance, 
and time, for passengers or vehicles, are the 
principal exposure types. They are used in the 
denominators of rates, such as fatalities per 
passenger departure or electrical system failures per 
aircraft hour. 
FAA, Federal Aviation Administration (1967 to date); the 
DOT Act of 1966, PL 89-670, 49 USC Sec. 1651). 
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FAA, Federal Aviation Agency (1958 to 1967); the FAA Act of 
1957, PL 85-726, 49 USC Section 1301). 
FA!, Federation Aeronautique International, Paris, France. 
Fatal injury, any injury which results in death within 30 
days of the accident (49 CFR 830.2). 
Fault, the party or parties responsible for the cause. 
FDR, Flight Data Recorder. 
Flying machines, name given to early aircraft, pre 1930s. 
FSF, Flight Safety Foundation, Arlington, VA. 
GAMA, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, 
Washington, DC. 
General Aviation, the non-airline, non-military segment of 
the aviation industry (usually small aircraft). 
GI, Veterans from World War II or subsequent wars. 
HR, House of Representatives, US Congress. 
!CAO, International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, 
Canada. 
!CSE, International Center for Safety Education, Phoenix. 
!IC, Investigator In Charge, the NTSB person responsible 
for the investigation and who usually grants 
designated party status to others during NTSB 
investigations. 
Incident, an occurrence other than an accident associated 
with the operation of an aircraft which affects or 
could affect the safety of operations (49 CFR 830.2). 
Investigator In Charge (!IC), the NTSB person responsible 
for the investigation and who usually grants 
designated party status to others during NTSB 
investigations. 
ISASI, International Society of Air Safety Investigators, 
Sterling, VA. 
APPENDIX B (continued) ... 
Jet age, the 1950s, when turbine (jet) engine airplanes 
become popular. 
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Level of safety (or risk, fatality or injury rates), only 
past levels of safety can be determined positively. 
Accident rates are closely associated with fatalities 
and injuries, and are acceptable measures of safety 
levels. Fatality, injury, and accident rates are 
benchmark safety indicators. Current and future 
safety levels must be estimated by other indicators or 
by past trends (NTSB). 
LPBA, Lawyer Pilots Bar Association, Cleveland. 
NAAIS, National Aircraft Accident Investigation School, 
Oklahoma City. 
NACA, National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. 
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
NBC, National Broadcasting Corp. 
NTSB, National Transportation Safety Board (1967 to 1974) 
The DOT Act of 1966, PL 89-670, 49 CFR Section 1651; 
(1974 to date) The Independent Safety Board Act of 
1974, PL 93-633, 49 USC Section 1901). 
PL, Public Law (Federal gov~rnment, USA). 
Plaintiff, the party which initiates a legal action. 
Probable cause, determined with a high degree of certainty 
(over 50%) as a cause of an accident. 
R&D, Research and development. 
RAeS, the Royal Aeronautical Society, London. 
Recip, reciprocating gas or diesel engines. 
Res ipsa loquitur, legal term, the thing speaks for itself. 
S, Senate, US Congress. 
APPENDIX B (continued) ... 
Safety factor, a procedure or event associated with 
fatalities, injuries, or accidents of their 
prevention. 
Safety indicator, a measurable safety factor. 
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Serious injury, any injury which requires hospitalization 
for more than 48 hours, results in a bone fracture, or 
involves internal organs or burns (49 CFR 830.2). 
SMU, Southern Methodist University, Dallas. 
Substantial damage, damage or failure which adversely 
affects the structural strength, performance, or 
flight characteristics of the aircraft, and which 
would normally require major repair or replacement of 
the affected component (49 CFR 830.2). 
Tort, an injury or wrongdoing against another. 
TSI, Transportation Safety Institute, Oklahoma City. 
UAA, University Aviation Assoication, Auburn, AL. 
UAL, United Air Lines, Inc., Denver. 
United, United Airlines, Inc., Denver. 
USAF, United States Air Force. 
USC, United States Code (US federal laws). 
USC, University of Southern California, Los Angeles. 
USFS, United States Forest Service. 
Wright Flyer, the name given to the first powered aircraft 
flown by the Wright Brothers. 
APPENDIX C 
AVIATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION SCHOOLS 
At the time of this research, there were ten 
organizations teaching aviation accident investigation 
courses in the United States. They were: 
a. three military organizations: 
the Air Force at Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque, 
the Navy Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 
the Army Safety Center, Ft. Rucker, AL; 
b. three federal government agencies: 
the FAA school at Oklahoma City, 
the NTSB school at Washington 
the TSI school at Oklahoma City; 
c. one private (not open to the public) organization: 
the Air Line Pilots Association, Herndon, VA; 
d. two academic institutions: 
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, 
Prescott, AZ 
the University of Southern California at Los 
Angles; 
e. one commercial firm: 
The International Center for Safety Education, 
Tucson, AZ. 
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APPENDIX D 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
As part of the research effort, interviews were 
conducted with over 125 individuals. As indicated in the 
research report, the comments from these persons may be 
influenced by their connection with the aviation industry 
and their interest in the topic of aviation accident 
investigation. A general summary of the professional 
interest of the persons interviewed is shown below: 
Aviation accident investigators: 46 persons 
General public: 20 persons 
Government personnel: 24 persons 
Lawyers: Defense 19 persons 
Government 5 persons 
Plaintiff 29 persons 
Manufacturers, etc. 16 persons 
The above numbers total more than the number of 
persons interviewed due to the fact that some persons had 
major personal interests in more than one professional 
area. 
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